Editing Israel Putnam (section)

==Personality and characteristics==
Israel Putnam did not fit the stereotype of the taciturn [[New Englanders|New Englander]].  He was a gregarious tavern-keeper, a very industrious farmer, and an aggressive soldier, always looking for an excuse to discipline his soldiers. His farm was one of the most productive in the area (he bought out his partner and paid off his mortgage after only two years).{{sfn|Hubbard|2017|p=12}} In battle, he would lead from the front, not from behind.{{sfn|Hubbard|2017|p=37, 95, 99, 127}}{{sfn|Humphreys|1855|p=89}} After hours, he would lead his comrades in singing the popular drinking songs of the day.{{sfn|Hubbard|2017|p=228}}

Putnam served as Washington's second in command, and the two shared some key characteristics that other general officers of the time did not.  Neither one of them had as much education as elite people of the era had.  Putnam's lack of education and unsophisticated manner prompted a captured [[Hessian (soldier)|Hessian]] officer to comment that "This old gray-beard may be a good honest man, but nobody but the rebels would have made him a general."  Some of America's proper Philadelphians agreed.{{sfn|Livingston|1901|p=336}}<ref>Langguth, A. J.  ''Patriots: The Men Who Started the American Revolution,'' p. 425, Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, New York, New York, 1988.  {{ISBN|978-0-671-52375-6}}.</ref> However, the common soldier admired Putnam's courage and could see from his many visible battle scars that he knew what it was like to be on the front lines.  They knew that he had achieved his position through first-hand experience, rather than just education or family connections.  Historian [[Nathaniel Philbrick]] says flatly that "Israel Putnam was the provincial army's most beloved officer."{{sfn|Philbrick|2013|p=182}}{{sfn|Hubbard|2017|p=39, 41, 48, 70, 75, 76, 105, 106, 107, 151, 174, 175}}<ref>Miller, John C.  ''Origins of the American Revolution,'' pp. 398, 430, Little Brown and Company, Boston, Massachusetts, 1943.</ref>{{sfn|Livingston|1901|p=177, 198, 253, 295, 417}}

Putnam, whose spelling was a language all its own, nevertheless had a way with words.  Both Washington and Putnam had to use their words to put down mutinies (on separate occasions) by their long-suffering, disgruntled troops.  Biographer [[David Humphreys (soldier)|David Humphreys]], who witnessed the Putnam event, wrote about it as follows:

"The troops who had been badly fed, badly cloathed and worse paid ... formed the design of marching to [[Hartford]], where the General Assembly was then in session, and of demanding redress at the point of the bayonet.  Word having been brought to General Putnam that the second Brigade was under arms for this purpose, he mounted his horse, galloped to the Cantonment and thus addressed them:

"'My brave lads, whither are you going?  Do you intend to desert your Officers and to invite the enemy to follow you into the country?  Whose cause have you been fighting and suffering so long in, is it not your own?  Have you no property, no parents, wives or children?  You have behaved like men so far – all the world is full of your praises – and posterity will stand astonished at your deeds: but not if you spoil all at last.  Don't you consider how much the country is distressed by the war, and that your officers have not been any better paid than yourselves?  But we all expect better times and that the Country will do us ample justice.  Let us all stand by one another then and fight it out like brave Soldiers.  Think what a shame it would be for Connecticut men to run away from their officers.'"{{sfn|Hubbard|2017|p=161, 162}}{{sfn|Humphreys|1855|p=242-246}}{{sfn|Livingston|1901|p=384-385}}

Putnam's speech worked.  After he finished, "he directed the acting Major of Brigade to give the word for them to shoulder, march to their Regimental parades, and lodge arms.  All of which they executed with promptitude and apparent good humor."{{sfn|Hubbard|2017|p=161, 162}}{{sfn|Humphreys|1855|p=242-246}}{{sfn|Livingston|1901|p=384-385}}

After hearing of the mutiny, Washington wrote to Putnam commending him for his success in quelling it.  Putnam wrote to Washington that the incident had "not been repeated, or attended with any farther ill consequences.".{{sfn|Hubbard|2017|p=161, 162}}

