Editing Hu Jintao (section)

==Leadership==
{{See also|Hu–Wen Administration}}

===Succeeding Jiang===
[[File:中國國家主席胡錦濤.jpg|thumb|left|Hu speaks as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and President of China]]
On 15 November 2002, after the [[16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party]], a new Hu Jintao-led Politburo nominally succeeded Jiang's, while Hu became the CCP general secretary, effectively making him the [[paramount leader]]. Additionally, [[Wen Jiabao]] became the premier. However, Jiang was re-elected to the post of [[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|chairman of the Central Military Commission]], the top military body, despite Hu taking over as the general secretary.<ref>{{Cite thesis |title=胡錦濤與江澤民的權力分配與權力互動（2003.11-2004.9） |url=https://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh1?DocID=U0002-1307201513580400 |publisher=淡江大學 |date=2015 |degree=Master's Thesis |doi=10.6846/tku.2015.00333 |language=zh |first=陳世 |last=豪 |access-date=28 October 2020 |archive-date=1 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201101020222/https://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh1?DocID=U0002-1307201513580400 |url-status=live}}</ref> Jiang resigned as CMC chairman in September 2004, his last official post. Following Jiang's stepping-down, Hu had officially taken on the three institutions in the People's Republic of China where power lie; the party, the state, as well as the [[People's Liberation Army|military]].

Although Jiang, then 76, stepped down as general secretary and from the Politburo Standing Committee to make way for a younger leadership, there was speculation that Jiang would retain significant influence because Hu was not associated with Jiang's influential [[Shanghai clique]], to which six out of the nine members of the all-powerful Standing Committee were believed to be linked. However, later developments show that many of its members had shifted their positions. [[Zeng Qinghong]], for example, moved from a disciple of Jiang to serving as an intermediary between the two factions.<ref>{{cite news |last=Wu |first=Zhong |date=7 February 2007 |title=Power in China: Through a glass, darkly |work=[[Asia Times]] |url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IB07Ad01.html |url-status=unfit |access-date=16 May 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080709012943/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IB07Ad01.html |archive-date=9 July 2008}}</ref>

Hu was mostly conservative on political reforms during his tenure.<ref>{{cite news |last=Luard |first=Tim |date=11 January 2005 |title=China's leader shows his stripes |work=[[BBC News]] |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4165209.stm |url-status=live |access-date=13 March 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100822154247/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4165209.stm |archive-date=22 August 2010}}</ref> In the beginning of 2006, Hu launched the "[[Eight Honors and Eight Shames]]" movement in a bid to promote a more selfless and moral outlook amongst the population.<ref name="Ewing, 2003" /> At the [[17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|17th CCP National Congress]], Hu was re-elected as general secretary of the Central Committee and chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission on 22 October 2007. At the [[11th National People's Congress]], Hu was re-elected as president on 15 March 2008. He was also re-elected as chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission.<ref>{{Cite news |date=15 March 2008 |title=Hu Jintao reelected Chinese president |work=[[China Daily]] |agency=[[Xinhua News Agency]] |url=https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008npc/2008-03/15/content_6539302.htm |access-date=7 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304055352/http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008npc/2008-03/15/content_6539302.htm |archive-date=4 March 2016}}</ref>

===Domestic policy===
====SARS crisis====
The first crisis of Hu's leadership happened during the [[2002–2004 SARS outbreak|outbreak of SARS]] in 2003. Following strong criticism of China for initially covering up and responding slowly to the crisis, he dismissed several party and government officials, including the health minister, who supported Jiang, and the [[Mayor of Beijing]], [[Meng Xuenong]], widely perceived as Hu's protégé.<ref name="Ewing, 2003"/>

[[File:Hu Jintao and Barack Obama 2009.jpg|thumb|Hu talks with U.S. President [[Barack Obama]] at the [[2009 G20 Pittsburgh summit]]]]
[[File:George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush with Hu Jintao.jpg|thumb|right|Hu with U.S. President [[George W. Bush]] and former U.S. president [[George H. W. Bush]] in Beijing, 10 August 2008]]

