Editing Millennials (section)

==Demographics==
===Asia===
{{See also|Aging of Japan|Aging of South Korea|l2=South Korea|Aging of China|l3=China}}
Chinese millennials are commonly called the [[post-80s]] and [[post-90s]] generations. At a 2015 conference in Shanghai organized by [[University of Southern California]]'s US–China Institute, millennials in China were examined and contrasted with American millennials. Findings included millennials' marriage, childbearing, and child raising preferences, life and career ambitions, and attitudes towards volunteerism and activism.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://china.usc.edu/video-millennialminds|title=Video: #MillennialMinds|date=2015|publisher=University of Southern California}}</ref> Due to the [[one-child policy]] introduced in the late 1970s, one-child households have become the norm in China, leading to rapid population aging, especially in the cities where the costs of living are much higher than in the countryside.<ref name="French-2020">{{Cite news|last=French|first=Howard|date=June 2020|title=China's Twilight Years|work=The Atlantic|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/chinas-twilight-years/480768/|access-date=13 August 2020}}</ref>

As a result of cultural ideals, government policy, and modern medicine, there has been severe gender imbalances in China and India. According to the United Nations, in 2018, there were 112 Chinese males aged 15 to 29 for every hundred females in that age group. That number in India was 111. China had a total of 34&nbsp;million excess males and India 37&nbsp;million, more than the entire population of Malaysia. Such a discrepancy fuels loneliness epidemics, human trafficking (from elsewhere in Asia, such as Cambodia and Vietnam), and prostitution, among other societal problems.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-reads/article/2142658/too-many-men-china-and-india-battle-consequences|title=Too many men: China and India battle with the consequences of gender imbalance|last1=Deyner|first1=Simon|date=24 April 2018|work=South China Morning Post|access-date=6 December 2019|last2=Gowen|first2=Annie}}</ref>

Singapore's birth rate has fallen below the replacement level of 2.1 since the 1980s before stabilizing by during the 2000s and 2010s.<ref name="Sin-2018" /> (It reached 1.14 in 2018, making it the lowest since 2010 and one of the lowest in the world.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/number-of-babies-born-here-drops-to-8-year-low|title=Number of babies born in Singapore drops to 8-year low|last=Sin|first=Yuen|date=22 July 2019|work=Straits Times|access-date=27 December 2019|department=Singapore}}</ref>) Government incentives such as the baby bonus have proven insufficient to raise the birth rate. Singapore's experience mirrors those of Japan and South Korea.<ref name="Sin-2018">{{Cite news|url=https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/govt-aid-alone-not-enough-to-raise-birth-rate-minister|title=Govt aid alone not enough to raise birth rate: Minister|last=Sin|first=Yuen|date=2 March 2018|work=Straits Times|access-date=27 December 2019|department=Singapore}}</ref>

Vietnam's median age in 2018 was 26 and rising. Between the 1970s and the late 2010s, life expectancy climbed from 60 to 76.<ref name="TheEconomist-2018c">{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/11/08/vietnam-is-getting-old-before-it-gets-rich|title=Vietnam is getting old before it gets rich|date=8 November 2018|newspaper=The Economist|access-date=8 February 2020}}</ref> It is now the second highest in Southeast Asia. Vietnam's fertility rate dropped from 5 in 1980 to 3.55 in 1990 and then to 1.95 in 2017. In that same year, 23% of the Vietnamese population was 15 years of age or younger, down from almost 40% in 1989.<ref name="Hutt-2017">{{Cite news|last=Hutt|first=David|url=https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/will-vietnam-grow-old-before-it-gets-rich/|title=Will Vietnam Grow Old Before it Gets Rich?|date=2 October 2017|work=The Diplomat|access-date=8 February 2020|department=ASEAN Beat}}</ref> Other rapidly growing Southeast Asian countries, such as the Philippines, saw similar demographic trends.<ref>{{Cite news|work=Business Wire|url=https://apnews.com/e003c55a028f4cfcae7c1e17c60d21f7|title=Focus on the bleak ramifications of falling fertility rates in South East Asian countries|date=6 May 2019|agency=Associated Press|access-date=8 February 2020}}</ref>

<gallery class="center" widths="300" heights="209" mode="packed" caption="Population pyramids of India, China, and Singapore in 2016">
File:Population pyramid of India 2016.png
File:Population pyramid of China 2016.png
File:Population pyramid of Singapore 2016.png
</gallery>