Both Washington and Putnam were aggressive by nature and did not hesitate to put themselves in harm's way if that was what was called for in battle.  Both were fearless or at least able to function calmly while bullets whizzed around them.  Yet, each was nevertheless able to calculate risk and make decisions accordingly.  After leading inexperienced men in a successful engagement while being bombarded with cannonballs, Putnam commented, "I wish we could have something of the kind to do every day; it would teach our men how little danger there is from cannon balls, for though they have sent a great many at us, nobody has been hurt by them."{{sfn|Hubbard|2017|p=44, 77, 79, 118, 119, 157}}{{sfn|Livingston|1901|p=204}}{{sfn|Philbrick|2013|p=186}}

Putnam has been criticized by historians as having not been a great strategic thinker, and during one of the planning sessions during the [[siege of Boston]] with Washington and his senior officers, Putnam grew tired of the endless discussion, and went to the window and started observing the British.  Washington invited him back to the planning table, and Putnam responded, "Oh, my dear General, you may plan the battle to suit yourself, and I will fight it."{{sfn|Livingston|1901|p=270}}{{sfn|Hubbard|2017|p=119}}

However, Putnam was not without the ability to foresee both effective battlefield strategy and the big picture.  He ordered his men to aim for the British officers, knowing the crippling effect it would have.  He knew the value of inoculating the American troops against [[small pox]], and the tendency of nervous soldiers to fire too soon and aim too high (possibly thus the orders to not fire until "you see the whites of their eyes" and to "Take aim at the waistbands.").{{sfn|Nelson|2011|p=274-275}}{{sfn|Hubbard|2017|p=88, 140}}{{sfn|Borneman|2014|p=368}}{{sfn|Livingston|1901|p=228}}<ref>Thompson, John M.  ''The Revolutionary War,'' p. 38, National Geographic Society, Washington, D.C., 2004.  {{ISBN|0-7922-6734-6}}.</ref> 
 
Putnam had a feel for the common soldier and how to make good use of him.  He knew that a soldier was not worried about his head, but if his body was protected with earthworks, he would "fight forever."  Putnam also understood that a retreat could be a very effective tactic.  "Let me pick my officers, and I would not fear to meet [the enemy] with half the number...  I would fight them on the retreat, and every stone wall we passed should be lined with their dead ... our men are lighter of foot, they understand their grounds and how to take advantage of them…"{{sfn|Hubbard|2017|p=76, 82, 83}}{{sfn|Livingston|1901|p=212}}

For one who was not supposed to be much of a strategic thinker, in some cases he was more prescient than his fellow generals.  In discussion with [[Joseph Warren]] and General [[Artemas Ward]] before the Battle of Bunker Hill, Putnam advocated aggressive action against the British.  Ward replied that "As peace and reconciliation is what we seek for, would it not be better to act only on the defensive and give no unnecessary provocation?"  Putnam turned to Warren and said with emphasis, "You know, Dr. Warren, we shall have no peace worth anything, till we gain it by the sword."{{sfn|Hubbard|2017|p=78}}

Shortly after Washington took command at Cambridge in 1775, he and the other generals hoped for a speedy resolution of the war.  On one occasion with them gathered around his dinner table, Washington offered a toast: "A speedy and honorable peace."  A few days later, Putnam offered a different one: "A long and moderate war."  The sober and seldom-smiling Washington laughed out loud.  Washington addressed Putnam, "You are the last man, General Putnam, from whom I should have expected such a toast, you who are always urging vigorous measures, to plead now for a long, and what is still more extraordinary, a moderate, war, seems strange indeed."  Putnam replied that a false peace would divide Americans and not be long-lasting.  Putnam went on, "I expect nothing but a long war, and I would have it a moderate one, that we may hold out till the mother country becomes willing to cast us off forever."{{sfn|Livingston|1901|p=256-257}}{{sfn|Hubbard|2017|p=55}}

The Revolutionary War would drag on for eight and a half years, the longest in United States history until the [[Vietnam War]]. Washington did not soon forget Putnam's prescient toast. For years after, he more than once reminded Putnam of it.{{sfn|Livingston|1901|p=256-257}}{{sfn|Hubbard|2017|p=55}}