====Economic policies====
Hu and [[Wen Jiabao]] took a more conservative approach towards reforms, and began to reverse some of Deng Xiaoping's reforms in 2005. Observers note that the government adopted more egalitarian and populist policies.<ref>{{harvnb|Naughton|2008|p=129}}</ref> The administration increased subsidies and control over the health care sector,<ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Ramzy |first=Austin |date=9 April 2009 |title=China's New Healthcare Could Cover Millions More |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]] |url=https://time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1890306,00.html |access-date=16 September 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130826183344/http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1890306,00.html |archive-date=26 August 2013}}</ref> increased funding for education, halted privatization,<ref name="scissors">{{cite journal |last1=Scissors |first1=Derek |date=May–June 2009 |title=Deng Undone: The Costs of Halting Market Reform in China |url=http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64947/derek-scissors/deng-undone |url-status=live |journal=[[Foreign Affairs]] |volume=88 |issue=3 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150421035402/http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64947/derek-scissors/deng-undone |archive-date=21 April 2015 |access-date=30 September 2014}}</ref> and adopted a loose monetary policy, which led to the formation of a U.S.-style property bubble in which property prices tripled.<ref>Chovanec, Patrick (8 June 2009). [http://www.feer.com/economics/2009/june53/Chinas-Real-Estate-Riddle "China's Real Estate Riddle"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090614235233/http://www.feer.com/economics/2009/june53/Chinas-Real-Estate-Riddle|date=14 June 2009}}. ''Far East Economic Review''. Retrieved 13 March 2010.</ref>

The privileged state sector was the primary recipient of government investment, which, under the new administration, promoted the rise of large [[national champions]] which could compete with large foreign corporations.<ref name="scissors" /> During Hu's administration, the Chinese government increasingly funded the consolidation of [[State-owned enterprises of China|state-owned enterprises]] (SOEs), supplying massive subsidies and favoring SOEs in regulatory matters.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=217}} These efforts helped SOEs to crowd out foreign and domestic private sector competitors.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=217}} Nevertheless, the share of SOEs in the total number of companies have continued to fall, dropping to 5%, though their share of total output remained at 26%. Exchange rates for the yuan were also liberalized and the peg to the [[United States dollar|U.S. dollar]] was broken, leading the yuan to rise by 31% against the dollar from 2005 to 2012.<ref name=":27">{{Cite news |last=Orlik |first=Tom |date=16 November 2012 |title=Charting China's Economy: 10 Years Under Hu |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CJB-16841 |access-date=7 June 2023}}</ref> China's economic growth has averaged around 10% under Hu, while the economy surpassed the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan.<ref>{{Cite news |date=14 February 2011 |title=China overtakes Japan as world's second-biggest economy |work=[[BBC News]] |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/business-12427321 |access-date=7 June 2023 |archive-date=6 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190806095433/https://www.bbc.com/news/business-12427321 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":27" />

After taking over, Hu and Wen proposed to set up a [[Harmonious Society]] which aimed at lessening inequality and changing the style of the "GDP first and Welfare Second" policies.<ref name="Kuhn">{{cite web |title=Kuhn, Robert Lawrence: Hu's Political Philosophies |url=http://www.esnips.com/doc/907de9f2-a212-46b3-9efe-d23813bc03f3/Kuhn-Media-Press-Hu-Jintao.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090325103630/http://www.esnips.com/doc/907de9f2-a212-46b3-9efe-d23813bc03f3/Kuhn-Media-Press-Hu-Jintao.pdf |archive-date=25 March 2009 |access-date=13 March 2010 |publisher=Esnips.com}}</ref> They focused on sectors of the Chinese population that had been left behind by the economic reform, and took a number of high-profile trips to the poorer areas of China with the stated goal of understanding these areas better. Hu and Wen Jiabao also attempted to move China away from a policy of favouring economic growth at all costs and toward a more balanced view of growth that includes factors in social inequality and environmental damage, including the use of the [[green gross domestic product]] in personnel decisions. Jiang's clique, however, maintained control in most developing areas; as a result, Hu and Wen's macroeconomic regulation measures faced great resistance.<ref name="Ewing, 2003" />

