Editing Dictatorship (section)

=== Personalist <!--'Personalist dictatorship' and 'Personalist dictator' redirect here-->===
{{Further|Autocracy|Cult of personality}}{{See also|Personalismo|Dynasty#Hereditary dictatorship}}
[[File:The statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il on Mansu Hill in Pyongyang (april 2012).jpg|thumb|left|Citizens of North Korea bow to statues of former dictators [[Kim Il Sung]] and [[Kim Jong Il]] in 2012.]]

'''Personalist dictatorships'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> are regimes in which all of the power lies in the hands of a single individual.<ref name=":12" /> They differ from other forms of dictatorships in that the dictator has greater access to key political positions and the government's [[treasury]], and they are more commonly subject to the discretion of the dictator. Personalist dictators may be members of the military or leaders of a political party, but neither the military nor the party exercises power independently from the dictator. In personalist dictatorships, the elite corps are usually made up of close friends or family members of the dictator, who typically handpicks these individuals to serve their posts.{{sfn|Ezrow|Frantz|2011|pp=215–216}}<ref>{{cite journal|last=Peceny|first=Mark|date=2003|title=Peaceful Parties and Puzzling Personalists.|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume= 97| issue =  2|pages= 339–42|oclc=208155326|doi=10.1017/s0003055403000716|doi-broken-date=1 January 2025 |s2cid=145169371}}</ref> These dictatorships often emerge either from loosely organized seizures of power, giving the leader opportunity to consolidate power, or from democratically elected leaders in countries with weak institutions, giving the leader opportunity to change the constitution. Personalist dictatorships are more common in Sub-Saharan Africa due to less established institutions in the region.{{sfn|Ezrow|Frantz|2011|pp=42–45}} There has been an increase in personalist dictatorships since the end of the Cold War.<ref name=":12">{{Citation |last=Frantz |first=Erica |title=Personalist Dictatorship |date=2024 |work=The Oxford Handbook of Authoritarian Politics |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198871996.013.8 |publisher=Oxford University Press |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198871996.013.8 |isbn=978-0-19-887199-6 |quote=Personalist dictatorships are regimes in which a single individual controls access to political office and influence over policy, and no institutions exist that are autonomous of this individual (Geddes 2003). This contrasts with other more institutionalized forms of authoritarianism, where politics may be dictated by a single political party (as in dominant-party dictatorships) or a military junta (as in military dictatorships). Political parties may exist in personalist dictatorships, but they largely lack political autonomy.}}</ref>

Personalist dictators typically favor loyalty over competence in their governments and have a general distrust of [[intelligentsia]]. Elites in personalist dictatorships often do not have a professional political career and are unqualified for the positions they are given. A personalist dictator will manage these appointees by segmenting the government so that they cannot collaborate. The result is that such regimes have no internal [[checks and balances]], and are thus unrestrained when exerting repression on their people, making radical shifts in foreign policy, or starting wars with other countries.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Van den Bosch |first=Jeroen J. J. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cxYeEAAAQBAJ |title=Personalist Rule in Africa and Other World Regions |date=2021-04-19 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-000-37707-1 |pages=10–11 |language=en}}</ref> Due to the lack of accountability and the smaller group of elites, personalist dictatorships are more prone to [[corruption]] than other forms of dictatorship,{{sfn|Ezrow|Frantz|2011|pp=134–135}} and they are more repressive than other forms of dictatorship.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Frantz|first1=Erica|last2=Kendall-Taylor|first2=Andrea|last3=Wright|first3=Joseph|last4=Xu|first4=Xu|date=2019-08-27|title=Personalization of Power and Repression in Dictatorships|url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/706049|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=82|pages=372–377|doi=10.1086/706049|s2cid=203199813|issn=0022-3816}}</ref> Personalist dictatorships often collapse with the death of the dictator. They are more likely to end in violence and less likely to democratize than other forms of dictatorship.{{sfn|Ezrow|Frantz|2011|pp=61–67}}
[[File:Stans08-036 (3134870208).jpg|thumb|The rotating statue of [[Saparmurat Niyazov]] in [[Turkmenistan]]]]
Personalist dictatorships fit the exact classic stereotype of authoritarian rule.<ref>Frantz 2018</ref> Within a personalist regime, an issue called "the dictator's dilemma" arises.<ref>Wintrobe 2012{{Full citation needed|date=December 2024}}</ref> This idea references the heavy reliance on repression of the public to stay in power, which creates incentives for all constituents to falsify their preferences, which does not allow for dictators to know the genuine popular beliefs or their realistic measure of societal support.<ref>Kuran 2011</ref> As a result of authoritarian politics, a series of major issues may ensue. [[Preference falsification]], internal politics, data scarcity, and restriction on the [[freedom of the press]] are just a few examples of the dangers of a personalistic authoritarian regime.<ref>Robinson Tanneberg 2018</ref> Although, when it comes to polling and elections a dictator could use their power to override private preferences. Many personalist regimes will install open ballots to protect their regimes and implement heavy security measures and [[censorship]] for those whose personal preferences do not align with the values of the leader.<ref>Donno 2013</ref>

The shift in the power relation between the dictator and their inner circle has severe consequences for the behavior of such regimes as a whole. Personalist regimes diverge from other regimes when it comes to their longevity, methods of breakdown, levels of corruption, and proneness to conflicts. On average, they last twice as long as military dictatorships, but not as long as one-party dictatorships.<ref>{{Cite report |title=Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument |last=Geddes |first=Barbara |date=2004 |pages=18–19}}</ref> Personalist dictatorships also experience growth differently, as they often lack the institutions or qualified leadership to sustain an economy.<ref>Van den Bosch, Jeroen J. J., Personalist Rule in Africa and Other World Regions, (London-New York: Routledge, 2021): 13-16</ref>