Editing Jacobo Árbenz (section)

===Government of Juan José Arévalo===
Arévalo described his ideology as "[[Juan José Arévalo#Spiritual socialism (Arevalismo)|spiritual socialism]]". He was anti-[[communist]] and believed in a capitalist society regulated to ensure that its benefits went to the entire population.{{sfn|Immerman|1982|pp=46–49}} Arévalo's ideology was reflected in the new constitution that was ratified by the Guatemalan assembly soon after his inauguration, which was one of the most progressive in Latin America. It mandated [[suffrage]] for all but illiterate women, a decentralization of power, and provisions for a multiparty system. [[Communist parties]] were forbidden.{{sfn|Immerman|1982|pp=46–49}} Once in office, Arévalo implemented these and other reforms, including minimum wage laws, increased educational funding, and labor reforms. The benefits of these reforms were largely restricted to the upper-middle classes and did little for the peasant agricultural laborers who made up the majority of the population.{{sfn|Streeter|2000|pp=15–16}}{{sfn|Immerman|1982|p=48}} Although his reforms were based on liberalism and capitalism, he was viewed with suspicion by the United States government, which would later portray him as a communist.{{sfn|Streeter|2000|pp=15–16}}{{sfn|Immerman|1982|p=48}}

When Árbenz was sworn in as defense minister under President Arévalo, he became the first to hold the portfolio, since it had previously been known as the ''Ministry of War''. In the fall of 1947, Árbenz, as defense minister, objected to the deportation of several workers after they had been accused of being communists. Well-known communist [[José Manuel Fortuny]] was intrigued by this action and decided to visit him, and found Árbenz to be different from the stereotypical Central American military officer. That first meeting was followed by others until Árbenz invited Fortuny to his house for discussions that usually extended for hours. Like Árbenz, Fortuny was inspired by a fierce nationalism and a burning desire to improve the conditions of the Guatemalan people, and, like Árbenz, he sought answers in Marxist theory. This relationship would strongly influence Árbenz in the future.{{sfn|Sabino|2007|pp=9–24}}

On 16 December 1945, Arévalo was incapacitated for a while after a car accident.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=51–57}} The leaders of the [[Revolutionary Action Party]] (PAR), which was the party that supported the government, were afraid that Arana would take the opportunity to launch a coup and so struck a deal with him, which later came to be known as the ''Pacto del Barranco'' (Pact of the Ravine).{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=51–57}} Under the terms of this pact, Arana agreed to refrain from seizing power with the military; in return, the PAR agreed to support Arana's candidacy in the next presidential election, scheduled for November 1950.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=51–57}} Arévalo himself recovered swiftly, but was forced to support the agreement.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=51–57}} However, by 1949 the [[National Renovation Party]] and the PAR were both openly hostile to Arana due to his lack of support for labor rights. The leftist parties decided to back Árbenz instead, as they believed that only a military officer could defeat Arana.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=58–60}} In 1947 Arana had demanded that certain labor leaders be expelled from the country; Árbenz vocally disagreed with Arana, and the former's intervention limited the number of deportees.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=58–60}}

The land reforms brought about by the Arévalo administration threatened the interests of the landed elite, who sought a candidate who would be more amenable to their terms. They began to prop up Arana as a figure of resistance to Arévalo's reforms.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=59–63}} The summer of 1949 saw intense political conflict in the councils of the Guatemalan military between supporters of Arana and those of Árbenz, over the choice of Arana's successor.{{efn|In order to run for election, the constitution required that Arana resign his military position by May 1950, and that his successor be chosen by Congress from a list submitted by the Consejo Superior de la Defensa, or CSD.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=59–69}} Elections for the CSD were scheduled for July 1949. The months before this election saw intense wrangling, as Arana supporters tried to gain control over the election process. Specifically, they wanted the election to be supervised by regional commanders loyal to Arana, rather than centrally dispatched observers.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=59–69}}}} On 16 July 1949, Arana delivered an ultimatum to Arévalo, demanding the expulsion of all of Árbenz's supporters from the cabinet and the military; he threatened a coup if his demands were not met. Arévalo informed Árbenz and other progressive leaders of the ultimatum; all agreed that Arana should be exiled.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=59–69}} Two days later, Arévalo and Arana had another meeting; on the way back, Arana's convoy was intercepted by a small force led by Árbenz. A shootout ensued, killing three men, including Arana. Historian [[Piero Gleijeses]] stated that Árbenz probably had orders to capture, rather than to kill, Arana.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=59–69}} Arana's supporters in the military rose up in revolt, but they were leaderless, and by the next day the rebels asked for negotiations. The coup attempt left approximately 150 dead and 200 wounded.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=59–69}} Árbenz and a few other ministers suggested that the entire truth be made public; however, they were overruled by the majority of the cabinet, and Arévalo made a speech suggesting that Arana had been killed for refusing to lead a coup against the government.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=59–69}} Árbenz kept his silence over the death of Arana until 1968, refusing to speak out without first obtaining Arévalo's consent. He tried to persuade Arévalo to tell the entire story when the two met in [[Montevideo]] in the 1950s, during their exile: however, Arévalo was unwilling, and Árbenz did not press his case.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|p=70}}