==== Media ====
In media policy, Hu discussed the idea of "channeling" public opinion, a term he first used in a 23 January 2007 Politburo meeting.<ref name=":Wang">{{Cite book |last=Wang |first=Frances Yaping |title=The Art of State Persuasion: China's Strategic Use of Media in Interstate Disputes |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9780197757512}}</ref>{{Rp|page=71}} Hu stated that the Party should "grasp the online discourse power, enhance our ability to channel [[Internet in China|online]] discussions, emphasize the art of 'channeling', actively leverage new technologies, increase positive coverage, and promote a positive mainstream discourse."<ref name=":Wang" />{{Rp|page=71}} In an online discussion via the Strong China Forum, Hu stated that China should "strengthen our [[Mass media in China|traditional media]] and new media and form a new setting for channeling public opinion".<ref name=":Wang" />{{Rp|pages=71-72}}

====Tibet====
{{Main|2008 Tibetan unrest}}

====Hong Kong====
{{Main|Democratic development in Hong Kong}}
[[File:2012七一遊行 3.jpg|thumb|Protests against Hu in [[Hong Kong]], July 2012]]

=== Foreign policy ===
{{See also|List of international trips made by Hu Jintao}}
[[File:Dmitry Medvedev in China 14 April 2011-2.jpeg|thumb|Hu with the leaders of the [[BRICS]] countries (from left, [[Manmohan Singh|Singh]], [[Dmitry Medvedev|Medvedev]], [[Dilma Rousseff|Rousseff]] and [[Jacob Zuma|Zuma]]) in April 2011]]
[[File:Secretary Clinton, VIce President Biden and Dr. Biden Co-Host a Luncheon in Honor of Chinese President Hu Jintao (5371703392).jpg|thumb|Hu at a 2011 luncheon with [[Vice President of the United States|U.S. Vice President]] [[Joe Biden]] and [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[Hillary Clinton]]]]
[[File:The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh and the President of China, Mr. Hu Jintao in a press conference held by the leaders of five Outreach Countries (O5) during G-8 Summit, at Sapporo, Japan on July 08, 2008.jpg|thumb|Hu with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during the [[34th G8 summit|2008 G8 Summit]], in [[Sapporo]], Japan]]
[[File:Hu Protest2 (5367462375).jpg|thumb|Protests against Hu during his 2011 U.S. visit]]
Under Hu's leadership, China continued its style of developmental diplomacy which had been adopted under Deng Xiaoping and continued by Jiang Zemin.<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1332788951 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |location=Stanford, California |pages=11 |oclc=1332788951}}</ref><ref name="Ewing, 2003" /> China's international behavior continued to be generally pragmatic and predictable.<ref name=":02" /> Hu pledged that China would seek peaceful development in a harmonious world to assure the international community that China's economic growth offered opportunities and benefits rather than conflicts.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1332788951 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2022 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |location=Stanford, California |pages=51 |oclc=1332788951}}</ref> The key attributes of a harmonious world view of foreign policy are building and accepting a world where countries diverge in their paths of national development and political systems, coexistence of diverse civilizations, and rejected unilateralism and hegemonic ambitions.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1331741429 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3088-8 |location=Stanford, California |pages=75 |oclc=1331741429 |access-date=5 January 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306101710/https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1331741429 |url-status=live }}</ref>

In 2006, Hu articulated the four phases of China's foreign policy developmental objectives: (1) big powers were the key, (2) periphery countries the priority, (3) developing countries the foundation, and (4) multilateralism the stage.<ref name=":2" />

In 2009, Chinese leader Hu Jintao called for a bolstered arms control agenda at the United Nations General Assembly, joining United States President [[Barack Obama]]'s earlier calls for a nuclear-free world.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1331741429 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3088-8 |location=Stanford, California |pages=237 |oclc=1331741429 |author-link=Suisheng Zhao |access-date=5 January 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306101710/https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1331741429 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Throughout Hu's tenure, China's cooperation with [[Global North and Global South|global south]] countries increased.<ref name=":7">{{Cite book |last=Garlick |first=Jeremy |title=Advantage China: Agent of Change in an Era of Global Disruption |date=2024 |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |isbn=978-1-350-25231-8}}</ref>{{Rp|page=79}}

