Editing Hannibal (section)

===Battle of Lake Trasimene===
{{Main|Battle of Lake Trasimene}}
[[File:Battle of lake trasimene.gif|300px|thumb|The [[Battle of Lake Trasimene]], 217&nbsp;BC.<br />From the Department of History, United States Military Academy]]
Hannibal quartered his troops for the winter with the Gauls, whose support for him had abated. Fearing the possibility of an assassination attempt by his Gallic allies, Hannibal had a number of wigs made, dyed to suit the appearance of persons differing widely in age, and kept constantly changing them, so that any would-be assassins wouldn't recognize him.<ref name=":1" /> In the spring of 217&nbsp;BC, Hannibal decided to find a more reliable base of operations farther south. [[Gnaeus Servilius Geminus|Gnaeus Servilius]] and [[Gaius Flaminius (consul 223 BC)|Gaius Flaminius]] (the new consuls of Rome) were expecting Hannibal to advance on Rome, and they took their armies to block the eastern and western routes that Hannibal could use.<ref>Polybius, ''Histories'', Book III, 77</ref>

The only alternative route to central Italy lay at the mouth of the [[Arno]]. This area was practically one huge marsh, and happened to be overflowing more than usual during this particular season. Hannibal knew that this route was full of difficulties, but it remained the surest and certainly the quickest way to central Italy. Polybius claims that Hannibal's men marched for four days and three nights "through a land that was under water", suffering terribly from fatigue and enforced want of sleep. He crossed without opposition over both the [[Apennine Mountains|Apennines]] (during which he lost his right eye<ref>{{cite book |author1=John Selby Watson |author2=Marcus Junianus |author3=Justinus, Cornelius |author4=Nepos, Eutropius | url = https://archive.org/details/justincornelius00watsgoog/page/n44|quote=hannibal greatest. | title = Justin, Cornelius Nepos, and Eutropius: Literally Translated, with Notes | year = 1853 | publisher = H. G. Bohn | page = 420 | access-date = 23 July 2008}}</ref> because of [[conjunctivitis]]) and the seemingly impassable Arno, but he lost a large part of his force in the marshy lowlands of the Arno.<ref>Polybius, ''Histories'', Book III, p. 74</ref> He arrived in [[Etruria]] in the spring of 217&nbsp;BC and decided to lure the main Roman army under Flaminius into a pitched battle by devastating the region that Flaminius had been sent to protect. As Polybius recounts, "he [Hannibal] calculated that, if he passed the camp and made a descent into the district beyond, Flaminius (partly for fear of popular reproach and partly of personal irritation) would be unable to endure watching passively the devastation of the country but would spontaneously follow him... and give him opportunities for attack."<ref>[[B. H. Liddell Hart|Liddell Hart, B.H.]], ''Strategy'', New York, Penguin Group, 1967.</ref> 

At the same time, Hannibal tried to break the allegiance of Rome's allies by proving that Flaminius was powerless to protect them. Despite this, Flaminius remained passively encamped at Arretium. Hannibal marched boldly around Flaminius' left flank, unable to draw him into battle by mere devastation, and effectively cut him off from Rome, executing the first recorded [[turning movement]] in military history. He then advanced through the uplands of [[Etruria]], provoking Flaminius into a hasty pursuit and catching him in a [[defile (geography)|defile]] on the shore of [[Lake Trasimeno|Lake Trasimenus]]. There Hannibal destroyed Flaminius' army in the waters or on the adjoining slopes, killing Flaminius as well (see [[Battle of Lake Trasimene]]). This was the most costly ambush that the Romans ever sustained until the [[Battle of Carrhae]] against the [[Parthian Empire]]. Hannibal had now disposed of the only field force that could check his advance upon Rome. He realized that without [[siege engine]]s, he could not hope to take the capital. He opted to exploit his victory by entering into central and southern Italy and encouraging a general revolt against the sovereign power.<ref>[http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/hannibal/Parker_J_P_01.pdf USAWC] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151031070310/http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/hannibal/Parker_J_P_01.pdf|date=31 October 2015}} ''Comparing Strategies of the 2nd Punic War'' by James Parker.</ref>

The Romans appointed [[Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus]] as their dictator. Departing from Roman military traditions, Fabius adopted the [[Fabian strategy|strategy named after him]], avoiding open battle while placing several Roman armies in Hannibal's vicinity in order to watch and limit his movements. Hannibal ravaged Apulia but was unable to bring Fabius to battle, so he decided to march through [[Samnium]] to [[Campania]], one of the richest and most fertile provinces of Italy, hoping that the devastation would draw Fabius into battle. Fabius closely followed Hannibal's path of destruction, yet still refused to let himself be drawn out of the defensive. This strategy was unpopular with many Romans, who believed that it was a form of cowardice.

Hannibal decided that it would be unwise to winter in the already devastated lowlands of Campania, but Fabius had trapped him there by ensuring that all the exit passes were blocked. This situation led to the night [[Battle of Ager Falernus]]. Hannibal had his men tie burning torches to the horns of a herd of cattle and drive them up the heights nearby. Some of the Romans, seeing a moving column of lights, were tricked into believing it was the Carthaginian army marching to escape along the heights. As they moved off in pursuit of this decoy, Hannibal managed to move his army in complete silence through the dark lowlands and up to an unguarded pass. Fabius himself was within striking distance but in this case his caution worked against him, as rightly sensing a trick he stayed put. Thus, Hannibal managed to stealthily escape with his entire army intact. What Hannibal achieved in extricating his army was, as [[Adrian Goldsworthy]] puts it, "a classic of ancient generalship, finding its way into nearly every historical narrative of the war and being used by later military manuals".<ref>Goldsworthy, Adrian K. ''The Roman Army at War 100 BC&nbsp;– AD 200'', New York</ref> This was a severe blow to Fabius' prestige and soon after this his period of dictatorial power ended. For the winter, Hannibal found comfortable quarters in the [[Apulia]]n plain.