Editing Marbury v. Madison (section)

===Judicial review and striking down the law===
{{main|Judicial review in the United States}}
[[File:Marbury v Madison John Marshall by Swatjester.jpg|thumb|upright=1.6|Inscription on the wall of the [[United States Supreme Court Building|Supreme Court Building]] from ''Marbury v. Madison'', in which [[Chief Justice John Marshall]] (statue, foreground) outlined the concept of [[judicial review]].]]
After ruling that Section 13 of the Judiciary Act conflicted with the Constitution, the Court struck down that section in its first ever declaration of the power of judicial review.{{sfnp|Epstein|2014|p=89}}{{sfnp|Currie|1997|p=53}} The Court ruled that American federal courts have the power to refuse to give any consideration to congressional legislation that is inconsistent with their interpretation of the Constitution{{mdash}}a move colloquially known as "striking down" laws.{{sfnp|Tribe|2000|p=207}}

The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly give the federal judiciary the power of judicial review.{{sfnp|Tribe|2000|pp=207–08}} Nevertheless, the Court's opinion gives many reasons in support of the judiciary's possession of the power. First, Marshall reasoned that the written nature of the Constitution inherently established judicial review.{{sfnp|Prakash|Yoo|2003|p=914}}{{sfnp|Tribe|2000|p=210}} Borrowing from Alexander Hamilton's essay ''[[Federalist No. 78]]'', Marshall wrote:
{{Blockquote
|text=The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written. ... Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.
|source=''Marbury'', 5 U.S. at 176–77.<ref>Quoted in part in {{harvp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p.&nbsp;45}}, and {{harvp|Tribe|2000|p=210}}.</ref>
}}
Second, the Court declared that deciding the constitutionality of the laws it applies is an inherent part of the American judiciary's role.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p. 45}} In what has become the most famous and most frequently quoted line of the opinion, Marshall wrote:
{{Blockquote
|text=It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
|source=''Marbury'', 5 U.S. at 177.<ref>Quoted in {{harvp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p. 45}}.</ref>
}}
Marshall reasoned that the Constitution places limits on the American government's powers, and that those limits would be meaningless unless they were subject to judicial review and enforcement.{{sfnp|Tribe|2000|p=210}}{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p. 45}} He reasoned that the Constitution's provisions limiting Congress's power{{mdash}}such as the prohibitions on [[ex post facto law|''ex post facto'' laws]] and [[Bill of attainder|bills of attainder]]{{mdash}}meant that in some cases judges would be forced to choose between enforcing the Constitution or following Congress.{{sfnp|Nowak|Rotunda|2012|loc=§ 1.3, pp. 52–53}} Marshall held "virtually as a matter of iron logic" that in the event of conflict between the Constitution and statutory laws passed by Congress, constitutional law must be supreme.{{sfnp|Epstein|2014|p=89}}

Third, the Court said that denying the supremacy of the Constitution over Congress's acts would mean that "courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law."<ref>{{harvp|Tribe|2000|p=210}}, quoting ''Marbury'', 5 U.S. at 178.</ref> This, Marshall wrote, would make Congress omnipotent, because none of the laws it passed would ever be invalid.{{sfnp|Tribe|2000|p=210}}
{{Blockquote
|text=This doctrine ... would declare, that if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits.
|source=''Marbury'', 5 U.S. at 178.<ref>Quoted in {{harvp|Tribe|2000|p=210}}.</ref>
}}

Marshall then gave several other reasons in favor of judicial review. He reasoned that the authorization in Article III of the Constitution that the Court can decide cases arising "under this Constitution" implied that the Court had the power to strike down laws conflicting with the Constitution.{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p. 45}} This, Marshall wrote, meant that the [[Founding Fathers of the United States|Founders]] were willing to have the American judiciary use and interpret the Constitution when judging cases. He also said that federal judges' oaths of office—in which they swear to discharge their duties impartially and "agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States"—requires them to support the Constitution.{{sfnp|Nowak|Rotunda|2012|loc=§ 1.3, p. 53}} Lastly, Marshall reasoned that judicial review is implied in the [[Supremacy Clause]] of [[Article Six of the United States Constitution|Article VI of the U.S. Constitution]], because it declares that the supreme law of the United States is the Constitution and laws made "in Pursuance thereof".{{sfnp|Nowak|Rotunda|2012|loc=§ 1.3, p. 53}}{{sfnp|Chemerinsky|2019|loc=§&nbsp;2.2.1, p. 46}}

Having given his list of reasons, Marshall concluded the Court's opinion by reaffirming the Court's ruling on the invalidity of Section 13 of the Judiciary Act and, therefore, the Court's inability to issue Marbury's writ of mandamus.
{{Blockquote
|text=Thus, the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written Constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. The rule must be discharged.
|source=''Marbury'', 5 U.S. at 180.
}}