Editing Metaphysics (section)

=== Particulars ===
[[Particular]]s are individual entities and include both concrete objects, like Aristotle, the Eiffel Tower, or a specific apple, and abstract objects, like the number 2 or a specific set in mathematics. They are unique, non-repeatable entities and contrast with [[Universal (metaphysics)|universals]], like the color red, which can at the same time exist in several places and characterize several particulars.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=683}} | {{harvnb|MacLeod|Rubenstein|loc=Lead Section, § 1a. The Nature of Universals}} | {{harvnb|Bigelow|1998|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=§ Particularity and Individuality}} | {{harvnb|Maurin|2019|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> A widely held view is that particulars instantiate universals but are not themselves instantiated by something else, meaning that they exist in themselves while universals exist in something else. [[Substance theory|Substratum theory]], associated with [[John Locke]]'s philosophy, analyzes each particular as a substratum, also called ''bare particular'', together with various properties. The substratum confers individuality to the particular while the properties express its qualitative features or what it is like. This approach is rejected by [[Bundle theory|bundle theorists]]. Inspired by [[David Hume]]'s philosophy, they state that particulars are only bundles of properties without an underlying substratum. Some bundle theorists include in the bundle an individual essence, called ''[[haecceity]]'' following [[Scholasticism|scholastic]] terminology, to ensure that each bundle is unique. Another proposal for concrete particulars is that they are individuated by their space-time location.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Maurin|2019|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=§ Particularity and Individuality}} | {{harvnb|Bigelow|1998|loc=Lead Section, § 3. Bundles of Properties}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=82–83}} }}</ref>

Concrete particulars encountered in everyday life, like rocks, tables, and organisms, are complex entities [[Composition (objects)|composed]] of various parts. For example, a table consists of a tabletop and legs, each of which is itself made up of countless particles. The relation between parts and wholes is studied by [[mereology]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=250–251}} | {{harvnb|Varzi|2019|loc=Lead Section, § 1. 'Part' and Parthood}} | {{harvnb|Cornell|loc=Lead Section, § 2. The Special Composition Question}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=19–21}} }}</ref>{{efn|Mereological problems were discussed as early as ancient Greek philosophy.<ref>{{harvnb|Varzi|2019|loc=Lead Section}}</ref>}} The problem of the many is a philosophical question about the conditions under which several individual things compose a larger whole. For example, a cloud comprises many droplets without a clear boundary, raising the question of which droplets form part of the cloud. According to mereological universalists, every collection of entities forms a whole. This means that what seems to be a single cloud is an overlay of countless clouds, one for each cloud-like collection of water droplets. Mereological moderatists hold that certain conditions must be met for a group of entities to compose a whole, for example, that the entities touch one another. [[Mereological nihilism|Mereological nihilists]] reject the idea of wholes altogether, claiming that there are no clouds or tables but only particles that are arranged cloud-wise or table-wise.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weatherson|2023|loc=Lead section, § 3. Overpopulation}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=82–83}} | {{harvnb|Cornell|loc=Lead Section, § 2. The Special Composition Question}} | {{harvnb|Brenner|2015|p=1295}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=19–21, 23–24, 32–33}} }}</ref> A related mereological problem is whether there are simple entities that have no parts, as [[Atomism|atomists]] claim, or whether everything can be endlessly subdivided into smaller parts, as continuum theorists contend.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Berryman|2022|loc=§ 2.6 Atomism and Particle Theories in Ancient Greek Sciences}} | {{harvnb|Varzi|2019|loc=§ 3.4 Atomism, Gunk, and Other Options}} }}</ref>