===Europe===
{{See also|Aging of Europe|Russian Cross}}
[[File:Population pyramid of the European Union 2016.png|thumb|400x400px|Population pyramid of the European Union in 2016]]
From about 1750 to 1950, most of Western Europe transitioned from having both high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates. By the late 1960s and 1970s, the average woman had fewer than two children, and, although demographers at first expected a "correction", such a rebound came only for a few countries. Despite a bump in the [[total fertility rate]]s (TFR) of some European countries in the very late twentieth century (the 1980s and 1990s), especially France and [[Scandinavia]], it returned to replacement level only in Sweden (reaching a TFR of 2.14 in 1990, up from 1.68 in 1980),<ref>{{cite web|title=Summary of Population Statistics 1960–2020|url=https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/population/population-composition/population-statistics/pong/tables-and-graphs/yearly-statistics--the-whole-country/summary-of-population-statistics/#Fotnoter|website=[[Statistics Sweden]]}}</ref> along with Ireland<ref>{{cite web|title=Central Statistics Office|url=https://data.cso.ie}}</ref> and Iceland;<ref>{{cite web|title=Fertility and reproduction rates 1853-2020|url=https://px.hagstofa.is/pxen/pxweb/en/Ibuar/Ibuar__Faeddirdanir__faeddir__faedingar/MAN05202.px|website=[[Statistics Iceland]]}}</ref> the bump in Sweden was largely due to improving economic output and the generous, far-reaching family benefits granted by the Nordic welfare system,<ref>{{cite web|title=Why does Sweden have such high fertility?|url=https://www.demographic-research.org/volumes/vol13/22/13-22.pdf|website=[[Demographic Research (journal)|Demographic research]]}}</ref> while in France it was mostly driven by older women realizing their dreams of motherhood. For Sweden, the increase in the fertility rate came with a rise in the birth rate (going from 11.7 in 1980 to 14.5 in 1990),<ref name="auto9">{{cite web|title=Summary of Population Statistics 1960-2020|url=https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/population/population-composition/population-statistics/pong/tables-and-graphs/yearly-statistics--the-whole-country/summary-of-population-statistics/#Fotnoter|website=Statistics Sweden}}</ref> which slowed down and then stopped for a brief period to the aging of the Swedish population<ref>{{cite web|title=Average age and median age in sweden by sex. Year 1968 - 2020|url=https://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START__BE__BE0101__BE0101B/BefolkMedianAlder/|website=Statistics Sweden}}</ref> caused by the decline in birth rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s. To this day, France and Sweden still have higher fertility rates than most of Europe, and both almost reached replacement level in 2010 (2.03<ref>{{cite web|title=Demographic balance sheet 2019|url=https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/2382605?sommaire=2382613|website=[[Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques]]}}</ref> and 1.98<ref name="auto9"/> respectively).

