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==History== The earliest documented use of EW was during the [[Second Boer War]] of 1899–1902. The British Army, when trying to relieve Ladysmith, [[Siege of Ladysmith|under siege by the Boers]], used a [[searchlight]] to "bounce" Morse code signals off the clouds. The Boers immediately spotted this and used one of their own searchlights in an attempt to jam the British signals. This was graphically described by Winston Churchill in his book ''[[London to Ladysmith via Pretoria]]''. During the [[Russo-Japanese War]] of 1904–1905 the Japanese [[auxiliary cruiser]] ''[[Shinano Maru (1900)|Shinano Maru]]'' had located the [[Russian Baltic Fleet]] in [[Battle of Tsushima|Tsushima Strait]], and was communicating the fleet's location by radio signals to the Imperial Japanese Fleet HQ. The captain of the Russian warship ''Ural'' requested permission to disrupt the Japanese communications link by attempting to transmit a stronger radio signal over the ''Shinano Maru's'' signal, hoping to distort the Japanese signal at the receiving end. Russian Admiral [[Zinovy Rozhestvensky]] refused the advice and denied the ''Ural'' permission to electronically jam the enemy, which in those circumstances might have proved invaluable. The intelligence the Japanese gained ultimately led to the decisive [[Battle of Tsushima]], where the Russian Navy lost all its battleships and most of its cruisers and destroyers. These losses effectively ended the Russo-Japanese War in Japan's favor.<ref name=History>{{cite web |url= http://ew30.blogspot.com/2009/12/such-is-reliance-on-electromagnetic-em.html |title= History of Electronic Warfare |date= December 7, 2009 |website= Blogspot.com |access-date= August 14, 2018}}</ref>{{Better source needed|reason=Can we get a more reliable reference than an unsourced blog?|date=February 2024}} During [[World War II]], the Allies and Axis Powers both extensively used EW, or what Winston Churchill referred to as the "[[Battle of the Beams]]": as navigational radars were used to guide bombers to their targets and back to their base, the first application of EW in WWII was to interfere with the navigational radars. [[Chaff (countermeasure)|Chaff]] was also introduced during WWII to confuse and defeat tracking radar systems. As battlefield communication and radar technology improved, so did electronic warfare, which played a major role in several military operations during the [[Vietnam War]]. Aircraft on bombing runs and air-to-air missions often relied on EW to survive the battle, although many were defeated by Vietnamese ECCM.<ref name=DTIC>{{cite web |url= http://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a186626.pdf |title= Electronic Warfare in Vietnam: Did We Learn Our Lessons? |last= Dickson (Col) |first= John R. |date= May 1987 |website= DTIC.mil |access-date= August 14, 2018 |archive-date= March 4, 2017 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20170304033648/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a186626.pdf |url-status= live }}</ref> Electronic Warfare was used extensively during the [[Gulf War]], primarily by [[USAF]] and [[USN]] electronic attack aircraft such as the [[EF-111A]] and [[EA-6B]] to disrupt Iraq's large and capable [[Surface-to-Air Missile|SAM]] and [[Ground-controlled interception|GCI]] network. In 2007, an Israeli attack on a suspected Syrian nuclear site during [[Operation Outside the Box]] (or [[Operation Orchard]]) used electronic warfare systems to disrupt Syrian air defenses while Israeli jets crossed much of Syria, bombed their targets, and returned to Israel undeterred.<ref name=Yaakov>{{cite web |url= http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Features/And-they-struck-them-with-blindness |title= And They Struck Them With Blindness |last= Katz |first= Yaakov |date= September 29, 2010 |website= The Jerusalem Post |access-date= August 14, 2018}}</ref><ref name=AviationWeek>{{cite web |url= http://aviationweek.com/awin/israel-shows-electronic-prowess |title= Israel Shows Electronic Prowess |last= Fulghum |first= David |date= November 26, 2007 |website= Aviation Week and Space Technology |url-access= subscription |access-date= August 14, 2018}}</ref> The target was a suspected nuclear reactor under construction near the [[Euphrates River]], modeled after a North Korean reactor and supposedly financed with Iranian assistance. Some reports say<ref name=AviationWeek /> Israeli EW systems deactivated all of Syria's air defense systems for the entire period of the raid. In December 2010, the Russian Army deployed their first land-based multifunctional electronic warfare system known as [[Borisoglebsk 2]], developed by [[Sozvezdie]]. Development of the system started in 2004 and evaluation testing successfully completed in December 2010. The Borisoglebsk-2 uses four different types{{Clarify|reason=Clarification on what the four types are.