Editing Fokker Scourge (section)

===The Scourge begins===

[[File:Parschau's E1-15.jpg|thumb|Otto Parschau's second Eindecker, E.1/15, with experimental "mid-wing" modification which became standard on production E.Is]]
The Fokker Scourge is usually considered by the British to have begun on 1{{nbsp}}August, when [[B.E.2c]]s of [[No. 2 Squadron RAF|2 Squadron]] [[Royal Flying Corps]] (RFC) bombed the base of FFA{{nbsp}}62 at {{nowrap|5:00 a. m.,}} waking the German pilots, including Boelcke (most likely, still with E 3/15) and Immelmann (flying E 13/15), who were quickly into the air after the raiders.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 14"/> Boelcke suffered a [[Firearm malfunction|jammed gun]] but Immelmann caught up with a B.E.2c and shot it down. This aircraft was flown as a bomber, without an observer or Lewis gun, the pilot armed only with an automatic pistol.<ref name="Franks 2001, pp. 10–11"/> After about ten minutes of manoeuvring (giving the lie to exaggerated accounts of the stability of B.E.2 aircraft) Immelmann had fired 450{{nbsp}}rounds, which riddled the B.E. and wounded the pilot in the arm.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 15">Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 15.</ref> By late October, towards the end of the [[Battle of Loos]], more Fokkers (including the similar Pfalz E-type fighters, which were also called Fokkers by Allied airmen) were encountered by RFC pilots and by December, forty Fokkers were in service.<ref>Franks 2001, p. 59.</ref><ref>Jones, 2002, p. 144</ref><ref>Wise, 1981, p. 355</ref>

In the new fighters, pilots could make long, steep dives, aiming the fixed, synchronised machine-gun by aiming the aircraft. The machine gun was belt-fed, unlike the drum-fed [[Lewis gun]]s of their opponents, who had to change drums when in action. The Fokker pilots took to flying high and diving on their quarry, usually out of the sun, firing a long burst and continuing the dive until well out of range. If the British aircraft had not been shot down, the German pilot could climb again and repeat the process. Immelmann invented the [[Immelmann turn]], a [[Zoom climb|zoom]] after the dive, followed by a roll when vertical to face the opposite way, after which he could turn to attack again.<ref>Jones, 2002, p. 150</ref>
{|class="wikitable" align=right style="margin:0 0 1em 1em"
|+RFC aircraft losses<br /><small>(July 1915<br />to January 1916)</small><ref>Wise, 1981, p. 355</ref>
|-
! Month
! Total
|-
| June ||align="right"|6
|-
| July ||align="right"|15
|-
| August ||align="right"|10
|-
| September ||align="right"|14
|-
| October ||align="right"|12
|-
| November ||align="right"|16
|-
| December ||align="right"|17
|-
| January ||align="right"|30
|-
| '''Total''' ||align="right"|'''120'''
|}
The mystique acquired by the Fokker was greater than its material effect and in October, RFC HQ expressed concern at the willingness of pilots to avoid combat. RFC losses were exacerbated by the increase in  the number of aircraft at the front, from 85 to 161 between March and September, the hard winter of 1915–1916 and some aggressive flying by the new German "C" type two-seaters.<ref>Wise, 1981, p. 355</ref><ref>Hoeppner 1994, p. 38</ref> Boelcke and Immelmann continued to score, as did [[Hans Joachim Buddecke]], [[Ernst Freiherr von Althaus|Ernst von Althaus]] and [[Rudolph Berthold]] from FFA{{nbsp}}23 and Kurt von{{nbsp}}Crailshein of FFA{{nbsp}}53. The "official" list of claims by Fokker pilots for the second half of 1915 was no more than 28, many of them over French aircraft. Thirteen aeroplanes had been shot down by Immelmann or Boelcke and the rest by seven other Fokker pilots.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 18"/><ref>Franks 2001, p. 41.</ref> January 1916 brought thirteen claims, most of them against the French, followed by twenty more in February, the last month of the "scourge" proper. Most of the victories were scored by [[Flying ace|aces]] rather than the newer pilots flying the greater number of Fokkers. Allied casualties had been light by later standards but the loss of air superiority to the Germans, flying a new and supposedly invincible aircraft, caused dismay among the Allied commanders and lowered the morale of Allied airmen. In his memoir ''Sagittarius Rising'' (1936), [[Cecil Arthur Lewis|Cecil Lewis]] wrote,

{{quote|Hearsay and a few lucky encounters had made the machine respected, not to say dreaded by the slow, unwieldy machines then used by us for Artillery Observation and Offensive Patrols.<ref>Lewis 1977, p. 51.</ref>}}

On 14 January, RFC HQ issued orders that until better aircraft arrived, long and short-range reconnaissance aircraft must have three escorts flying in close formation. If contact with the escorts was lost, the reconnaissance must be cancelled, as would photographic reconnaissance to any great distance beyond the front line. Sending the B.E.2c into action without an observer armed with a Lewis gun also became less prevalent.<ref name="Terraine p. 199">Terraine 1982, p. 199.</ref> The new tactic of concentrating aircraft in time and space had the effect of reducing the number of reconnaissance sorties the RFC could fly.<ref>Jones, 2002, pp. 156–157</ref>

[[File:FE2B, Masterton, New Zealand, 25 April 2009 01.jpg|thumb|Reproduction FE2b, Masterton, New Zealand, 2009]]
New defensive formations were devised; a [[No. 2 Wing RAF|II Wing RFC]] method was for the reconnaissance aircraft to lead, escorted on each side {{convert|500|ft|m|abbr=on}} higher, with another escort {{convert|1000|ft|m|abbr=on}} behind and above.<ref>Jones, 2002, pp. 147–148</ref> On 7 February, on a II{{nbsp}}Wing long-range reconnaissance, the observation pilot flew at {{convert|7500|ft|m|abbr=on}}; a German aircraft appeared over [[Roulers]] (Roeselare) and seven more closed in behind the formation. West of [[Torhout]] (Thourout) two Fokkers arrived and attacked at once, one diving on the reconnaissance machine and the other on an escort. Six more German aircraft appeared over [[Cortemarck]] (Kortemark) and formed a procession of fourteen aeroplanes stalking the British formation. None of the German pilots attacked and all the British aircraft returned, only to meet two German aircraft coming back from a bombing raid, which opened fire and mortally wounded the pilot of one of the escorts. The British ascribed their immunity to attack during the 55-minute flight to the rigid formation which the two Fokkers were unable to disrupt.<ref>Jones, 2002, pp. 157–158</ref>

On 7 February, a [[No. 12 Squadron RAF|12 Squadron]] B.E.2c., was to be escorted by three B.E.2cs, two F.E.2s and a [[Bristol Scout]] from 12 Squadron and two more F.Es. and four R.E. aeroplanes from [[No. 21 Squadron RAF|21 Squadron]]. The flight was cancelled due to bad weather but twelve escorts for one reconnaissance aircraft demonstrated the effect of the Fokkers in reducing the efficiency of RFC operations.<ref>Jones, 2002, p. 158</ref> British and French reconnaissance flights to get [[aerial photographs]] for intelligence and artillery ranging data had become riskier, in spite of German fighters being forbidden to fly over Allied lines (to keep the synchronisation gear secret).<ref>Franks 2001, pp. 11–12.</ref> This policy, for various reasons, prevailed for most of the war; the rarity of German fighters appearing behind the Allied lines limited the degree of air superiority they were able to attain.<ref>Hoeppner, 1994, p. 41</ref><ref>Franks 2001, p. 6.</ref>