At first, falling fertility is due to urbanization and decreased [[infant mortality]] rates, which diminished the benefits and increased the costs of raising children. In other words, it became more economically sensible to invest more in fewer children, as economist [[Gary Becker]] argued. (This is the first demographic transition.) Falling fertility then came from attitudinal shifts. By the 1960s, people began moving from traditional and communal values towards more expressive and individualistic outlooks due to access to and aspiration of higher education, and to the spread of lifestyle values once practiced only by a tiny minority of cultural elites. (This is the [[Demographic transition#Second demographic transition|second demographic transition]].) Although the momentous cultural changes of the 1960s leveled off by the 1990s, the social and cultural environment of the very late twentieth-century was quite different from that of the 1950s. Such changes in values have had a major effect on fertility. Member states of the [[European Economic Community]] saw a steady increase in not just divorce and out-of-wedlock births between 1960 and 1985 but also falling fertility rates. In 1981, a survey of countries across the [[Developed country|industrialized world]] found that while more than half of people aged 65 and over thought that women needed children to be fulfilled, only 35% of those between the ages of 15 and 24 (younger Baby Boomers and older Generation X) agreed.<ref name="Kaufmann-2013">{{Cite book|title=Whither the Child? Causes and Consequences of Low Fertility|last=Kaufmann|first=Eric|publisher=Paradigm Publishers|year=2013|isbn=978-1-61205-093-5|editor-last=Kaufmann|editor-first=Eric|location=Boulder, Colorado, United States|pages=135–56|chapter=Chapter 7: Sacralization by Stealth? The Religious Consequences of Low Fertility in Europe|editor-last2=Wilcox|editor-first2=W. Bradford}}</ref> In the early 1980s, East Germany, West Germany, Denmark, and the [[Channel Islands]] had some of the world's lowest fertility rates.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/06/29/why-germanys-birth-rate-is-rising-and-italys-isnt|title=Why Germany's birth rate is rising and Italy's isn't|date=29 June 2019|newspaper=The Economist|access-date=8 February 2020|department=Europe}}</ref>
[[File:Зрители лектория Cosmos на Geek Picnic 2018 SPb.jpg|thumb|Russian young adults at the [[Geek Picnic]] in Saint Petersburg (2018)]]
At the start of the twenty-first century, Europe suffers from an [[Population ageing|aging population]]. This problem is especially acute in Eastern Europe, whereas in Western Europe, it is alleviated by international immigration. In addition, an increasing number of children born in Europe has been born to non-European parents. Because children of immigrants in Europe tend to be about as religious as they are, this could slow the decline of religion (or the growth of [[secularism]]) in the continent as the twenty-first century progresses.<ref name="Kaufmann-2010">{{Cite journal|last=Kaufmann|first=Eric|author-link=Eric Kaufmann|date=Winter 2010|title=Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?|journal=Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review|volume=99|issue=396, the future of religion|pages=387–94|jstor=27896504}}</ref> In the United Kingdom, the number of foreign-born residents stood at 6% of the population in 1991. Immigration subsequently surged and has not fallen since (as of 2018). Research by the demographers and political scientists [[Eric Kaufmann]], [[Roger Eatwell]], and [[Matthew Goodwin]] suggest that such a fast ethno-demographic change is one of the key reasons behind public backlash in the form of [[Right-wing populism|national populism]] across the rich liberal democracies, an example of which is the [[2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum]] (Brexit).<ref name="TheEconomist-2018b">{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/britain/2018/11/03/two-new-books-explain-the-brexit-revolt|title=Two new books explain the Brexit revolt|date=3 November 2018|newspaper=The Economist|access-date=21 December 2019|department=Britain}}</ref>

Italy is a country where the problem of an aging population is especially acute. The fertility rate dropped from about four in the 1960s down to 1.2 in the 2010s. This is not because young Italians do not want to procreate. Quite the contrary, having many children is an Italian ideal. But its economy has been floundering since the [[Great Recession]] of 2007–08, with the [[youth unemployment]] rate at a staggering 35% in 2019. Many Italians have moved abroad—150,000 did in 2018—and many are young people pursuing educational and economic opportunities. With the plunge in the number of births each year, the Italian population is expected to decline in the next five years. Moreover, the Baby Boomers are retiring in large numbers, and their numbers eclipse those of the young people taking care of them. Only Japan has an age structure more tilted towards the elderly.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/in-italy-rising-anxiety-over-falling-birth-rates|title=In Italy, rising anxiety over falling birth rates|last=Livesay|first=Christopher|date=25 November 2019|work=PBS Newshour|access-date=21 December 2019}}</ref>

Greece also suffers from a serious demographic problem as many young people are leaving the country in search of better opportunities elsewhere in the wake of the Great Recession. This [[Human capital flight|brain drain]] and a rapidly aging population could spell disaster for the country.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/brain-drain-and-declining-birth-rate-threaten-the-future-of-greece|title=Brain drain and declining birth rate threaten the future of Greece|last=Brabant|first=Malcolm|date=13 November 2017|work=PBS Newshour|access-date=21 December 2019}}</ref>

Overall, E.U. demographic data shows that the number of people aged 18 to 33 in 2014 was 24% of the population, with a high of 28% for Poland and a low of 19% for Italy.<ref name="Stokes-2015">{{Cite web|last=Stokes|first=Bruce|date=9 February 2015|title=Who are Europe's Millennials?|url=https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/02/09/who-are-europes-millennials/|access-date=10 November 2020|website=Pew Research Center}}</ref>