|date=February 2024}} of jamming stations on a single system. The Borisoglebsk-2 system is mounted on nine [[MT-LB]] armored vehicles and is intended to suppress mobile satellite communications and satellite-based navigation signals.<ref name="Borisoglebsk">{{cite web |title=Borisoglebsk-2 |url=http://www.deagel.com/Aircraft-Protection-Systems/Borisoglebsk-2_a003063001.aspx |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151104021259/https://www.deagel.com/Aircraft-Protection-Systems/Borisoglebsk-2_a003063001.aspx |archive-date=2015-11-04 |website=Deagel.com}}</ref> This EW system is developed to conduct electronic reconnaissance and suppression of radio-frequency sources.<ref name=ArmyRecog>{{cite web |url= http://armyrecognition.com/february_2015_global_defense_security_news_uk/russian_army_units_of_eastern_district_have_received_new_borisoglebsk-2_electronic_warfare_vehicles.html |title= Russian Army Units of Eastern District Have Received New Borisoglebsk-2 Electronic Warfare Vehicles |author= Administrator |date= February 11, 2015 |access-date= August 14, 2018 |work= armyrecognition.com}}</ref> In August 2015, the Swedish newspaper {{Lang|sv|[[Svenska Dagbladet]]}} said its initial usage caused concern within NATO.<ref>{{cite news |url= http://www.svd.se/putins-nya-supervapen-skrammer-nato |trans-title= Putin's New Superpower Scares NATO |title= Putins nya supervapen skrämmer Nato |newspaper= Svenska Dagbladet |date= 16 August 2015}}</ref> A Russian blog described Borisoglebsk-2 thus:<ref>{{cite web|url=http://shokidriver.blogspot.se/2015/02/emd-received-new-borisoglebsk-2-ew.html|title=Russian Military News in English|author=Shoki Driver|work=shokidriver.blogspot.se|date=9 February 2015}}</ref> {{cquote|The 'Borisoglebsk-2', when compared to its predecessors, has better technical characteristics: wider frequency bandwidth for conducting radar collection and jamming, faster scanning times of the frequency spectrum, and higher precision when identifying the location and source of radar emissions, and increased capacity for suppression.}} [[File:UA NGU downed Russian Grifon 12 01.jpg|thumb|[[National Guard of Ukraine|Ukrainian National Guard]] personnel display drone jammers and a downed Russian Grifon 12 drone in 2022]] During the first two days of the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], Russian EW disrupted Ukraine's air defense radars and communications, severely disrupting Ukrainian ground-based air defense systems. Russian jamming was so effective it interfered with their own communications, so efforts were scaled back. This led to Ukrainian [[Surface-to-air missile|SAMs]] regaining much of their effectiveness, which began inflicting significant losses on Russian aircraft by the start of March 2022.<ref>[https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air-War-Ukraine-web-final.pdf The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence]. ''[[Royal United Services Institute]]''. 7 November 2022.</ref> Rapid Russian advances at the start of the war prevented EW troops from properly supporting the advancing troops, but by late March and April 2022, extensive jamming infrastructure had been deployed. EW complexes were set up in [[Donbas]] in concentrations of up to 10 complexes per {{cvt|13|mi}} of frontage. Electronic suppression of GPS and radio signals caused heavy losses of Ukrainian UAVs, depriving them of intelligence and precise artillery fire spotting. Small [[quadcopter]]s had an average life expectancy of around three flights, and larger fixed-wing UAVs like the [[Bayraktar TB2]] had a life expectancy of about six flights. By summer 2022, only some one-third of Ukrainian UAV missions could be said to have been successful, as EW had contributed to Ukraine losing 90% of the thousands of drones it had at the beginning of the invasion.