Editing Consciousness (section)

==Philosophy of mind==
While historically philosophers have defended various views on consciousness, surveys indicate that [[physicalism]] is now the dominant position among contemporary philosophers of mind.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl|title=PhilPapers Survey 2020|publisher=PhilPapers|access-date=2023-12-15}}</ref> For an overview of the field, approaches often include both historical perspectives (e.g., Descartes, Locke, [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]]) and organization by key issues in contemporary debates. An alternative is to focus primarily on current philosophical stances and empirical findings.

===Coherence of the concept===
Philosophers differ from non-philosophers in their intuitions about what consciousness is.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Justin Sytsma|author2=Edouard Machery|title=Two conceptions of subjective experience|journal=Philosophical Studies|year=2010|volume=151|issue=2|pages=299–327|doi=10.1007/s11098-009-9439-x|s2cid=2444730|url=http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004888/01/Two_Conceptions_of_Subjective_Experience.pdf|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004888/01/Two_Conceptions_of_Subjective_Experience.pdf|archive-date=2022-10-09|url-status=live}}</ref> While most people have a strong intuition for the existence of what they refer to as consciousness,<ref name=Antony2001/> skeptics argue that this intuition is too narrow, either because the concept of consciousness is embedded in our intuitions, or because we all are illusions. [[Gilbert Ryle]], for example, argued that traditional understanding of consciousness depends on a [[dualism (philosophy of mind)|Cartesian dualist]] outlook that improperly distinguishes between mind and body, or between mind and world. He proposed that we speak not of minds, bodies, and the world, but of entities, or identities, acting in the world. Thus, by speaking of "consciousness" we end up leading ourselves by thinking that there is any sort of thing as consciousness separated from behavioral and linguistic understandings.<ref name=RyleConsciousness>{{cite book|title=The Concept of Mind|author=Gilbert Ryle|publisher=University of Chicago Press|date=2000 |orig-date=1949|pages=156–163|isbn=978-0-226-73296-1|title-link=The Concept of Mind|author-link=Gilbert Ryle}}</ref>

===Types===
[[Ned Block]] argues that discussions on consciousness have often failed properly to distinguish ''phenomenal consciousness'' from ''access consciousness''. The terms had been used before Block used them, but he adopted the short forms P-consciousness and A-consciousness.<ref name=block>{{cite book|title=The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates|editor=N. Block|editor2=O. Flanagan|editor3=G. Guzeldere|chapter=On a confusion about a function of consciousness|author=Ned Block|pages=375–415|year=1998|isbn=978-0-262-52210-6|publisher=MIT Press|chapter-url=http://cogprints.org/231/1/199712004.html|author-link=Ned Block|access-date=2011-09-10|archive-date=2011-11-03|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111103034117/http://cogprints.org/231/1/199712004.html|url-status=live}} Pages 230 and 231 in [https://www.nedblock.us/papers/1995_Function.pdf the version on the author's own website].</ref> According to Block:
* P-consciousness is raw experience: it is moving, colored forms, sounds, sensations, emotions and feelings with our bodies and responses at the center. These experiences, considered independently of any impact on behavior, are called [[qualia]].
* A-consciousness is the phenomenon whereby information in our minds is accessible for verbal report, reasoning, and the control of behavior. So, when we [[perception|perceive]], information about what we perceive is access conscious; when we [[introspection|introspect]], information about our thoughts is access conscious; when we [[memory|remember]], information about the past is access conscious, and so on.
Block adds that P-consciousness does not allow of easy definition: he admits that he "cannot define P-consciousness in any remotely [[circular definition|noncircular]] way.<ref name=block />

Although some philosophers, such as [[Daniel Dennett]], have disputed the validity of this distinction,<ref name="D375">{{cite book|author=Daniel Dennett|year=2004|title=Consciousness Explained|page=375|publisher=Penguin|isbn=978-0-7139-9037-9|title-link=Consciousness Explained|author-link=Daniel Dennett}}</ref> others have broadly accepted it. [[David Chalmers]] has argued that A-consciousness can in principle be understood in mechanistic terms, but that understanding P-consciousness is much more challenging: he calls this the [[hard problem of consciousness]].<ref name=ChalmersHardProblem>{{cite journal|url=http://www.imprint.co.uk/chalmers.html|title=Facing up to the problem of consciousness|author=David Chalmers|journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|volume=2|year=1995|pages=200–219|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050308163649/http://www.imprint.co.uk/chalmers.html|archive-date=2005-03-08|author-link=David Chalmers}}</ref>

