Editing Cultural relativism (section)

==Comparison to moral relativism==
According to Marcus and Fischer, when the principle of cultural relativism was popularized after [[World War II]], it came to be understood "more as a doctrine, or position,
The principle of cultural relativity does not mean that because the members of some savage tribe are allowed to behave in a certain way that this fact gives intellectual warrant for such behavior in all groups. Cultural relativity means, on the contrary, that the appropriateness of any positive or negative custom must be evaluated with regard to how this habit fits with other group habits. While breeding a healthy scepticism as to the eternity of any value prized by a particular people, anthropology does not as a matter of theory deny the existence of moral absolutes. Rather, the use of the comparative method provides a scientific means of discovering such absolutes. If all surviving societies have found it necessary to impose some of the same restrictions upon the behavior of their members, this makes a strong argument that these aspects of the moral code are indispensable.<ref name="ReferenceA">Kluckhohn, Clyde 1944 ''Mirror For Man''</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.andrew.cmu.edu/course/80-241/guided_inquiries/articles/cultural_rel.html | title=Cultural Relativism | author=Caleb Rosado}}</ref>

Although Kluckhohn was using language that was popular at the time (e.g. "savage tribe") but which is now considered antiquated and coarse by most anthropologists, his point was that although moral standards are rooted in one's culture, anthropological research reveals that the fact that people have moral standards is a universal. He was especially interested in deriving specific moral standards that are universal, although few if any anthropologists think that he was successful.<ref name="ReferenceA"/>

There is an ambiguity in Kluckhohn's formulation that would haunt anthropologists in the years to come. It makes it clear that one's moral standards make sense in terms of one's culture. He waffles, however, on whether the moral standards of one society could be applied to another.  Four years later American anthropologists had to confront this issue head-on.

=== Vertical and horizontal relativism ===
It was James Lawrence Wray-Miller who provided an additional clarification tool, or caveat, of the theoretical underpinnings of cultural relativism by dividing it into two binary, analytical continuums: vertical and horizontal cultural relativism. Ultimately, these two analytical continuums share the same basic conclusion: that human morality and ethics are not static but fluid and vary across cultures depending on the time period and current condition of any particular culture.

'''Vertical relativism''' describes that cultures, throughout history (''vertical''—i.e., passage through past and future), are products of the prevailing societal norms and conditions of their respective historical periods. Therefore, any moral or ethical judgments, made during the present, regarding past cultures' belief systems or societal practices must be firmly
grounded and informed by these norms and conditions to be intellectually useful. Vertical relativism also accounts for the possibility that cultural values and norms will necessarily change as influencing norms and conditions change in the future.

'''Horizontal relativism''' describes that cultures in the present (''horizontal'' in time—i.e., the present period of the culture) are products of the prevailing norms and conditions developed as a result of their unique geographies, histories, and environmental influences. Therefore, moral or ethical judgments, made during the present, regarding a current culture's belief system or societal practices must account for these unique differences to be intellectually useful.

===Statement on human rights===
The transformation of cultural relativism as a heuristic tool into the doctrine of moral relativism occurred in the context of the work of the [[United Nations Commission on Human Rights|Commission of Human Rights of the United Nations]] in preparing the [[Universal Declaration of Human Rights]] (1948).

[[Melville J. Herskovits]] prepared a draft "Statement on Human Rights" which Executive Board of the [[American Anthropological Association]] revised, submitted to the Commission on Human Rights, and then published. The statement begins with a fairly straightforward explanation of the relevance of cultural relativism:<ref>[[Melville J. Herskovits|Herskovits, Melville J.]] 1947. "Statement on Human Rights." ''[[American Anthropologist]]'' 49(4):539–43.</ref>

{{quote|The problem is thus to formulate a statement of human rights that will do more than phrase respect for the individual as individual. It must also take into full account the individual as a member of a social group of which he is part, whose sanctioned modes of life shape his behavior, and with whose fate his own is thus inextricably bound.
 
The bulk of this statement emphasizes concern that the Declaration of Human Rights was being prepared primarily by people from Western societies, and would express values that, far from being universal, are really Western:
 
Today the problem is complicated by the fact that the Declaration must be of world-wide applicability. It must embrace and recognize the validity of many different ways of life. It will not be convincing to the Indonesian, the African, the Chinese, if it lies on the same plane as like documents of an earlier period. The rights of Man in the Twentieth Century cannot be circumscribed by the standards of any single culture, or be dictated by the aspirations of any single people. Such a document will lead to frustration, not realization of the personalities of vast numbers of human beings.}}
 
Although this statement could be read as making a procedural point (that the Commission must involve people of diverse cultures, especially cultures that had been or are still under [[Colonialism|European colonial]] or [[Imperialism|imperial domination]]), the document ended by making two substantive claims:
 
# Even where political systems exist that deny citizens the right of participation in their government, or seek to conquer weaker peoples, underlying cultural values may be called on to bring the peoples of such states to a realization of the consequences of the acts of their governments, and thus enforce a brake upon discrimination and conquest.
# Worldwide standards of freedom and justice, based on the principle that man is free only when he lives as his society defines freedom, that his rights are those he recognizes as a member of his society, must be basic.

These claims provoked an immediate response by a number of anthropologists. [[Julian Steward]] (who, as a student of [[Alfred Kroeber]] and [[Robert Lowie]], and as a professor at [[Columbia University]], was situated firmly in the Boasian lineage) suggested that the first claim "may have been a loophole to exclude Germany from the advocated tolerance", but that it revealed the fundamental flaw in moral relativism:<ref>[[Julian Steward|Steward, Julian]]. 1948. "Comments on the Statement of Human Rights." ''[[American Anthropologist]]'' 50(2):351–52.</ref><blockquote>"Either we tolerate everything, and keep hands off, or we fight intolerance and conquest—political and economic as well as military—in all their forms." Similarly, he questioned whether the second principle means that anthropologists "approve the social [[Caste|caste system]] of India, the racial caste system of the United States, or many other varieties of social discrimination in the world." </blockquote>Steward and others argued that any attempt to apply the principle of cultural relativism to moral problems would only end in contradiction: either a principle that seems to stand for tolerance ends up being used to excuse intolerance, or the principle of tolerance is revealed to be utterly intolerant of any society that seems to lack the (arguably, Western) value of tolerance.<ref name=":0">Barnett, H. G. "On Science and Human Rights" in ''American Anthropologist'' 50(2) 352–355. June 1948.</ref> They concluded that anthropologists must stick to science, and engage in debates over values only as individuals.<ref name=":0" />