Editing Convoy (section)

====Pacific====
{{See also|Pacific War}}
In the Pacific Theater of World War II, [[Japan]]ese merchant ships rarely traveled in convoys. Japanese destroyers were generally deficient in antisubmarine weaponry compared to their Allied counterparts, and the Japanese navy did not develop an inexpensive convoy escort like the Allies' [[destroyer escort]]/[[frigate]] until it was too late. In the early part of the conflict, American submarines in the Pacific were ineffective as they suffered from timid tactics, faulty torpedoes, and poor deployment, while there were only small numbers of British and Dutch boats. U.S. Admiral [[Charles A. Lockwood]]'s efforts, coupled with strenuous complaints from his captains, rectified these problems and U.S. submarines became much more successful by war's end. As a result, the Japanese merchant fleet was [[Allied submarines in the Pacific War|largely destroyed]] by the end of the war. Japanese submarines, unlike their U.S. and German equivalents, focused on U.S. battle fleets rather than merchant convoys, and while they did manage some early successes, sinking two U.S. carriers, they failed to significantly inhibit the invasion convoys carrying troops and equipment in support of the U.S. island-hopping campaign.<ref name="Oxford_Companion_online" />

Several notable battles in the South Pacific involved Allied bombers interdicting Japanese troopship convoys which were often defended by Japanese fighters, notable [[Naval Battle of Guadalcanal#Other actions.2C November 13.E2.80.9314|Guadalcanal]] (13 November 1942), [[Kenneth Walker (general)#Rabaul 5 January 1943|Rabaul]] (5 January 1943), and the [[Battle of the Bismarck Sea]] (2–4 March 1943).

At the [[Battle off Samar]], the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy's escorts was demonstrated when they managed to defend their troop convoy from a much larger and more powerful Japanese battle-fleet. The Japanese force comprised four battleships and numerous heavy cruisers, while the U.S. force consisted of escort carriers, destroyers, and destroyer escorts. Large numbers of American aircraft (albeit without much anti-ship ordnance other than torpedoes) and aggressive tactics of the destroyers (with their radar-directed gunfire) allowed the U.S. to sink three Japanese heavy cruisers at the cost of one escort carrier and three destroyers.