Some philosophers believe that Block's two types of consciousness are not the end of the story. [[William Lycan]], for example, argued in his book ''Consciousness and Experience'' that at least eight clearly distinct types of consciousness can be identified (organism consciousness; control consciousness; consciousness ''of''; state/event consciousness; reportability; introspective consciousness; subjective consciousness; self-consciousness)—and that even this list omits several more obscure forms.<ref>{{cite book|author=William Lycan|title=Consciousness and Experience|pages=1–4|year=1996|publisher=MIT Press|isbn=978-0-262-12197-2|author-link=William Lycan}}</ref>

There is also debate over whether or not A-consciousness and P-consciousness always coexist or if they can exist separately. Although P-consciousness without A-consciousness is more widely accepted, there have been some hypothetical examples of A without P. Block, for instance, suggests the case of a "[[Philosophical zombie|zombie]]" that is computationally identical to a person but without any subjectivity. However, he remains somewhat skeptical concluding "I don't know whether there are any actual cases of A-consciousness without P-consciousness, but I hope I have illustrated their conceptual possibility".<ref>{{cite journal|last= Block|first=Ned|year = 1995|title = How many concepts of consciousness?|url = https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6174/aff557977a75c5d76463871180f8d1befbbc.pdf|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200210172202/https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6174/aff557977a75c5d76463871180f8d1befbbc.pdf|url-status = dead|archive-date = 2020-02-10|journal = Behavioral and Brain Sciences|volume = 18|issue = 2| pages = 272–284|doi=10.1017/s0140525x00038486| s2cid = 41023484}}</ref>

===Distinguishing consciousness from its contents===
[[Sam Harris]] observes: "At the level of your experience, you are not a body of cells, organelles, and atoms; you are consciousness and its ever-changing contents".<ref>Harris, S. (12 October 2011). The mystery of consciousness. ''Sam Harris.'' https://www.samharris.org/blog/the-mystery-of-consciousness {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230423061921/https://www.samharris.org/blog/the-mystery-of-consciousness|date=2023-04-23}}</ref> Seen in this way, consciousness is a subjectively experienced, ever-present field in which things (the contents of consciousness) come and go.

Christopher Tricker argues that this field of consciousness is symbolized by the mythical bird that opens the Daoist classic the [[Zhuangzi (book)|''Zhuangzi.'']] This bird's name is Of a Flock ([[Peng (mythology)|''peng'' 鵬]]), yet its back is countless thousands of miles across and its wings are like clouds arcing across the heavens. "Like Of a Flock, whose wings arc across the heavens, the wings of your consciousness span to the horizon. At the same time, the wings of every other being's consciousness span to the horizon. You are of a flock, one bird among kin."<ref>Tricker, C. (2022). [https://thecicadaandthebird.com The cicada and the bird. The usefulness of a useless philosophy. Chuang Tzu's ancient wisdom translated for modern life.] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230421032929/https://thecicadaandthebird.com/|date=2023-04-21}} Page 52. [https://books.google.com/books?id=YnCaEAAAQBAJ (Google Books)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230608153319/https://books.google.com/books?id=YnCaEAAAQBAJ|date=2023-06-08}}</ref>

===Mind–body problem===
{{Main|Mind–body problem}}

[[Image:Descartes mind and body.gif|thumb|Illustration of [[mind–body dualism]] by [[René Descartes]]. Inputs are passed by the sensory organs to the [[pineal gland]], and from there to the immaterial [[Soul|spirit]].]]

Mental processes (such as consciousness) and physical processes (such as brain events) seem to be correlated, however the specific nature of the connection is unknown.

The first influential philosopher to discuss this question specifically was Descartes, and the answer he gave is known as [[mind–body dualism]]. Descartes proposed that consciousness resides within an immaterial domain he called ''[[mental substance|res cogitans]]'' (the realm of thought), in contrast to the domain of material things, which he called ''[[res extensa]]'' (the realm of extension).<ref>{{cite book|title=Philosophy of Man: selected readings|last=Dy|first=Manuel B. Jr.|publisher=Goodwill Trading Co.|year=2001|isbn=978-971-12-0245-3|page=97}}</ref> He suggested that the interaction between these two domains occurs inside the brain, perhaps in a small midline structure called the [[pineal gland]].<ref name="S_pineal">{{cite web|title=Descartes and the Pineal Gland|publisher=Stanford University|date=November 5, 2008|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pineal-gland/|access-date=2025-02-07|archive-date=2019-12-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191216035157/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pineal-gland/|url-status=live}}</ref>

