Editing Georgy Zhukov (section)

=== Before the War ===
==== Pre-war military exercises ====
[[File:Жуков и Тимошенко, 1940 год.jpg|thumb|upright|left|Zhukov and [[Semyon Timoshenko]] in 1940]]
In the autumn of 1940, Zhukov started preparing plans for the [[military exercise]] concerning the defence of the Western border of the Soviet Union. It had been pushed further to the west after the Soviet Union annexed eastern Poland and the Baltic republics.<ref>{{cite book|chapter = Folio 37977. inventory 5, file 564, sheets 32–34|title = Central State Archive of the Red Army|publisher = [[TsAMO RF|TsGAKA]]}}</ref> In his memoirs, Zhukov reports that in this exercise, he commanded the Western or Blue forces—the supposed invasion troops—and his opponent was Colonel General [[Dmitry Pavlov (general)|Dmitry Pavlov]], the commander of the Eastern or Red forces—the supposed Soviet troops. He noted that Blue had 60&nbsp;divisions, while Red had 50&nbsp;divisions. Zhukov describes the exercise as being similar to events that later took place during the German invasion.{{sfn|Zhukov|2002|pp=224–225}}

:''"In this military exercise, I commanded Blue forces representing the Germans, while Pavlov, the commander of Western Military District, commanded the Red forces representing our army [...] After knowing the original documents and the real amount of German forces, when commanding the Blue Forces, I had the attacks developed into three directions, that in the following event the Germans also attacked us in the same manners. The main strikes of us that time was also similar to the main strikes of the Germans later. The army groups built was also nearly similar to the army groups that the Germans formed during the war. [...] Comrade [Stalin] asked why the Blue forces was so powerful, why the original documents of the military exercise allocated too many large forces for the German. He was replied that such forces corresponded to the German capability and the real calculation about the potential forces that the German could unleash after they managed to achieve great superiority on the main axes. That sufficiently showed why the Blue forces could make strong advances during the military exercise.''"<ref>Konstantin Simonov. Notes about the biography of Zhukov. Translated to Vietnamese by Trần Anh Tuấn and published in Vietnam by Publisher of the People's Army in 2004. [https://sachcugiadinh.com/but-ky-ve-tieu-su-giucop/]</ref>

Russian historian Bobylev noted that the details of the exercises were reported differently by the various participants who published memoirs.<ref name="Bobylev">П. Н. БОБЫЛЕВ "Репетиция катастрофы" // "Военно-исторический журнал" № 7, 8, 1993 г. [http://rkka.ru/analys/kshu/main.htm]</ref> He said that there were two exercises; one from 2 to 6 January 1941, for the North-West direction; another from 8 to 11 January, for the South-West direction.<ref name="Bobylev"/> During the first, Western forces attacked Eastern forces on 15&nbsp;July, but the Eastern forces counterattacked and, by 1 August, reached the original border.<ref name="Bobylev"/>

At the time, the Eastern forces had a numerical advantage: 51 infantry divisions against 41; 8,811&nbsp;tanks against 3,512—with the exception of anti-tank guns.<ref name="Bobylev"/> Bobylev describes how by the end of the exercise, the Eastern forces did not manage to surround and destroy the Western forces. In their turn, the Western forces threatened to surround the Eastern forces.<ref name="Bobylev"/> The same historian reported that the second game was won by the Easterners, meaning that on the whole, both games were won by the side commanded by Zhukov.<ref name="Bobylev"/> However, he noted that the games had a serious disadvantage since they did not consider an initial attack by Western forces, but only an attack by Eastern forces from the initial border.<ref name="Bobylev"/>

According to Marshal [[Aleksandr Vasilevsky]], the war-game defeat of Pavlov's Red Troops against Zhukov was not widely known. The victory of Zhukov's Blue Troops was widely publicized, which created a popular illusion of easy success for a preemptive offensive.{{sfn|Vasilevsky|1973|p=24}} On 1&nbsp;February 1941, Zhukov became chief of the Red Army's [[General Staff]].{{sfn|Zhukov|2002|p=205}} He was also elected a candidate member of the [[Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] In February 1941, and was appointed a Deputy People's Commissar for Defence in March.