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Axe |first=David |title=Russia's Electronic-Warfare Troops Knocked Out 90 Percent Of Ukraine's Drones |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/12/24/russia-electronic-warfare-troops-knocked-out-90-percent-of-ukraines-drones/?sh=574d9cba575c |access-date=2022-12-24 |website=Forbes |language=en}}</ref> Russian EW capacity to disrupt GPS signals is credited with the reduction in the success of Ukrainian usage of [[HIMARS]] and [[JDAM]] bombs. The failure of GPS guidance forces these weapons, in particular JDAMS, to use [[inertial navigation system]] which reduces accuracy from around {{convert|15|ft|m|order=flip|0}} down to around {{convert|90|ft|m|order=flip|0}}.<ref>{{Cite web |title=GPS-Guided Bombs Should've Been Ukraine's Ace in the Hole. Then, Russian Jamming Stepped In |author=KYLE MIZOKAMI |url=https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a43591694/russian-jamming-gps-guided-bombs/ |date=21 April 2023 |access-date=2023-04-21 |website=popularmechanics.com}}</ref> Ukraine was losing some 10,000 drones a month due to Russian electronic warfare, according to a 19 May 2023 report by the [[Royal United Services Institute]]. This was an average of 300 drones a day. Russia has established EW posts about every {{convert|6|mi|km|order=flip|0}} of the front, being some {{convert|4|mi|km|order=flip|0}} back from the front line.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Ukraine is losing 10,000 drones a month to Russian electronic-warfare systems that send fake signals and screw with their navigation, researchers say |author=Mia Jankowicz |url=https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-losing-10000-drones-month-russia-electronic-warfare-rusi-report-2023-5 |publisher=Business Insider |date=22 May 2023 |access-date=2023-05-26 |website=popularmechanics.com}}</ref> In October 2023, ''[[The Economist]]'' reported that electronic warfare was in widespread use on front lines to impair small battlefield UAV activity, with Russia installing video feedback and control jammers on high-value equipment like tanks and artillery.<ref name=economist-20231029>{{cite news |url=https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/10/29/trenches-and-tech-on-ukraines-southern-front |title=Trenches and tech on Ukraine's southern front |magazine=The Economist |url-access=limited |date=29 October 2023 |access-date=31 October 2023}}</ref> By 11 March 2024, Ukraine reported it had destroyed a Russian Palantin EW system in Zaporizhzhia Oblast,<ref name= osintTech >Osinttechnical on X(Twitter) [https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1767311666486681866?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1767311666486681866%7Ctwgr%5E9dfacb0945f4b12929113033efe36da100412722%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.eurasiantimes.com%2Frussias-notorious-palantin-ew-system-that-kept%2F (11 March 2024) GMLRS strike]</ref> which "suppress satellite radio navigation along the entire line of contact and in most parts of Ukraine, replacing the satellite radio navigation field (spoofing)".<ref name= Xpalantin >Sakshi Tiwari [https://www.eurasiantimes.com/russias-notorious-palantin-ew-system-that-kept/ (13 March 2024) 'Big Win' For HIMARS! Russia’s 'Notorious' Palantin EW System, That Kept Spoofing Ukrainian Drones, Bites The Dust]</ref> An estimated three Palantin systems have been hit (June 2022, February 2023, and March 2024).<ref name= Xpalantin /> In addition to the Palantin, in Zaporizhzhia a Layer EW system was destroyed.