He sought to develop China's [[China–Japan relations|relationship with Japan]], which he visited in 2008.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Spencer |first=Richard |date=6 May 2008 |title=China's President Hu Jintao visits Japan |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/1930258/Chinas-President-Hu-Jintao-visits-Japan.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221022214958/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/1930258/Chinas-President-Hu-Jintao-visits-Japan.html |archive-date=22 October 2022 |access-date=22 October 2022 |website=[[The Daily Telegraph]]}}</ref> He downgraded [[China–Russia relations|relations with Russia]] because of unfulfilled deals.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://thediplomat.com/2011/07/chinese-foreign-policy-after-hu/|title=Chinese Foreign Policy After Hu|last=Pei|first=Minxin|website=thediplomat.com|access-date=19 January 2020|archive-date=2 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210302204802/https://thediplomat.com/2011/07/chinese-foreign-policy-after-hu/|url-status=live}}</ref>

Hu emphasized an [[China's core interests|international relations premise of "shared responsibility": China would contribute to global common good, but it must not adversely affect its core]] interests in doing so, and its commitments must be conditional to those of other nations.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1331741429 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3088-8 |location=Stanford, California |pages=76 |oclc=1331741429 |access-date=5 January 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306101710/https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1331741429 |url-status=live }}</ref> In the analysis of academic [[Suisheng Zhao]], under Hu's leadership, "China remained a reluctant rising power and selectively took on global and regional obligations. Chinese foreign policy became omnidirectional, multilevel, and multidimensional."<ref name=":2" />

====Taiwan====
Early in his [[Hu–Wen Administration|leadership]], Hu faced a pro-independence counterpart in then [[Taiwan|Republic of China]] (ROC) president [[Chen Shui-bian]]. Chen called for talks without any preconditions, repudiating the [[1992 Consensus]]. Chen Shui-bian and the [[Democratic Progressive Party]] (DPP) had continued to express an ultimate goal of [[de jure]] [[Taiwanese independence]], and made statements on the [[political status of Taiwan]] that the PRC considers provocative. Hu's initial response was a combination of "soft" and "hard" approaches. On the one hand, Hu expressed a flexibility to negotiate on many issues of concern to Taiwan. On the other hand, he continued to refuse talks without preconditions and remained committed to [[Chinese unification]] as an ultimate goal. While Hu gave some signs of being more flexible with regard to political relationships with Taiwan as in his [[May 17 Statement]], where he offered to address the issue of "international living space" for Taiwan, Hu's government remained firm in its position that the PRC would not tolerate any attempt by the Taiwanese government to declare de jure independence from China.<ref name="Zhao Suisheng 2010" />

After Chen's re-election in 2004, Hu's government changed tactics, conducting a no-contact policy with Taiwan due to Chen and the DPP's independence leanings and repudiation of the 1992 consensus. The government maintained its military build-up against Taiwan, and pursued a vigorous policy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically. In March 2005, the [[Anti-Secession Law]] was passed by the [[National People's Congress]], formalizing "non-peaceful means" as an option of response to a declaration of independence in Taiwan.

Hu's government increased contacts with the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT), its former foe in the [[Chinese Civil War]], and still a major party in Taiwan.<ref name=":322">{{Cite book |last=Hammond |first=Ken |title=China's Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future |publisher=1804 Books |year=2023 |isbn=9781736850084 |location=New York, NY |pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=138}} The increased contacts culminated in the [[2005 Pan-Blue visits to mainland China]], including a historic meeting between Hu and then-KMT chairman [[Lien Chan]] in April 2005. This was the first meeting between the leaders of the two parties since the conclusion of World War II.<ref>{{cite news |last=Sisci |first=Francesco |date=5 April 2005 |title=Strange cross-Taiwan Strait bedfellows |work=[[Asia Times]] |url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GD05Ad08.html |url-status=unfit |access-date=15 May 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080512150111/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GD05Ad08.html |archive-date=12 May 2008}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last=Zhong |first=Wu |date=29 March 2005 |title=KMT makes China return in historic trip to ease tensions |work=The Standard |url=http://www.thestandard.com.hk/stdn/std/Front_Page/GC29Aa02.html |url-status=dead |access-date=16 May 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080602220112/http://www.thestandard.com.hk/stdn/std/Front_Page/GC29Aa02.html |archive-date=2 June 2008}}</ref>

