Editing Dương Văn Minh (section)

==Overthrow by Nguyễn Khánh==
{{Main|January 1964 South Vietnamese coup}}
General [[Nguyễn Khánh]] began to plot against the MRC after it was created. Khánh expected a large reward for his part in the coup, but the other generals regarded him as untrustworthy and excluded him from the MRC.<ref name=l161>Logevall, p. 161</ref> They further moved him to the command of the [[I Corps (South Vietnam)|I Corps]] in the far north to keep him far away from Saigon.<ref name=kb>Karnow, pp. 354–355</ref><ref name=s230>Shaplen, p. 230</ref> Khánh later claimed that he had built up intelligence infrastructure to weed out the VC under Diệm, but that Minh's MRC had disbanded it and released VC prisoners.<ref name=m294>Moyar (2006), p. 294</ref> Khánh was assisted by Generals [[Trần Thiện Khiêm]], who controlled the forces around Saigon, [[Đỗ Mậu]] and [[Nguyễn Chánh Thi]].<ref name=s321>Shaplen, p. 321</ref> Khánh and his colleagues spread rumours to American officials that Minh and his colleagues were about to declare South Vietnam's neutrality and sign a peace deal to end the war with the North.<ref name=s232>Shaplen, p. 232</ref><ref name=l162>Logevall, p. 162</ref>

Khánh overthrew Minh and his colleagues on 30 January 1964, in a bloodless coup, completely catching the MRC off guard.<ref>Karnow, pp. 352–354</ref><ref>Shaplen, pp. 332–333</ref> Minh, Đôn and [[Lê Văn Kim]] woke up to find hostile forces surrounding their houses and thought it to be a quixotic stunt by some disgruntled young officers.<ref name=l278>Langguth, p. 278</ref>

Khánh used the coup to enact retribution against Minh, Đôn, Kim, Đính and Xuân. He had them arrested, claiming that they were part of a neutralist plot with the French. Khánh cited their service in the Vietnamese National Army in the early 1950s, under the French colonial administration as evidence, although he did as well.<ref name=l/> Khánh also had Major Nhung, the bodyguard of Minh, shot, causing riots among parts of the population who feared that Khánh would wind back the clock to the Diệm era.<ref name=k354>Karnow, p. 354</ref><ref>Langguth, p. 279</ref> Khánh later persuaded Minh to remain as a figurehead head of state. This was partly due to pressure from American officials, who felt that the popular Minh would be a unifying and stabilising factor in the new regime. However, Khánh soon sidelined Minh.<ref name=s2367>Shaplen, pp. 236–237</ref><ref name=k355>Karnow, p. 355</ref>

Minh reportedly resented the fact that he had been deposed by a younger officer whom he viewed as an unscrupulous upstart. He was also upset with the detention of his fellow generals and around 30 of his junior officers. The junior officers were set free when Minh demanded that Khánh release them in return for his service. In the meantime, Khánh could not substantiate his claims against the generals.<ref name="s2445">Shaplen, pp. 244–245</ref>

Khánh presided over the trial,<ref name=l/> which took place in May. Minh was perfunctorily accused of misusing a small amount of money, before being allowed to serve as an advisor on the trial panel.<ref name=k355/><ref name=s2445/> The other generals were eventually asked by Khánh to "once you begin to serve again in the army, you do not take revenge on anybody".<ref name=l>Langguth, pp. 289–291.</ref> The tribunal then "congratulated" the generals, but found that they were of "lax morality", unqualified to command due to a "lack of a clear political concept" and confined to desk jobs.<ref name=l/> Khánh's actions left divisions among the officers of the ARVN. When Khánh was himself deposed in 1965, he handed over <!-- to whom?? -->dossiers proving that Minh and the other generals were innocent.<ref>Langguth, p. 347</ref> Robert Shaplen said that "the case … continued to be one of Khánh's biggest embarrassments".<ref name=s2445/>