Editing Free will (section)

====Non-causal theories====
Non-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will do not require a free action to be caused by either an agent or a physical event. They either rely upon a world that is not causally closed, or physical indeterminism. Non-causal accounts often claim that each intentional action requires a choice or volition&nbsp;– a willing, trying, or endeavoring on behalf of the agent (such as the cognitive component of lifting one's arm).<ref name=LumerNannini2007>{{cite book|author1=Christoph Lumer|author2=Sandro Nannini|title=Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4LzldxvSk4kC|access-date=27 December 2012|year=2007|publisher=Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.|isbn=978-0-7546-6058-3}}</ref><ref name=McCann1998>{{cite book|author=Hugh McCann|title=The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom|url=https://archive.org/details/worksofagencyonh00mcca_0|url-access=registration|access-date=27 December 2012|year=1998|publisher=Cornell University Press|isbn=978-0-8014-8583-1}}</ref> Such intentional actions are interpreted as free actions. It has been suggested, however, that such acting cannot be said to exercise control over anything in particular. According to non-causal accounts, the causation by the agent cannot be analysed in terms of causation by mental states or events, including desire, belief, intention of something in particular, but rather is considered a matter of spontaneity and creativity. The exercise of intent in such intentional actions is not that which determines their freedom&nbsp;– intentional actions are rather self-generating. The "actish feel" of some intentional actions do not "constitute that event's activeness, or the agent's exercise of active control", rather they "might be brought about by direct stimulation of someone's brain, in the absence of any relevant desire or intention on the part of that person".<ref name=stanfordincompatibilismtheories /> Another question raised by such non-causal theory, is how an agent acts upon reason, if the said intentional actions are spontaneous.

Some non-causal explanations involve invoking [[panpsychism]], the theory that a quality of [[mind]] is associated with all particles, and pervades the entire universe, in both animate and inanimate entities.