Although it is widely accepted that Descartes explained the problem cogently, few later philosophers have been happy with his solution, and his ideas about the pineal gland have especially been ridiculed.<ref name="S_pineal" /> However, no alternative solution has gained general acceptance. Proposed solutions can be divided broadly into two categories: [[dualism (philosophy of mind)|dualist]] solutions that maintain Descartes's rigid distinction between the realm of consciousness and the realm of matter but give different answers for how the two realms relate to each other; and [[monism|monist]] solutions that maintain that there is really only one realm of being, of which consciousness and matter are both aspects. Each of these categories itself contains numerous variants. The two main types of dualism are [[substance dualism]] (which holds that the mind is formed of a distinct type of substance not governed by the laws of physics), and [[property dualism]] (which holds that the laws of physics are universally valid but cannot be used to explain the mind). The three main types of [[monism]] are physicalism (which holds that the mind is made out of matter), [[idealism]] (which holds that only thought or experience truly exists, and matter is merely an illusion), and [[neutral monism]] (which holds that both mind and matter are aspects of a distinct essence that is itself identical to neither of them). There are also, however, a large number of idiosyncratic theories that cannot cleanly be assigned to any of these schools of thought.<ref>{{cite book|author=William Jaworski|title=Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction|publisher=John Wiley and Sons|year=2011|isbn=978-1-4443-3367-1|pages=5–11}}</ref>

Since the dawn of Newtonian science with its vision of simple mechanical principles governing the entire universe, some philosophers have been tempted by the idea that consciousness could be explained in purely physical terms. The first influential writer to propose such an idea explicitly was [[Julien Offray de La Mettrie]], in his book ''[[Man a Machine]]'' (''L'homme machine''). His arguments, however, were very abstract.<ref name=LaMettrie>{{cite book| editor=Ann Thomson|author=Julien Offray de La Mettrie|title=Machine man and other writings|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1996|isbn=978-0-521-47849-6|author-link=Julien Offray de La Mettrie}}</ref> The most influential modern physical theories of consciousness are based on [[psychology]] and [[neuroscience]]. Theories proposed by neuroscientists such as [[Gerald Edelman]]<ref>{{cite book|title=Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind|author=Gerald Edelman|publisher=Basic Books|year=1993|isbn=978-0-465-00764-6|author-link=Gerald Edelman|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/brightairbrillia00gera}}</ref> and [[António Damásio|Antonio Damasio]],<ref name=DamasioFeeling>{{cite book|author=Antonio Damasio|year=1999|title=The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness|location=New York|publisher=Harcourt Press|isbn=978-0-15-601075-7|author-link=Antonio Damasio|url=https://archive.org/details/feelingofwhathap00dama_0}}</ref> and by philosophers such as Daniel Dennett,<ref>{{cite book|author=Daniel Dennett|year=1991|title=Consciousness Explained|url=https://archive.org/details/consciousnessexp00denn|url-access=registration|location=Boston|publisher=Little & Company|isbn=978-0-316-18066-5|author-link=Daniel Dennett}}</ref> seek to explain consciousness in terms of neural events occurring within the brain. Many other neuroscientists, such as [[Christof Koch]],<ref name=KochQuest>{{cite book| author=Christof Koch|year=2004|title=The Quest for Consciousness|location=Englewood, CO|publisher=Roberts & Company|isbn=978-0-9747077-0-9|author-link=Christof Koch}}</ref> have explored the neural basis of consciousness without attempting to frame all-encompassing global theories. At the same time, [[computer scientist]]s working in the field of [[artificial intelligence]] have pursued the goal of creating digital computer programs that can [[Artificial consciousness|simulate or embody consciousness]].<ref>Ron Sun and Stan Franklin, Computational models of consciousness: A taxonomy and some examples. In: P.D. Zelazo, M. Moscovitch, and E. Thompson (eds.), ''The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness'', pp. 151–174. Cambridge University Press, New York. 2007</ref>