As a result of the shocks due to the decline and [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]], Russia's birth rates began falling in the late 1980s while death rates have risen, especially among men.<ref name="Grammaticas-2004">{{Cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3984951.stm|title=Life ebbs away from Russian villages|last=Grammaticas|first=Damian|date=4 November 2004|work=BBC News|access-date=22 December 2019|department=Europe}}</ref> In the early 2000s, Russia had not only a falling birth rate but also a declining population despite having an improving economy.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4125072.stm|title=Russia's population falling fast|last=Eke|first=Stephen|date=23 June 2005|work=BBC News|access-date=22 December 2019|department=Europe}}</ref> Between 1992 and 2002, Russia's population dropped from 149&nbsp;million to 144&nbsp;million. According to the "medium case scenario" of the U.N.'s Population Division, Russia could lose another 20&nbsp;million people by the 2020s.<ref name="Grammaticas-2004" />

Europe's demographic reality contributes to its economic troubles. Because the European baby boomers failed to replace themselves, by the 2020s and 2030s, dozens of European nations will find their situation even tougher than before.<ref name="Zeihan-2016" />

<gallery class="center" widths="300" heights="209" mode="packed" caption="Population pyramids of Italy, Greece, and Russia in 2016">
File:Population pyramid of Italy 2016.png
File:Population pyramid of Greece 2016.png
File:Population pyramid of Russia 2016.png
</gallery>

===Oceania===
{{See also|Aging of Australia}}
Australia's total fertility rate has fallen from above three in the post-war era, to about replacement level (2.1) in the 1970s to below that in the late 2010s. However, immigration has been offsetting the effects of a declining birthrate. In the 2010s, among the residents of Australia, 5% were born in the United Kingdom, 3% from China, 2% from India, and 1% from the Philippines. 84% of new arrivals in the fiscal year of 2016 were below 40 years of age, compared to 54% of those already in the country. Like other immigrant-friendly countries, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Australia's working-age population is expected to grow till about 2025. However, the ratio of people of working age to retirees (the [[dependency ratio]]) has gone from eight in the 1970s to about four in the 2010s. It could drop to two by the 2060s, depending on immigration levels.<ref name="Fensom-2019">{{Cite news|url=https://news.yahoo.com/australia-demographic-time-bomb-arrived-193400024.html|title=Australia's Demographic "Time Bomb" Has Arrived|last=Fensom|first=Anthony|date=1 December 2019|work=The National Interest|access-date=24 December 2019|publisher=Yahoo! News}}</ref> "The older the population is, the more people are on welfare benefits, we need more health care, and there's a smaller base to pay the taxes," Ian Harper of the Melbourne Business School told ABC News (Australia).<ref name="Kohler-2019">{{Cite news|url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-11-20/economy-demographics-baby-boomers-retiring-immigration/11700508|title=So many baby boomers are retiring this doctor quit his job to go build them luxury homes|last1=Kohler|first1=Alan|work=ABC News (Australia)|access-date=24 December 2019|last2=Hobday|first2=Liz|department=7.30}}</ref> While the government has scaled back plans to increase the retirement age, to cut pensions, and to raise taxes due to public opposition, demographic pressures continue to mount as the buffering effects of immigration are fading away.<ref name="Fensom-2019" />

