Editing Kerckhoffs's principle (section)

==Security through obscurity==
{{Main|Security through obscurity}}
It is moderately common for companies, and sometimes even standards bodies as in the case of the [[Content Scramble System|CSS encryption on DVDs]], to keep the inner workings of a system secret. Some{{who|date=April 2023}} argue this "security by obscurity" makes the product safer and less vulnerable to attack. A counter-argument is that keeping the innards secret may improve security in the short term, but in the long run, only systems that have been published and analyzed should be trusted.

[[Steven M. Bellovin|Steven Bellovin]] and [[Randy Bush (scientist)|Randy Bush]] commented:<ref name="draft-ymbk-obscurity-00">{{citation
| url = https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/draft-ymbk-obscurity-00.txt
| title = Security Through Obscurity Considered Dangerous
| first1 = Steven
| last1 = Bellovin
| first2 = Randy
| last2 = Bush
| publisher = [[Internet Engineering Task Force]] (IETF)
| date = February 2002
| access-date = December 1, 2018
| archive-date = February 1, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210201025046/https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/draft-ymbk-obscurity-00.txt
| url-status = live
}}</ref>
{{quotation
|
'''Security Through Obscurity Considered Dangerous'''

Hiding security vulnerabilities in algorithms, software, and/or hardware decreases the likelihood they will be repaired and increases the likelihood that they can and will be exploited. Discouraging or outlawing discussion of weaknesses and vulnerabilities is extremely dangerous and deleterious to the security of computer systems, the network, and its citizens.

'''Open Discussion Encourages Better Security'''

The long history of cryptography and cryptoanalysis has shown time and time again that open discussion and analysis of algorithms exposes weaknesses not thought of by the original authors, and thereby leads to better and more secure algorithms.  As Kerckhoffs noted about cipher systems in 1883 [Kerc83], "Il faut qu'il n'exige pas le secret, et qu'il puisse sans inconvénient tomber entre les mains de l'ennemi."  (Roughly, "the system must not require secrecy and must be able to be stolen by the enemy without causing trouble.")
}}