Editing Juan Pujol García (section)

=== Operation Fortitude ===
In January 1944, the Germans told Pujol that they believed a large-scale invasion in Europe was imminent and asked to be kept informed. This invasion was [[Operation Overlord]], and Pujol played a leading role in [[Operation Fortitude]], the deception campaign to conceal Overlord. He sent over 500 radio messages between January 1944 and [[D-Day]], at times more than twenty messages per day.<ref name=MarkSeaman342>[[#Seaman|Seaman (2004)]]. p. 342 "...which at times amounted to more than twenty messages per day..."</ref> During planning for the Normandy beach invasion, the Allies decided that it was vitally important that the German leaders be misled into believing that the landing would happen at the [[Strait of Dover]].<ref name=MI5 />

In order to maintain his credibility, it was decided that Garbo (or one of his agents) should forewarn the Germans of the timing and some details of the actual invasion of Normandy, although sending it too late for them to take effective action. Special arrangements were made with the German radio operators to be listening to Garbo through the night of 5/6 June 1944 using the story that a sub-agent was about to arrive with important information. However, when the call was made at 3&nbsp;AM, no reply was received from the German operators until 8&nbsp;AM. This enabled Garbo to add more, genuine but now out-of-date, operational details to the message when finally received, and thus increase his standing with the Germans. Garbo told his German contacts that he was disgusted that his first message was missed, saying, "I cannot accept excuses or negligence. Were it not for my ideals I would abandon the work."<ref name=MI5/>

[[Image:DummyShermanTank.jpg|thumb|left|upright=1.25|An inflatable [[M4 Sherman]] tank of the [[First U.S. Army Group]]]]
On 9 June{{snd}}three days after D-day{{snd}}Garbo sent a message to German intelligence that was passed to [[Adolf Hitler]] and the {{lang|de|[[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht]]}} (OKW; German High Command).<ref name=Historynet/> Garbo said that he had conferred with his top agents and developed an [[order of battle]] showing 75 divisions in Britain; in reality, there were only about 50. Part of the "Fortitude" plan was to convince the Germans that a fictitious formation{{snd}}[[First U.S. Army Group]], comprising 11 divisions (150,000 men), commanded by General [[George Patton]]{{snd}}was stationed in southeast Britain.<ref name=MI5 />

The deception was supported by fake planes, inflatable tanks, and vans travelling about the area transmitting bogus radio chatter. Garbo's message pointed out that units from this formation had not participated in the invasion, and therefore the first landing should be considered a diversion. A German message to Madrid sent two days later said "all reports received in the last week from Arabel [spy network codename] undertaking have been confirmed without exception and are to be described as especially valuable."{{sfn|Masterman|2013|p=163}} A post-war examination of German records found that, during Operation Fortitude, no fewer than sixty-two of Pujol's reports were included in OKW intelligence summaries.<ref name=Pujol06>[[#Pujol|Pujol (1985)]]. p. [https://books.google.com/books?id=7tIDAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA196 196] "The post-war analysis demonstrated that, during the FORTITUDE campaign period, no less than sixty-two of his messages were quoted in the German high command's intelligence summaries."</ref>

OKW accepted Garbo's reports so completely that they kept two armoured divisions and 19 infantry divisions in the Pas de Calais waiting for a second invasion through July and August 1944. The German Commander-in-Chief in the west, Field Marshal [[Gerd von Rundstedt]], refused to allow General [[Erwin Rommel]] to move these divisions to Normandy.<ref name=MI5/> There were more German troops in the Pas de Calais region two months after the Normandy invasion than there had been on D-Day.<ref name=Pujol07>[[#Pujol|Pujol (1985)]]. p. 197 "Indeed, there were more German forces in that region at the end of June than there had been on D-Day."</ref>

In late June, Garbo was instructed by the Germans to report on the falling of [[V-1 flying bomb]]s. Finding no way of giving false information without arousing suspicion, and being unwilling to give correct information, Harris arranged for Garbo to be "arrested."<ref name=MarkSeaman259>[[#Seaman|Seaman (2004)]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ut5y5vwKyW4C&pg=PA75 p. 75], [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ut5y5vwKyW4C&pg=PA259 p. 259].</ref><ref name=MarkSeaman159>[[#Seaman|Seaman (2004)]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=7tIDAAAAMAAJ&&pg=PA159 p. 159].</ref> He returned to duty a few days later, now having a "need" to avoid London and forwarded an "official" letter of apology from the Home Secretary for his unlawful detention.<ref name=MarkSeaman159 /><ref name=MarkSeaman397>[[#Seaman|Seaman (2004)]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ut5y5vwKyW4C&pg=PA397 p. 397].</ref>

The Germans paid Pujol US$340,000<ref name="NatGeo">{{cite book|title=I Lie for a Living: Greatest Spies of All Time|last1=Shugaar|first1=Antony|first2=Steven|last2=Guarnaccia|year=2006|publisher=National Geographic |isbn=978-0-7922-5316-7|page=71|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oohnZw6xRkkC&pg=PA71|access-date=24 April 2020|archive-date=24 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211124235826/https://books.google.com/books?id=oohnZw6xRkkC&pg=PA71&hl=en |url-status=live}}</ref> over the course of the war to support his network of agents.<ref name=MarkSeaman40>[[#Seaman|Seaman (2004)]]. [https://books.google.com/books?id=Ut5y5vwKyW4C&pg=PA40 p. 40].</ref>