Editing Kosovo War (section)

===The slide to war (1995–1998)===
{{main|Insurgency in Kosovo (1995–1998)}}

{{Kosovo War}}

According to an Amnesty International report in 1998, due to dismissals from the Yugoslav government it was estimated that by 1998 unemployment rate in the Kosovar Albanian population was higher than 70%.<ref name="The Kosovo Tragedy page 116">The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions, p. 116</ref> The economic apartheid imposed by Belgrade was aimed at impoverishing an already poor Kosovo Albanian population.<ref name="The Kosovo Tragedy page 116"/>

In 1996, 16,000 Serb refugees from Bosnia and Croatia were settled in Kosovo by the Milosevic government, sometimes against their will.<ref>[https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3c2b204a0.pdf War crimes in Kosovo ] p. 25</ref>

[[Ibrahim Rugova]], first [[Ibrahim Rugova|President of the Republic of Kosovo]] pursued a policy of passive resistance which succeeded in maintaining peace in Kosovo during the [[Yugoslav wars|earlier wars]] in [[Slovenia]], [[Croatia]] and [[Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnia]] during the early 1990s. As evidenced by the emergence of the [[Kosovo Liberation Army]] (KLA), this came at the cost of increasing frustration among Kosovo's Albanian population. In the mid-1990s, Rugova pleaded for a [[United Nations peacekeeping|United Nations peacekeeping force]] for Kosovo.

Continuing repression<ref name="Perritt2010">{{cite book |author=Henry H. Perritt |title=Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency |year= 2010 |publisher=University of Illinois Press |page=62}}</ref> convinced many Albanians that only armed resistance would change the situation. On 22 April 1996, four attacks on Serbian security personnel were carried out almost simultaneously in different parts of Kosovo. The KLA, a hitherto-unknown organisation, subsequently claimed responsibility.<ref name="RadanPavkovic2013">{{cite book |author1=Professor Peter Radan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=k-ahAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA178 |title=The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession |author2=Dr Aleksandar Pavkovic |date=28 April 2013 |publisher=Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. |isbn=978-1-4094-7652-8 |pages=178–}}</ref> The nature of the KLA was at first mysterious. It initially seemed that their only goals were to stop repression from Yugoslav authorities.{{sfn|Reveron|Murer|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OjvdsfiWwJcC&pg=PT104 68–69]}} KLA goals also included the establishment of a [[Greater Albania]], a state stretching into surrounding [[North Macedonia|Macedonia]], [[Montenegro]] and [[Preševo Valley|southern Serbia]].<ref name=DavidL>{{Cite book|title=Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U. S. Intervention |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=X5sa90AEvi0C&q=greater%20albania%20kla&pg=PR7|publisher=[[Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs]]|date=2012|page=69|isbn=978-0262305129}}</ref><ref name=ICG>{{cite journal|title=Pan-Albanianism: How big a threat to Balkan stability?|journal=International Crisis Group: Europe Report|date=25 February 2004|issue=Report No 153|page=6|url=https://www1.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000201.pdf|access-date=4 December 2017}}</ref> In July 1998, in an interview for [[Der Spiegel]], KLA spokesman [[Jakup Krasniqi]] publicly announced that the KLA's goal was the unification of all Albanian-inhabited lands.<ref name=ICG /> [[Sulejman Selimi]], a General Commander of KLA in 1998–1999, said:<ref name=DavidL />

{{blockquote|There is ''de facto'' Albanian nation. The tragedy is that European powers after [[World War I]] decided to divide that nation between several Balkan states. We are now fighting to unify the nation, to liberate all Albanians, including those in Macedonia, Montenegro, and other parts of Serbia. We are not just a liberation army for Kosovo.}}

While Rugova promised to uphold the minority rights of Serbs in Kosovo, the KLA was much less tolerant. Selimi stated that "Serbs who have blood on their hands would have to leave Kosovo".<ref name=DavidL />

