Editing Foundationalism (section)

==Criticisms==
{{See also|Anti-foundationalism}}
Critics of foundationalism often argue that for a belief to be justified it must be supported by other beliefs;<ref name=SEP/> in [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]]'s phrase, "only a belief can be a reason for another belief". For instance, [[Wilfrid Sellars]] argued that non-[[doxastic logic|doxastic]] mental states cannot be reasons, and so noninferential warrant cannot be derived from them. Similarly, critics of [[externalist]] foundationalism argue that only mental states or properties the believer is aware of could make a belief justified.

[[Postmodernists]] and [[post-structuralism|post-structuralists]] such as [[Richard Rorty]] and [[Jacques Derrida]] have attacked foundationalism on the grounds that the truth of a statement or discourse is only verifiable in accordance with other statements and discourses. Rorty in particular elaborates further on this, claiming that the individual, the community, the human body as a whole have a 'means by which they know the world' (this entails language, culture, semiotic systems, mathematics, science etc.). In order to verify particular means, or particular statements belonging to certain means (e.g., the propositions of the natural sciences), a person would have to 'step outside' the means and critique them neutrally, in order to provide a foundation for adopting them. However, this is impossible. The only way in which one can know the world is through the means by which they know the world; a method cannot justify itself. This argument can be seen as directly related to [[Wittgenstein]]'s theory of language, drawing a parallel between postmodernism and late [[logical positivism]] that is united in critique of foundationalism.<ref>{{Citation |last=Rorty |first=Richard |title=Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language |date=1993 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-heidegger/wittgenstein-heidegger-and-the-reification-of-language/9678EE30FC5FD89BD254AAE72730D0BF |work=The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger |pages=337–357 |editor-last=Guignon |editor-first=Charles |access-date=2023-03-09 |series=Cambridge Companions to Philosophy |place=Cambridge |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/ccol0521385709.014 |isbn=978-1-139-00051-2}}</ref>