Editing Liar paradox (section)

===Arthur Prior===
[[Arthur Prior]] asserts that there is nothing paradoxical about the liar paradox. His claim (which he attributes to [[Charles Sanders Peirce]] and [[John Buridan]]) is that [[Deflationary theory of truth#Redundancy theory|every statement includes an implicit assertion of its own truth]].<ref>{{cite book
 |last=         Kirkham
 |first=        Richard
 |author-link=  Richard Kirkham
 |date=         1992
 |title=        [[Theories of Truth|Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction]]
 |publisher=    MIT Press
 |at=           section 9.6 "A. N. Prior's Solution"
 |isbn=         0-262-61108-2
}}</ref>
Thus, for example, the statement "It is true that two plus two equals four" contains no more information than the statement "two plus two equals four", because the phrase "it is true that..." is always implicitly there. And in the self-referential spirit of the Liar Paradox, the phrase "it is true that..." is equivalent to "this whole statement is true and ...".

Thus the following two statements are equivalent:

{{block indent |This statement is false.}}
{{block indent |This statement is true and this statement is false.}}

The latter is a simple contradiction of the form "A and not A", and hence is false. Therefore, there is no paradox, because the claim that this two-conjunct Liar is false does not lead to a contradiction. Eugene Mills presents a similar answer. <ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Mills | first1 = Eugene | year = 1998 | title = A simple solution to the Liar | journal = Philosophical Studies | volume = 89 | issue = 2/3| pages = 197–212 | doi = 10.1023/a:1004232928938 | s2cid = 169981769 }}</ref>