[[File:Kosovo-metohija-koreni-duse002.jpg|thumb|left|Serbian victims during [[Insurgency in Kosovo (1995–1998)|insurgency]]]]

The crisis escalated in December 1997 at the [[Peace Implementation Council]] meeting in [[Bonn]], where the international community (as defined in the [[Dayton Agreement]]) agreed to give the [[High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina|High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina]] sweeping powers, including the right to dismiss elected leaders. At the same time, Western diplomats insisted that Kosovo be discussed and that Yugoslavia be responsive to Albanian demands there. The delegation from Yugoslavia stormed out of the meetings in protest.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/11/world/serbs-pull-out-of-talks-on-bosnia-to-protest-warning-on-kosovo.html|title=Serbs Pull Out of Talks on Bosnia to Protest Warning on Kosovo|newspaper=The New York Times|first=Alan|last=Cowell|date=1999-08-12|access-date=2008-05-31}}</ref> This was followed by the return of the [[Contact Group (Balkans)|Contact Group]] that oversaw the last phases of the Bosnian conflict and declarations from European powers demanding that Yugoslavia solve the problem in Kosovo.

The KLA received financial and material support from the Kosovo Albanian diaspora.<ref name="interpol">{{cite web|url=http://judiciary.house.gov/Legacy/muts1213.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050226123208/http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/muts1213.htm|url-status=dead|archive-date=2005-02-26|title=The Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drugs Trafficking and Terrorism |author=written Testimony of Ralf Mutschke Assistant Director, Criminal Intelligence Directorate International Criminal Police Organization&nbsp;– Interpol General Secretariat before a hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime|publisher=United States House Judiciary Committee|date=2000-12-13|access-date=2008-05-31|quote=In 1998, the U.S. State Department listed the KLA as a terrorist organization}}</ref><ref name="Kubo2010" /> In early 1997, [[1997 Albanian civil unrest|Albania collapsed into chaos]] following the fall of President [[Sali Berisha]]. [[Albanian Armed Forces]] stockpiles were looted with impunity by criminal gangs, with much of the hardware ending up in western Kosovo and boosting the growing KLA arsenal. [[Bujar Bukoshi]], shadow prime minister in exile (in [[Zürich]], Switzerland), created a group called FARK ([[Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosova]]). FARK and the KLA were initially rivals, but later FARK merged into the KLA. The Yugoslav government considered the KLA to be "terrorists" and "[[insurgents]]" who indiscriminately attacked police and civilians, while most Albanians saw the KLA as "[[Resistance movement|freedom fighters]]".

On 23 February 1998, the United States Special Envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, stated in [[Pristina]] that "the KLA was without any question a terrorist group."<ref name="Crawford2001">{{cite journal |title=Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War: Why the Holbrooke Agreement Failed |journal=Political Science Quarterly |year=2001 |last=Crawford |first=Timothy W. |volume=116 |issue=4 |pages=499–523 |doi=10.2307/798219 |jstor=798219 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/798219 }}</ref><ref name="bbc_june_1998">{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/121818.stm|title=The KLA&nbsp;– terrorists or freedom fighters?|date=1998-06-28|publisher=BBC|first=Nened|last=Sebak}}</ref> He later told the [[United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs|House Committee on International Relations]] that "while the KLA had committed 'terrorist acts,' it had 'not been classified legally by the U.S. Government as a terrorist organization.'"<ref name="senate">{{cite web|url=https://www.senate.gov/~rpc/releases/1999/fr033199.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20000816165402/https://www.senate.gov/~rpc/releases/1999/fr033199.htm |url-status=dead |archive-date=2000-08-16 |title=The Kosovo Liberation Army: Does Clinton Policy Support Group with Terror, Drug Ties? |publisher=[[United States Senate]], Republican Policy Committee |date=1999-03-31 |access-date=2008-05-31 }}</ref> However, his 23 February statements have been seen as an unwitting "green light" to the Serbian crackdown that followed less than a week later.{{sfn|Judah|2002|p=138}}