A few theoretical physicists have argued that classical physics is intrinsically incapable of explaining the holistic aspects of consciousness, but that [[Quantum mechanics|quantum theory]] may provide the missing ingredients. Several theorists have therefore proposed [[quantum mind]] (QM) theories of consciousness.<ref name="Stanford_qm_cos">{{cite book|title=Quantum Approaches to Consciousness|publisher=Stanford University|date=December 25, 2011|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-consciousness/|access-date=December 25, 2011|archive-date=August 8, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210808080906/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-consciousness/|url-status=live}}</ref> Notable theories falling into this category include the [[holonomic brain theory]] of [[Karl H. Pribram|Karl Pribram]] and [[David Bohm]], and the [[Orch-OR|Orch-OR theory]] formulated by [[Stuart Hameroff]] and [[Roger Penrose]]. Some of these QM theories offer descriptions of phenomenal consciousness, as well as QM interpretations of access consciousness. None of the quantum mechanical theories have been confirmed by experiment. Recent publications by G. Guerreshi, J. Cia, S. Popescu, and H. Briegel<ref name="Cai2010">{{cite journal|doi=10.1103/PhysRevE.82.021921|pmid=20866851|last1=Cai|first1=J.|last2=Popescu|first2=S.|last3=Briegel|first3=H.|title=Persistent dynamic entanglement from classical motion: How bio-molecular machines can generate non-trivial quantum states|journal=Physical Review E|volume=82|issue=2|pages=021921|arxiv=0809.4906|bibcode=2010PhRvE..82b1921C|year=2010|s2cid=23336691}}</ref> could falsify proposals such as those of Hameroff, which rely on [[quantum entanglement]] in protein. At the present time many scientists and philosophers consider the arguments for an important role of quantum phenomena to be unconvincing.<ref>{{cite book|author=John Searle|year=1997|title=The Mystery of Consciousness|publisher=The New York Review of Books|pages=53–88|isbn=978-0-940322-06-6|author-link=John Searle}}</ref> Empirical evidence is against the notion of quantum consciousness, an experiment about [[wave function collapse]] led by [[Catalina Curceanu]] in 2022 suggests that quantum consciousness, as suggested by [[Roger Penrose]] and [[Stuart Hameroff]], is highly implausible.<ref name="Curceanuetal">{{cite journal|last1=Derakhshani|first1=Maaneli|last2=Diósi|first2=Lajos|last3=Laubenstein|first3=Matthias|last4=Piscicchia|first4=Kristian|last5=Curceanu|first5=Catalina|title=At the crossroad of the search for spontaneous radiation and the Orch OR consciousness theory|journal=Physics of Life Reviews|date=September 2022|volume=42|pages=8–14|doi=10.1016/j.plrev.2022.05.004|pmid=35617922|bibcode=2022PhLRv..42....8D|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1571064522000197}}</ref>

Apart from the general question of the [[Hard problem of consciousness|"hard problem" of consciousness]] (which is, roughly speaking, the question of how mental experience can arise from a physical basis<ref>{{cite book|title=The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts|author= Rocco J. Gennaro|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=t-XgKMgzwk4C&pg=PA75|page=75|chapter=§4.4 The hard problem of consciousness|isbn=978-0-262-01660-5|year=2011|publisher=MIT Press}}</ref>), a more specialized question is how to square the subjective notion that we are in control of our decisions (at least in some small measure) with the customary view of causality that subsequent events are caused by prior events. The topic of [[free will]] is the philosophical and scientific examination of this conundrum.

===Problem of other minds===
{{Main|Problem of other minds}}

Many philosophers consider experience to be the essence of consciousness, and believe that experience can only fully be known from the inside, subjectively. The [[problem of other minds]] is a philosophical problem traditionally stated as the following [[Epistemology|epistemological]] question: Given that I can only observe the behavior of others, how can I know that others have minds?<ref>{{cite web|last=Hyslop|first=Alec|date=14 January 2014|editor1-last=Zalta|editor1-first=Edward N.|editor2-last=Nodelman|editor2-first=Uri|title=Other minds|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/|access-date=May 26, 2015|website=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University|issn=1095-5054}}</ref> The problem of other minds is particularly acute for people who believe in the possibility of [[philosophical zombie]]s, that is, people who think it is possible in principle to have an entity that is physically indistinguishable from a human being and behaves like a human being in every way but nevertheless lacks consciousness.<ref>{{cite web|author=Robert Kirk|title=Zombies|publisher=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition)|editor=Edward N. Zalta|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/zombies|access-date=2011-10-25|archive-date=2013-12-02|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131202074345/http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/zombies/|url-status=live}}</ref> Related issues have also been studied extensively by Greg Littmann of the University of Illinois,<ref name="Ridley Scott pp. 133-144">''The Culture and Philosophy of Ridley Scott'', Greg Littmann, pp. 133–144, Lexington Books (2013).</ref> and by Colin Allen (a professor at the University of Pittsburgh) regarding the literature and research studying [[artificial intelligence]] in androids.<ref name="Machine Morals 2010">''Moral Machines'', Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen, 288 pages, Oxford University Press, USA (June 3, 2010), {{ISBN|0-19-973797-5}}.</ref>