===North America===
{{See also|Aging in the American workforce}}
[[File:US living adult generations.png|alt=|center]]
Historically, the early Anglo-Protestant settlers in the seventeenth century were the most successful group, culturally, economically, and politically, and they maintained their dominance till the early twentieth century. Commitment to the ideals of the Enlightenment meant that they sought to assimilate newcomers from outside of the [[British Isles]], but few were interested in adopting a pan-European identity for the nation, much less turning it into a global melting pot. But in the early 1900s, liberal progressives and modernists began promoting more inclusive ideals for what the national identity of the United States should be. While the more traditionalist segments of society continued to maintain their Anglo-Protestant ethnocultural traditions, universalism and cosmopolitanism started gaining favor among the elites. These ideals became institutionalized after the Second World War, and ethnic minorities started moving towards institutional parity with the once dominant Anglo-Protestants.<ref name="Varzally-2005">{{Cite journal|last=Varzally|first=Allison|date=2005|title=Book Review: The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America|url=https://www.sneps.net/research-interests/the-rise-and-fall-of-anglo-america-the-decline-of-dominant-ethnicity-in-the-united-states/the-rise-and-fall-of-anglo-america-review|journal=The Journal of American History|volume=92|issue=2|pages=680–81|doi=10.2307/3659399|jstor=3659399}}</ref> The [[Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965]] (also known as the Hart–Celler Act), passed at the urging of President Lyndon B. Johnson, abolished national quotas for immigrants and replaced it with a system that admits a fixed number of persons per year based in qualities such as skills and the need for refuge. Immigration subsequently surged from elsewhere in North America (especially Canada and Mexico), Asia, Central America, and the West Indies.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The American Nation: A History of the United States|last=Garraty|first=John A.|publisher=Harper Collins Publishers|year=1991|isbn=978-0-06-042312-4|pages=857–58|chapter=Chapter XXXI: The Best of Times, The Worst of Times}}</ref> By the mid-1980s, most immigrants originated from Asia and Latin America. Some were refugees from Vietnam, Cuba, Haiti, and other parts of the Americas while others came illegally by crossing the long and largely undefended U.S.-Mexican border. At the same time, the postwar baby boom and subsequently falling fertility rate seemed to jeopardize America's social security system as the Baby Boomers retire in the twenty-first century.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The American Nation: A History of the United States|last=Garraty|first=John A|publisher=Harper Collins|year=1991|isbn=978-0-06-042312-4|pages=932–33|chapter=Chapter XXXIII: Our Times}}</ref> Provisional data from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention reveal that U.S. fertility rates have fallen below the replacement level of 2.1 since 1971. (In 2017, it fell to 1.765.)<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/10/health/us-fertility-rate-replacement-cdc-study/index.html|title=US fertility rate is below level needed to replace population, study says|last=Howard|first=Jacqueline|date=10 January 2019|work=CNN|access-date=1 January 2020}}</ref>

[[File:Population pyramid of the United States 2016.png|thumb|left|400x400px|Population pyramid of the United States in 2016]]
Millennial population size varies, depending on the definition used. Using its own definition, the Pew Research Center estimated that millennials comprised 27% of the U.S. population in 2014.<ref name="Stokes-2015" /> In the same year, using dates ranging from 1982 to 2004, Neil Howe revised the number to over 95&nbsp;million people in the U.S.<ref>{{cite web|title=The Millennial Generation, 'Keep Calm and Carry On'|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/neilhowe/2014/09/04/the-millennial-generation-keep-calm-and-carry-on-part-6-of-7/#3324e014bb20|last=Howe|first=Neil|website=[[Forbes]]|access-date=2 April 2019}}</ref> In a 2012 [[Time (magazine)|''Time'' magazine]] article, it was estimated that there were approximately 80&nbsp;million U.S. millennials.<ref>{{cite magazine|author=Dan Schawbel|date=29 March 2012|title=Millennials vs. Baby Boomers: Who Would You Rather Hire?|url=https://business.time.com/2012/03/29/millennials-vs-baby-boomers-who-would-you-rather-hire/|magazine=Time Magazine|access-date=27 May 2013}}</ref> The [[United States Census Bureau]], using birth dates ranging from 1982 to 2000, stated the estimated number of U.S. millennials in 2015 was 83.1&nbsp;million people.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Millennials Outnumber Baby Boomers and Are Far More Diverse|url=https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/cb15-113.html|website=www.census.gov|access-date=5 October 2015}}</ref>

In 2017, fewer than 56% millennials were [[non-Hispanic whites]], compared with more than 84% of Americans in their 70s and 80s, 57% had never been married, and 67% lived in a metropolitan area.<ref name="pewmillennials" /> According to the [[Brookings Institution]], millennials are the "demographic bridge between the largely white older generations (pre-millennials) and much more racially diverse younger generations (post-millennials)."<ref name="Frey-2018">{{cite web|title=The millennial generation: A demographic bridge to America's diverse future|url=https://www.brookings.edu/research/millennials/|last1=Frey|first1=William|date=January 2018|publisher=The Brookings Institution|access-date=13 March 2019}}</ref>