On 20 March 2008, the Kuomintang under [[Ma Ying-jeou]] won the presidency in Taiwan, and a majority in the [[Legislative Yuan]]. Thereafter Hu immediately turned to a more 'soft' diplomatic approach and opened the way to a thaw in relations between the two sides.<ref>{{cite news |last=Sisci |first=Francesco |date=28 June 2006 |title=Hu Jintao and the new China |work=[[Asia Times]] |url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HF28Ad01.html |url-status=unfit |access-date=15 May 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080706184832/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HF28Ad01.html |archive-date=6 July 2008}}</ref> A series of historic meetings between the CCP and KMT have followed. On 12 April 2008, Hu Jintao met with Taiwan's vice president-elect [[Vincent Siew]] in the latter's role as chairman of the Cross-strait Common Market Foundation during the [[Boao Forum for Asia]]. On 28 May 2008, Hu met with KMT chairman [[Wu Po-hsiung]], the first meeting between the heads of the CCP and the KMT as ruling parties. During this meeting, Hu and Wu agreed that both sides should re-commence official dialogue under the 1992 consensus &ndash; that "both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition." Wu committed the new government in Taiwan against Taiwanese independence; Hu committed his government to addressing the concerns of the Taiwanese people in regard to security, dignity, and "international living space", with a priority given to allowing Taiwan to participate in the [[World Health Organization]].

In addition to the party-to-party dialogue, de facto governmental dialogue took place via the [[Straits Exchange Foundation]] and the [[Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits]] in June 2008 on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, with the first meeting held in Beijing. Both Hu and his new counterpart [[Ma Ying-jeou]] agreed that the 1992 Consensus is the basis for negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan strait. On 26 March 2008, Hu Jintao held a telephone talk with then US president [[George W. Bush]], in which he became the first Chinese leader to officially recognize the 1992 Consensus.<ref>{{cite news |date=27 March 2008 |title=Chinese, U.S. presidents hold telephone talks on Taiwan, Tibet |publisher=Xinhuanet |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/27/content_7865209.htm |url-status=dead |access-date=15 May 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080512002546/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/27/content_7865209.htm |archive-date=12 May 2008}}</ref> After several months of negotiations, in December 2008, the two sides agreed on the resumption of the [[Three Links]], i.e., a re-opening of mail, trade, and direct air links between the two sides. Relations continued to be cordial between the two sides during Hu's tenure, and trade increased immensely, culminating in the signing of the preferential trade agreement [[Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement]] (ECFA) in 2010.

===Transition to Xi===
{{Main|18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party}}
{{See also|12th National People's Congress}}
On 15 November 2012, immediately after the [[18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|18th CCP National Congress]], Xi was elected to the posts of general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the CMC by the 18th Central Committee, succeeding Hu.<ref>{{cite news |date=17 November 2012 |title=China Confirms Leadership Change |work=[[BBC News]] |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20322288 |access-date=15 November 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160729201558/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20322288 |archive-date=29 July 2016}}</ref> On 14 March 2013, he was succeeded by Xi as president.<ref>{{cite news |last=Demick |first=Barbara |author-link=Barbara Demick |date=13 March 2013 |title=China's Xi Jinping formally assumes title of president |newspaper=[[Los Angeles Times]] |url=http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-china-xi-presidency-20130313,0,1240600.story |url-status=live |access-date=16 March 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130316021753/http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-china-xi-presidency-20130313,0,1240600.story |archive-date=16 March 2013}}</ref>