The most commonly given answer is that we attribute consciousness to other people because we see that they resemble us in appearance and behavior; we reason that if they look like us and act like us, they must be like us in other ways, including having experiences of the sort that we do.<ref name=HyslopAnalogy/> There are, however, a variety of problems with that explanation. For one thing, it seems to violate the [[Occam's razor|principle of parsimony]], by postulating an invisible entity that is not necessary to explain what we observe.<ref name=HyslopAnalogy>{{cite book|author=Alec Hyslop|chapter=The analogical inference to other minds|title=Other Minds|year=1995|publisher=Springer|isbn=978-0-7923-3245-9|pages=41–70}}</ref> Some philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett in a research paper titled "The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies", argue that people who give this explanation do not really understand what they are saying.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Daniel Dennett|title=The unimagined preposterousness of zombies|journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|volume=2|year=1995|pages=322–325|author-link=Daniel Dennett}}</ref> More broadly, philosophers who do not accept the possibility of zombies generally believe that consciousness is reflected in behavior (including verbal behavior), and that we attribute consciousness on the basis of behavior. A more straightforward way of saying this is that we attribute experiences to people because of what they can ''do'', including the fact that they can tell us about their experiences.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Stevan Harnad|title=Why and how we are not zombies|journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|year=1995|volume=1|pages=164–167|author-link=Stevan Harnad}}</ref>

=== Qualia ===
{{Main|Qualia}}

The term "qualia" was introduced in philosophical literature by [[C. I. Lewis]]. The word is derived from Latin and means "of what sort". It is basically a quantity or property of something as perceived or experienced by an individual, like the scent of rose, the taste of wine, or the pain of a headache. They are difficult to articulate or describe. The philosopher and scientist [[Daniel Dennett]] describes them as "the way things seem to us", while philosopher and cognitive scientist [[David Chalmers]] expanded on qualia as the "[[hard problem of consciousness]]" in the 1990s. When qualia is experienced, activity is simulated in the brain, and these processes are called [[neural correlates of consciousness]] (NCCs). Many scientific studies have been done to attempt to link particular brain regions with emotions or experiences.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last1=Parsons |first1=Paul |title=50 Ideas You Really Need to Know: Science |last2=Dixon |first2=Gail |publisher=[[Quercus]] |year=2016 |isbn=978-1-78429-614-8 |location=London |pages=141–143 |language=en}}</ref><ref>Oxford English Dictionary, "qualia", 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 2010. Accessed October 3, 2024. https://www.oed.com/search/dictionary/?scope=Entries&q=qualia.</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Qualia {{!}} Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/qualia/#:~:text=The%20term%20%E2%80%9Cqualia%E2%80%9D%20(singular,properties%20of%20sense%2Ddata%20themselves. |access-date=4 October 2024 |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref>

Species which experience qualia are said to have [[sentience]], which is central to the [[animal rights movement]], because it includes the ability to experience pain and suffering.<ref name=":0" />

=== Identity ===
{{Main|Personal identity}}

An unsolved problem in the philosophy of consciousness is how it relates to the nature of personal identity.<ref>{{cite web |title=Personal Identity - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/person-i/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170903032724/http://www.iep.utm.edu/person-i/ |archive-date=3 September 2017 |access-date=24 January 2025 |website=www.iep.utm.edu}}</ref> This includes questions regarding whether someone is the "same person" from moment to moment. If that is the case, another question is what exactly the "identity carrier" is that makes a conscious being "the same" being from one moment to the next. The problem of determining personal identity also includes questions such as Benj Hellie's [[vertiginous question]], which can be summarized as "Why am I me and not someone else?".<ref>{{cite journal|last=Hellie|first=Benj|year=2013|title=Against egalitarianism|journal=Analysis|volume=73|issue=2|pages=304–320|doi=10.1093/analys/ans101}}</ref> The philosophical problems regarding the nature of personal identity have been extensively discussed by Thomas Nagel in his book ''[[The View from Nowhere]]''.