By analyzing data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the Pew Research Center estimated that millennials, whom they define as people born between 1981 and 1996, outnumbered baby boomers, born from 1946 to 1964, for the first time in 2019. That year, there were 72.1 million millennials compared to 71.6 million baby boomers, who had previously been the largest living adult generation in the country. Data from the [[National Center for Health Statistics]] shows that about 62 million millennials were born in the United States, compared to 55 million members of Generation X, 76 million baby boomers, and 47 million from the Silent Generation. Between 1981 and 1996, an average of 3.9 million millennial babies were born each year, compared to 3.4 million average Generation X births per year between 1965 and 1980. But millennials continue to grow in numbers as a result of immigration and naturalization. In fact, millennials form the largest group of immigrants to the United States in the 2010s. Pew projected that the millennial generation would reach around 74.9 million in 2033, after which mortality would outweigh immigration.<ref name="2020Overtake">{{Cite web|last=Fry|first=Richard|date=28 April 2020|title=Millennials overtake Baby Boomers as America's largest generation|url=https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/28/millennials-overtake-baby-boomers-as-americas-largest-generation/|access-date=28 April 2020|website=Pew Research Center}}</ref> Yet 2020 would be the first time millennials (who are between the ages of 24 and 39) find their share of the electorate shrink as the leading wave of Generation Z (aged 18 to 23) became eligible to vote. In other words, their electoral power peaked in 2016. In absolute terms, however, the number of foreign-born millennials continues to increase as they become naturalized citizens. In fact, 10% of American voters were born outside the country by the 2020 election, up from 6% in 2000. The fact that people from different racial or age groups vote differently means that this demographic change will influence the future of the American political landscape. While younger voters hold significantly different views from their elders, they are considerably less likely to vote. Non-whites tend to favor candidates from the Democratic Party while whites by and large prefer the Republican Party.<ref>{{Cite web|title=An early look at the 2020 electorate|url=https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/essay/an-early-look-at-the-2020-electorate/|last1=Cilluffo|first1=Anthony|last2=Fry|first2=Richard|date=30 January 2019|website=Pew Research Center|access-date=8 May 2020}}</ref>
[[File:US Navy 050223-N-5821P-054 Seaman Chanthorn Peou of San Diego, Calif., takes his Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) aboard the conventionally powered aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63).jpg|thumb|A U.S. Navy sailor taking the [[SAT]] aboard the U.S.S. ''[[USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63)|Kitty Hawk]]'' (2004)]]
As of the mid-2010s, the United States is one of the few developed countries that does ''not'' have a top-heavy population pyramid. In fact, as of 2016, the median age of the U.S. population was younger than that of all other rich nations except Australia, New Zealand, Cyprus, Ireland, and Iceland, whose combined population is only a fraction of the United States. This is because American baby boomers had a higher fertility rate compared to their counterparts from much of the developed world. Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, and South Korea are all aging rapidly by comparison because their millennials are smaller in number than their parents. This demographic reality puts the United States at an advantage compared to many other major economies as the millennials reach middle age: the nation will still have a significant number of consumers, investors, and taxpayers.<ref name="Zeihan-2016" />

According to the Pew Research Center, "Among men, only 4% of millennials [ages 21 to 36 in 2017] are [[veteran]]s, compared with 47%" of men in their 70s and 80s, "many of whom came of age during the [[Korean War]] and its aftermath."<ref name="pewmillennials">{{cite news|url=http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/16/how-millennials-compare-with-their-grandparents/|title=How Millennials today compare with their grandparents 50 years ago|date=16 March 2018|publisher=Pew Research Center}}</ref> Some of these former military service members are combat veterans, having fought in [[War in Afghanistan (2001–present)|Afghanistan]] or [[Iraq War|Iraq]].<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Smith|first=C. Brian|date=2018|title=A Millennial Veteran Takes On The Notion That His Generation Isn't Man Enough|url=https://melmagazine.com/en-us/story/a-millennial-veteran-takes-on-the-notion-that-his-generation-isnt-man-enough-2|magazine=Mel Magazine|location=Los Angeles|publisher=Dollar Shave Club|access-date=11 May 2019}}</ref> As of 2016, millennials are the majority of the total veteran population.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://medium.com/@martian_bob/what-percentage-of-veterans-are-millennials-d5309d51481b|title=What percentage of veterans are Millennials?|last=Arens|first=Bob|date=4 April 2016|website=Medium|access-date=11 May 2019}}</ref> According to the Pentagon in 2016, 19% of millennials are interested in serving in the military, and 15% have a parent with a history of military service.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2016/07/09/the-pentagon-keeps-data-on-millennials-this-is-what-it-says/|title=The Pentagon keeps data on millennials. This is what it says|last=Tilghman|first=Andrew|date=9 July 2016|work=Military Times|access-date=11 May 2019|location=Virginia}}</ref>