Editing Frank Borman (section)

==== Apollo 1 ====
{{Main|Apollo 1}}
In planning for Project Apollo, Slayton designated new crews under the command of the experienced astronauts who commanded the early Gemini missions. On missions with a [[lunar module]], the senior pilot (later known as the command module pilot) would also be an experienced astronaut, as he would have to fly the [[Apollo command and service module#Command module (CM)|command module]] solo. Borman was given the assignment of backup for the second mission, an Earth-orbital mission without a lunar module. He would then command the fourth, a [[medium Earth orbit]] mission with a lunar module. He was given [[Charles Bassett]] for a senior pilot and [[Bill Anders]] as the pilot (later known as the lunar module pilot);{{sfn|Slayton|Cassutt|1994|pp=182–184}}{{sfn|Shayler|2002|p=116}} Bassett was expected to fly on [[Gemini 9]], but he died in the air crash that also killed See.{{sfn|Hacker|Grimwood|2010|p=533}} Borman was then given Stafford as senior pilot and Collins as pilot.{{sfn|Ertel|Newkirk|Brooks|1978|pp=40–41}} Subsequently, Stafford was given his own crew, and Anders was reassigned to Borman's crew. As Collins had spaceflight experience on [[Gemini 10]], he became the senior pilot.{{sfn|Ertel|Newkirk|Brooks|1978|p=56}} The second mission was scrubbed, but Borman's remained unchanged, although now it was to be the third mission, and he had no backup responsibility.{{sfn|Slayton|Cassutt|1994|pp=182–184}}{{sfn|Shayler|2002|p=116}} The crew selection was officially announced in a NASA press release on December 22, 1966.{{sfn|Shayler|2002|p=127}}

[[File:Apollo 1 fire.jpg|thumb|left|The charred remains of the Apollo 1 cabin interior]]
On January 27, 1967, the crew members of the first crewed Apollo mission ([[Apollo 1]]&nbsp;— then designated AS-204), Gus Grissom, Ed White, and [[Roger B. Chaffee]], were killed in a fire aboard their command module. Following this deadly accident, the AS-204 Accident Review Board was charged with investigating the root causes of the fire and recommending corrective measures. Borman was chosen as the only astronaut to serve on the nine-member review board. He inspected the burnt-out command module and verified the positions of the switches and circuit breakers.{{sfn|Ertel|Newkirk|Brooks|1978|pp=63–65}} In April 1967, while serving on the board, Borman was one of five astronauts who testified before the [[United States House of Representatives]] and [[United States Senate]] committees investigating the Apollo&nbsp;1 fire (the others were Shepard, Schirra, Slayton and McDivitt). Borman faced tough and sometimes hostile questioning.{{sfn|Borman|Serling|1988|pp=179–180}}<ref>{{cite web |title=Apollo-1 Investigation |publisher=NASA |url=https://history.nasa.gov/Apollo204/inv.html |access-date=May 12, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190714112758/https://history.nasa.gov/Apollo204/inv.html |archive-date=July 14, 2019 |url-status=live }}</ref> Borman's testimony helped convince Congress that Apollo would be safe to fly again.{{sfn|Brooks|Grimwood|Swenson|1979|p=224}} He told them: "We are trying to tell you that we are confident in our management, and in our engineering and in ourselves. I think the question is really: Are you confident in us?"{{sfn|Brooks|Grimwood|Swenson|1979|p=224}}

In the aftermath of the disaster, [[Joseph Francis Shea|Joe Shea]] resigned as manager of the Apollo project. [[Robert Gilruth]], the director of the MSC, offered the position to Borman, who turned it down. The job was given to Gilruth's deputy, [[George Low]]; Borman accepted a temporary posting to the [[North American Aviation]] plant in [[Downey, California]], where the command modules were made, to oversee the implementation of the recommendations of the AS-204 Accident Review Board. Borman was forced to confront one of the root causes of the disaster: the natural tension between getting the job done on time and building the spacecraft as well as possible.{{sfn|Borman|Serling|1988|pp=181–187}}

Borman argued with test pilot [[Scott Crossfield]], who was in charge of safety engineering at North American, over the design of an effective emergency oxygen system. Borman refused to accept the design because it did not protect the crew from noxious fumes. Crossfield then opposed the delivery of North American's [[S-II]], the second stage of the [[Saturn V]] Moon rocket, which Crossfield deemed unsafe. Borman informed management at North American that he could not work with Crossfield, and Crossfield eventually left the company. A redesigned hatch that allowed the astronauts to exit within seconds instead of minutes added {{convert|1500|lb}} to the weight of the spacecraft. The parachutes had to be redesigned to ensure they could hold the additional weight, and re-testing them cost $250,000. This led to a clash with [[George Mueller (NASA)|George Mueller]], who thought the cost was excessive.{{sfn|Borman|Serling|1988|pp=181–187}}