A common view of personal identity is that an individual has a continuous identity that persists from moment to moment, with an individual having a continuous identity consisting of a line segment stretching across time from birth to death. In the case of an afterlife as described in Abrahamic religions, one's personal identity is believed to stretch infinitely into the future, forming a ray or line. This notion of identity is similar to the form of dualism advocated by René Descartes. However, some philosophers argue that this common notion of personal identity is unfounded. [[Daniel Kolak]] has argued extensively against it in his book ''I am You''.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kolak |first=Daniel |url=https://digitalphysics.ru/pdf/Kaminskii_A_V/Kolak_I_Am_You.pdf |title=I Am You: The Metaphysical Foundations for Global Ethics |date=2007-11-03 |publisher=Springer Science & Business Media |isbn=978-1-4020-3014-7 |language=en |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240906163443/https://digitalphysics.ru/pdf/Kaminskii_A_V/Kolak_I_Am_You.pdf |archive-date=2024-09-06 |url-status=live}}</ref> Kolak refers to the aforementioned notion of personal identity being linear as "Closed individualism". Another view of personal identity according to Kolak is "Empty individualism", in which one's personal identity only exists for a single moment of time. However, Kolak advocates for a view of personal identity called [[Open individualism]], in which all consciousness is in reality a single being and individual personal identity in reality does not exist at all. Another philosopher who has contested the notion of personal identity is [[Derek Parfit]]. In his book ''[[Reasons and Persons]]'',<ref>{{Cite book |last=Parfit |first=Derek |url=https://archive.org/details/trent_0116300637661/page/n5/mode/2up |title=Reasons and persons |date=1984 |isbn=0-19-824615-3 |location=Oxford [Oxfordshire] |publisher=Clarendon Press |oclc=9827659}}</ref> he describes a thought experiment known as the [[teletransportation paradox]]. In Buddhist philosophy, the concept of [[anattā]] refers to the idea that the self is an illusion.

Other philosophers have argued that Hellie's vertiginous question has a number of philosophical implications relating to the [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]] nature of consciousness. [[Christian List]] argues that the vertiginous question and the existence of first-personal facts is evidence against physicalism, and evidence against other third-personal metaphysical pictures, including standard versions of [[Mind–body dualism|dualism]].<ref>{{cite web |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LISTFA |title=The first-personal argument against physicalism |last=List |first=Christian |date=2023 |access-date=3 September 2024}}</ref> List also argues that the vertiginous question implies a "quadrilemma" for theories of consciousness. He claims that at most three of the following metaphysical claims can be true: 'first-person [[Philosophical realism|realism]]', 'non-[[solipsism]]', 'non-fragmentation', and 'one world' – and at at least one of these four must be false.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/LISAQF |title=A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness |last=List |first=Christian |date=2023 |publisher=The Philosophical Quarterly |access-date=24 January 2025}}</ref> List has proposed a model he calls the "many-worlds theory of consciousness" in order to reconcile the subjective nature of consciousness without lapsing into solipsism.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/LISTMT-2 |title=The many-worlds theory of consciousness |last=List |first=Christian |date=2023 |publisher=The Philosophical Quarterly |access-date=24 January 2025}}</ref> Vincent Conitzer argues that the nature of identity is connected to [[A series and B series]] theories of time, and that A-theory being true implies that the "I" is metaphysically distinguished from other perspectives.<ref>{{cite arXiv|last=Conitzer|first=Vincent |date=30 Aug 2020|title=The Personalized A-Theory of Time and Perspective|eprint=2008.13207v1|class=physics.hist-ph}}</ref> Other philosophical theories regarding the metaphysical nature of self are Caspar Hare's theories of [[perspectival realism]],<ref>{{cite journal |last=Hare |first=Caspar |date=September 2010 |title=Realism About Tense and Perspective |url=http://web.mit.edu/~casparh/www/Papers/CJHarePerspectivalRealism.pdf |journal=Philosophy Compass |volume=5 |issue=9 |pages=760–769 |doi=10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00325.x |hdl-access=free |hdl=1721.1/115229}}</ref> in which things within perceptual awareness have a defining intrinsic property that exists absolutely and not relative to anything, and [[egocentric presentism]], in which the experiences of other individuals are not ''present'' in the way that one's current perspective is.<ref name="JPhil">{{cite journal|last=Hare|first=Caspar|title=Self-Bias, Time-Bias, and the Metaphysics of Self and Time|journal=The Journal of Philosophy|date=July 2007|volume=104|issue=7|pages=350–373|doi=10.5840/jphil2007104717|url=http://web.mit.edu/~casparh/www/Papers/CJHareSelfBias2.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Hare|first=Caspar|title=On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects|year=2009|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=9780691135311|url=http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8921.html}}</ref>