Editing Cosmological argument (section)

=== The infinite regress ===

A ''regress'' is a series of related elements, arranged in some type of sequence of succession, examined in backwards succession (regression) from a fixed point of reference. Depending on the type of regress, this retrograde examination may take the form of [[recursion|recursive]] analysis, in which the elements in a series are studied as products of prior, often simpler, elements. If there is no 'last member' in a regress (i.e. no 'first member' in the series) it becomes an [[infinite regress]], continuing in perpetuity.<ref name="Cameron">{{cite encyclopedia|last1=Cameron |first1=Ross |title=Infinite Regress Arguments |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/infinite-regress/ |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=2018}}</ref> In the context of the cosmological argument the term 'regress' usually refers to ''causal regress'', in which the series is a chain of [[cause and effect]], with each element in the series arising from causal activity of the prior member.<ref name="Huemer">{{cite book |last1=Huemer |first1=Michael |title=Approaching Infinity |date=2016 |publisher=New York: Palgrave Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HUEAI-2 |chapter=13. Assessing Infinite Regress Arguments}}</ref> Some variants of the argument may also refer to ''temporal regress'', wherein the elements are past events (discrete units of time) arranged in a [[temporality|temporal]] sequence.<ref name="craig-sinclair"/>

An [[infinite regress argument]] attempts to establish the falsity of a proposition by showing that it [[logical consequence|entails]] an infinite regress that is [[Infinite regress#Viciousness|vicious]].<ref name="Cameron"/><ref name="Maurin">{{cite book |last1=Maurin |first1=Anna-Sofia |title=Hommage À Wlodek |date=2007 |publisher=Department of Philosophy, Lund University |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MAUIR |chapter=Infinite Regress – Virtue or Vice?}}</ref> The cosmological argument is a type of ''positive'' infinite regress argument given that it defends a proposition (in this case, the existence of a [[first cause]]) by arguing that its negation would lead to a vicious regress.<ref name="Day">{{cite journal |last1=Day |first1=Timothy Joseph |title=Infinite Regress Arguments |journal=Philosophical Papers |date=1987 |volume=16 |issue=2 |pages=155–164 |doi=10.1080/05568648709506273 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMIRA}}</ref> An infinite regress may be vicious due to various reasons:<ref name="Wieland">{{cite journal |last1=Wieland |first1=Jan Willem |title=Infinite Regress Arguments |journal=Acta Analytica |date=2013 |volume=28 |issue=1 |pages=95–109 |doi=10.1007/s12136-012-0165-1 |s2cid=170181468 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/WIEIRA}}</ref><ref name="Reichenbach"/>

*Impossibility: [[Thought experiments]] such as [[Hilbert's paradox of the grand hotel|Hilbert's Hotel]] are cited to demonstrate the [[metaphysics|metaphysical]] impossibility of [[actual infinities]] existing in reality. Accordingly, it may be argued that an infinite causal or temporal regress cannot occur in the real world.<ref name="Maurin"/>
*Implausibility: The regress contradicts empirical evidence (e.g. for the [[temporal finitism|finitude of the past]]) or basic principles such as [[Occam's razor]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Schaffer |first1=Jonathan |year=2015 |title=What Not to Multiply Without Necessity |url=http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/laser.pdf |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |volume=93 |issue=4|pages=644–664|doi=10.1080/00048402.2014.992447 |s2cid=16923735 }}</ref>
*Explanatory failure: A failure of explanatory goals resulting in an infinite regress of explanations. This may arise in the case of logical fallacies such as [[begging the question]] or from an attempt to investigate causes concerning origins or fundamental principles.<ref name="Clark">{{cite journal |last1=Clark |first1=Romane |title=Vicious Infinite Regress Arguments |journal=Philosophical Perspectives |date=1988 |volume=2 |pages=369–380 |doi=10.2307/2214081 |jstor=2214081 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CLAVIR}}</ref>