<ref name= Lykhovyi >Kaitlin Lewis [https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-destroys-russias-new-high-tech-radar-jammer-us-made-himars-1878174 Ukraine Destroys Russia's New High-Tech Radar Jammer With US-Made HIMARS]</ref> === Cognitive Electronic Warfare (CEW) === Originating from digital EW, and as a continuation of software based modulation and demodulation, cognitive electronic warfare or cognitive electromagnetic warfare (CEW), is the use of [[Artificial intelligence|AI]] in electronic warfare systems. CEW is affecting all [[#Subdivisions|electronic warfare subdivisions]], and can improve situation-assessment (SA) and [[#Electronic warfare support|ESM]], through automatic detection and classification of new and unknown signals, signatures, and even [[Radar cross section|RCS]]. Cognitive electronic warfare systems can be used to collect [[#Electronic warfare support|ESM]] data and assist augmenting, updating, and broadcasting (over [[Joint Tactical Information Distribution System|JTIDS]]), real time maps with electronic order of battle (EOB) and electronic identification (EID) data. As well as the ability to adapt in real time to changes in the eletromagnetic spectrum, by using artificial intelligence algorithms to quickly generate optimal [[#Electronic attack|EA]], or [[#Electronic protection|EP]] solutions. <ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-10-02 |title=Foundational Research for Electronic Warfare in Multi-domain Operations (FREEDOM) - DEVCOM Army Research Laboratory |url=https://arl.devcom.army.mil/what-we-do/freedom/ |access-date=2025-01-03 |website=arl.devcom.army.mil |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Rogoway |first=Joseph Trevithick and Tyler |date=2020-07-07 |title=Cognitive Electronic Warfare Could Revolutionize How America Wages War With Radio Waves |url=https://www.twz.com/34606/cognitive-electronic-warfare-could-revolutionize-how-america-wages-war-with-radio-waves |access-date=2025-01-03 |website=The War Zone |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Zhou |first=Huaji |chapter=An Introduction of Cognitive Electronic Warfare System |series=Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering |date=2020 |volume=517 |editor-last=Liang |editor-first=Qilian |editor2-last=Liu |editor2-first=Xin |editor3-last=Na |editor3-first=Zhenyu |editor4-last=Wang |editor4-first=Wei |editor5-last=Mu |editor5-first=Jiasong |editor6-last=Zhang |editor6-first=Baoju |title=Communications, Signal Processing, and Systems |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-13-6508-9_144 |language=en |location=Singapore |publisher=Springer |pages=1202–1210 |doi=10.1007/978-981-13-6508-9_144 |isbn=978-981-13-6508-9}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Tingley |first=Brett |date=2019-11-07 |title=The Navy's Secretive And Revolutionary Program To Project False Fleets From Drone Swarms |url=https://www.twz.com/29505/the-navys-secretive-nemesis-electronic-warfare-capability-will-change-naval-combat-forever |access-date=2025-01-03 |website=The War Zone |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last=Haigh and Andrusenko |first=Karen and Julia |title=Cognitive Electronic Warfare: An Artificial Intelligence Approach |publisher=Artech House |year=2021 |isbn=9781630818128 |language=EN}}</ref><ref name=":2" /> It can provide more comprehensive information to cryptologic technicians, by helping to select the jamming techniques that will be the most effective, and therefore provide faster and better [[#Electronic attack|ECM]], or [[#Electronic protection|ECCM]], decisions. <ref name=":2">{{Cite web |date=2023-08-01 |title=Implement AI in Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations |url=https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/august/implement-ai-electromagnetic-spectrum-operations |access-date=2025-01-03 |website=U.S. Naval Institute |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":1" /> CEW is part of the ''Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy'' (ESSS), published in October 2020, according to Lieutenant Commander Brian P. Gannon, U.S. Navy. <ref name=":2" /> DARPA has used CEW in some [[Signals intelligence|SIGINT]] studies with convolutional neural networks. <ref name=":2" /> DARPA had projects such as Blade, and ARC, which are related to [[Research and development|R&D]] on CEW <ref name=":0" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Keller |first=John |date=2010-07-10 |title=DARPA pursues electronic warfare machine learning technology to automatically jam enemy adaptive communications |url=https://www.militaryaerospace.com/defense-executive/article/16724192/darpa-pursues-electronic-warfare-machine-learning-technology-to-automatically-jam-enemy-adaptive-communications |access-date=2025-01-03 |website=Military Aerospace |language=en}}</ref>
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