Editing LGM-30 Minuteman (section)

===Polaris===
{{main|UGM-27 Polaris}}
[[File:Polaris missile launch from HMS Revenge (S27) 1983.JPEG|thumb|The Polaris SLBM could ostensibly fill the role of the Minuteman, and was perceived as significantly less vulnerable to attack.]]

During Minuteman's early development, the Air Force maintained the policy that the manned [[strategic bomber]] was the primary weapon of nuclear war. Blind bombing accuracy on the order of {{convert|1500|feet|km}} was expected, and the weapons were sized to ensure even the hardest targets would be destroyed as long as the weapon fell within this range. The USAF had enough bombers to attack every military and industrial target in the USSR and was confident that its bombers would survive in sufficient numbers that such a strike would utterly destroy the country.<ref name="1990_MacKenzie" />{{rp|page=202}}

Soviet ICBMs upset this equation to a degree. Their accuracy was known to be low, on the order of {{convert|4|nmi}}, but they carried large warheads that would be useful against [[Strategic Air Command]]'s bombers, which parked in the open. Since there was no system to detect the ICBMs being launched, the possibility was raised that the Soviets could launch a sneak attack with a few dozen missiles that would take out a significant portion of SAC's bomber fleet.<ref name="1990_MacKenzie" />{{rp|page=202}}

In this environment, the Air Force saw their own ICBMs not as a primary weapon of war, but as a way to ensure that the Soviets would not risk a sneak attack. ICBMs, especially newer models that were housed in silos, could be expected to survive an attack by a single Soviet missile. In any conceivable scenario where both sides had similar numbers of ICBMs, the US forces would survive a sneak attack in sufficient numbers to ensure the destruction of all major Soviet cities in return. The Soviets would not risk an attack under these conditions.<ref name="1990_MacKenzie" />{{rp|page=202}}

Considering this ''[[countervalue]]'' attack concept, strategic planners calculated that an attack of "400 equivalent megatons" aimed at the largest Soviet cities would promptly kill 30% of their population and destroy 50% of their industry. Larger attacks raised these numbers only slightly, as all of the larger targets would already have been hit. This suggested that there was a "[[finite deterrent]]" level around 400 megatons that would be enough to prevent a Soviet attack no matter how many missiles they had of their own. All that had to be ensured was that the US missiles survived, which seemed likely given the low accuracy of the Soviet weapons.<ref name="1990_MacKenzie" />{{rp|page=199}} Reversing the problem, the addition of ICBMs to the US Air Force's arsenal did not eliminate the need, or desire, to attack Soviet military targets, and the Air Force maintained that bombers were the only suitable platform in that role.<ref name="1990_MacKenzie" />{{rp|page=199}}

Into this argument came the Navy's [[UGM-27 Polaris]]. Launched from submarines, Polaris was effectively invulnerable and had enough accuracy to attack Soviet cities. If the Soviets improved the accuracy of their missiles this would present a serious threat to the Air Force's bombers and missiles, but none at all to the Navy's submarines. Based on the same 400 equivalent megatons calculation, they set about building a fleet of 41 submarines carrying 16 missiles each, giving the Navy a finite deterrent that was unassailable.<ref name="1990_MacKenzie" />{{rp|page=197}}

This presented a serious problem for the Air Force. They were still pressing for the development of newer bombers, like the supersonic [[North American XB-70 Valkyrie|B-70]], for attacks against military targets, but this role seemed increasingly unlikely in a nuclear war scenario. A February 1960 memo by [[RAND]], entitled "The Puzzle of Polaris", was passed around among high-ranking Air Force officials. It suggested that Polaris negated any need for Air Force ICBMs if they were also being aimed at Soviet cities. If the role of the missile was to present an unassailable threat to the Soviet population, Polaris was a far better solution than Minuteman. The document had long-lasting effects on the future of the Minuteman program, which, by 1961, was firmly evolving towards a [[counterforce]] capability.<ref name="1990_MacKenzie" />{{rp|page=197}}