Editing Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (section)

====European waters====
Admiral Hartsinck at first proved himself highly reluctant to risk his fleet. However, political pressure to venture outside the safety of the [[Texel roadstead]] mounted and several cautious attempts were made to capture British convoys, or escort Dutch convoys. In one of those forays, an unusually strong squadron, under Admiral [[Johan Zoutman]] and his second-in-command, Rear Admiral [[Jan Hendrik van Kinsbergen]], encountered in August 1781 a British squadron of about equal strength under Admiral [[Sir Hyde Parker, 5th Baronet|Hyde Parker]] in the [[Battle of Dogger Bank (1781)|Battle of Dogger Bank]], which ended in a tactical draw.<ref>{{Harvnb|Dirks|1871|pp=306–309}}</ref>

Another promising venture seemed to be what has become known as the [[Brest Affair]]. In September 1782, after the Dutch politicians had hesitantly agreed to coordinate their actions with the French, acting "in concert", an opportunity seemed to exist to combine a Dutch squadron of 10 [[ship of the line|ships of the line]] with the French squadron at [[Brest, France|Brest]], as the British fleet in the channel had suddenly sailed south. However, Hartsinck, as usual, made objections, based on intelligence that British ships lay in ambush. When this proved false, the stadtholder ordered him to send the squadron, under command of Vice Admiral Count [[Lodewijk van Bylandt]] to Brest. However, as had happened countless times before, Bylandt, after having inspected the ships, declared them "unready" to put out to sea. In this refusal, he was supported by the other flag officers. The incident caused a political storm that threatened to engulf the stadtholder himself, as he was responsible as commander-in-chief for both the state of readiness of the fleet and its strategic decisions (though the officers were tactically and operationally responsible, and could not decline responsibility for the alleged state of "unreadiness" themselves). The opponents of the stadtholder demanded an investigation that was, however, very long drawn out, and quietly terminated after the stadtholder was restored in his full powers after 1787, long after the end of the war.<ref>{{Harvnb|Dirks|1871|pp=330–353}}</ref>

Though, except for the Battle of Dogger-Bank, no major engagements were fought in European waters, and the British blockade encountered little opposition from the Dutch fleet, the blockade itself exacted its toll on the British seamen, who were at sea for long times at a stretch (which even exposed them to the danger of [[scurvy]]) and the ships that suffered from severe wear and tear. Also, because an appreciable number of ships had to be detached to maintain naval superiority in the North Sea, the already overstretched Royal Navy was even more strained after 1781. Ships that were needed to blockade the Dutch coast could not be used against the French, Americans, and Spaniards in other theatres of war. This may have contributed to a number of the naval defeats the British suffered after 1781.<ref>Syrett, ''passim''</ref>