==== Soviet offensive controversy ====
{{see also|Soviet offensive plans controversy}}
From 2 February 1941, as the chief of the general staff, and Deputy Minister of Defense, Zhukov was said to take part in drawing up the "Strategic plan for deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of war with Germany and its allies."<ref>A. M. Vasilevsky (May 1941) {{cite web|url=http://www.tuad.nsk.ru/~history/Russia/USSR/1936-1941/soobr.htm |title=Соображения по плану стратегического развёртывания сил Советского Союза на случай войны с Германией и её союзниками |access-date=4 June 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071219152133/http://www.tuad.nsk.ru/~history/Russia/USSR/1936-1941/soobr.htm |archive-date=19 December 2007 }}. tuad.nsk.ru</ref> The plan was completed no later than 15 May 1941, according to a dated document found in the Soviet archives after they were declassified in the 1990s. Some researchers, such as [[Victor Suvorov]], have theorized that on 14 May, Soviet People's Commissar of Defense [[Semyon Timoshenko]] and General Zhukov presented these plans to Stalin for a preemptive attack against Germany through Southern Poland.

Soviet forces would occupy the [[Vistula]] Border and continue to [[Katowice]] or even [[Berlin]]—should the main German armies retreat—or the Baltic coast, should German forces not retreat and be forced to protect Poland and [[East Prussia]]. The attacking Soviets were supposed to reach [[Siedlce]], [[Dęblin]], and then capture [[Warsaw]] before penetrating toward the southwest and imposing final defeat at [[Lublin]].<ref>[[Viktor Suvorov]] (2006). [http://tapirr.com/texts/history/suvorov/pravda/nevezhin.htm Стратегические замыслы Сталина накануне 22 июня 1941 года], in ''Правда Виктора Суворова: переписывая историю Второй мировой'', Moscow: Yauza</ref>

Historians do not have the original documents that could verify the existence of such a plan, and there is no evidence that Stalin accepted it. In a transcript of an interview on 26 May 1965, Zhukov said that Stalin did not approve the plan. But Zhukov did not clarify whether execution was attempted. {{As of|1999}}, no other approved plan for a Soviet attack had been found.<ref>[[Mikhail Meltyukhov|Mikhail I. Meltyukhov]] (1999) ''Упущенный шанс Сталина. Советский Союз и борьба за Европу, 1939–1941''. Moscow</ref>

On 10 June 1941, Zhukov sent a message to the Military Council of the Kiev Special Military District, after someone, most likely the commander of the Kiev district, [[Mikhail Kirponos]], had ordered troops on the border to occupy forward positions. Zhukov ordered: "Such action could provoke the Germans into armed confrontation fraught with all sorts of consequences. Revoke this order immediately and report who, specifically, gave such an unauthorised order." On 11 June, he sent a telegram saying that his immediate superior, Timoshenko, had ordered that they were to report back by 16 June confirming that the troops had been withdrawn from their forward positions." According to the historian David E. Murphy, "the action by Timoshenko and Zhukov must have been initiated at the request of Stalin."<ref>{{cite book |last=Murphy |first=David E. |title=What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa |publisher=[[Yale University Press]] |location=New Haven, CT |date=2005 |pages=135–136 |isbn=0-300-10780-3}}</ref>

[[David Glantz]] and [[Jonathan House]], American scholars of the Red Army, argue that "the Soviet Union was not ready for war in June 1941, nor did it intend, as some have contended, to launch a preventative war."{{sfn|Uldricks|1999|p=629}} [[Gerhard Weinberg]], a scholar of Nazi foreign policy, supports their view, arguing that [[Adolf Hitler]]'s decision to launch ''[[Operation Barbarossa]]'' was not because of a sense of urgent foreboding, but rather from a "purposeful determination" and he had started his planning for the invasion well in advance of the summer of 1941{{sfn|Uldricks|1999|pp=629–630}}