Editing Confederate States of America (section)

==Diplomacy==
During its four years, the Confederacy asserted its independence and appointed dozens of diplomatic agents abroad. None were recognized by a foreign government. The US government regarded the Southern states as being in rebellion or insurrection and so refused any formal recognition of their status.

The US government never declared war on those "kindred and countrymen" in the Confederacy but conducted its military efforts beginning with a presidential proclamation issued April 15, 1861.<ref>{{cite book|author=Carl Sandburg|title=Abraham Lincoln: The Prairie Years and the War Years|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_nL5xCYLFs0C&pg=PA151|date=1940|page=151|publisher=Sterling Publishing Company |isbn=978-1402742880}}</ref> It called for troops to recapture forts and suppress what Lincoln later called an "insurrection and rebellion".<ref>{{cite book|author=Abraham Lincoln|title=Abraham Lincoln; Complete Works, Comprising His Speeches, State Papers, and Miscellaneous Writings|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hX8_AQAAMAAJ&pg=PA542|year=1920|publisher=Century|page=542}}</ref> Mid-war parleys between the two sides occurred without formal political recognition, though the [[laws of war]] predominantly governed military relationships on both sides of uniformed conflict.<ref>Violations of the rules of law were precipitated on both sides and can be found in historical accounts of guerrilla war, units in cross-racial combat and captives held in prisoner of war camps, brutal, tragic accounts against both soldiers and civilian populations.</ref>

Once war with the United States began, the Confederacy pinned its hopes for survival on military intervention by the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|UK]] or [[Second French Empire|France]]. The Confederate government sent [[James M. Mason]] to London and [[John Slidell]] to Paris. On their way in 1861, the U.S. Navy intercepted their ship, the ''Trent,'' and took them to Boston, an international episode known as the [[Trent Affair|''Trent'' Affair]]. The diplomats were eventually released and continued their voyage.<ref>Francis M. Carroll, "The American Civil War and British Intervention: The Threat of Anglo-American Conflict." ''Canadian Journal of History'' (2012) 47#1 pp. 94–95.</ref> However, their mission was unsuccessful; historians judge their diplomacy as poor.<ref>Blumenthal (1966) p. 151; Jones (2009) p. 321; Owsley (1959)</ref>{{page needed|date=December 2020}} Neither secured [[diplomatic recognition]] for the Confederacy, much less military assistance.

The Confederates who had believed that "[[King Cotton|cotton is king]]", that is, that Britain had to support the Confederacy to obtain cotton, proved mistaken. The British had stocks to last over a year and been developing alternative sources.<ref name=Young>{{cite book|title=Senator James Murray Mason: Defender of the Old South|first=Robert W.|last=Young|author-link= Robert W. Young|location=[[Knoxville, Tennessee]]|publisher=[[University of Tennessee Press]]|year=1998|isbn=978-0870499982|page=166}}</ref> The United Kingdom took pride leading the end of transatlantic enslavement of Africans; by [[Slavery Abolition Act 1833|1833]], the Royal Navy patrolled middle passage waters to prevent additional slave ships from reaching the Western Hemisphere. It was in London that the first [[World Anti-Slavery Convention]] had been held in 1840. Black abolitionist speakers toured England, Scotland, and Ireland, exposing the reality of America's chattel slavery and rebutting the Confederate position that blacks were "unintellectual, timid, and dependent",<ref>{{cite book|title=Plantation slavery in Georgia|first=Ralph Betts|last=Flanders|location=Chapel Hill, North Carolina|publisher=[[University of North Carolina Press]]|year=1933|url=https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015000661366&view=1up&seq=319|page=289}}</ref> and "not equal to the white man...the superior race." [[Frederick Douglass]], [[Henry Highland Garnet]], [[Sarah Parker Remond]], her brother [[Charles Lenox Remond]], [[James W. C. Pennington]], [[Martin Delany]], [[Samuel Ringgold Ward]], and [[William G. Allen]] all spent years in Britain, where fugitive slaves were safe and, as Allen said, there was an "absence of prejudice against color. Here the colored man feels himself among friends, and not among enemies".<ref>{{cite news|title=Letter from Professor Wm. G. Allen [dated June 20, 1853]|newspaper=[[The Liberator (newspaper)|The Liberator]]|via=[[newspapers.com]]. Reprinted in ''[[Frederick Douglass' Paper]]'', August 5, 1853.|date=July 22, 1853|page=4|first=Wm. G.|last=Allen|author-link=William G. Allen|url=https://www.newspapers.com/clip/33711948/letter-from-william-g-allen/}}</ref> Most British public opinion was against the practice, with Liverpool seen as the primary base of Southern support.<ref>{{Cite web |title=British Support During the U.S. Civil War · Liverpool's Abercromby Square and the Confederacy During the U.S. Civil War · Lowcountry Digital History Initiative |url=https://ldhi.library.cofc.edu/exhibits/show/liverpools-abercromby-square/britain-and-us-civil-war#:~:text=By%20the%20time%20of%20the,start%20of%20the%20Civil%20War. |access-date=2024-04-21 |website=ldhi.library.cofc.edu}}</ref>

{{multiple image|caption_align=center
|image1=Lord John Russell.jpg |width1=150|caption1= Lord John Russell, British foreign secretary and later PM, considered mediation in the 'American War'
|image2=Alexandre Cabanel 002.jpg|width2=157|caption2= French Emperor Napoleon III sought joint French–British recognition of CSA}}

Throughout the early years of the war, British foreign secretary [[John Russell, 1st Earl Russell|Lord John Russell]], Emperor [[Napoleon III]] of France, and, to a lesser extent, British Prime Minister [[Henry Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston|Lord Palmerston]], showed interest in recognition of the Confederacy or at least mediation of the war. [[Chancellor of the Exchequer]] [[William Ewart Gladstone|William Gladstone]] attempted unsuccessfully to convince Palmerston to intervene.<ref>{{cite book|author= Richard Shannon|author-link = Richard Shannon (historian)|title= Gladstone: God and Politics|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=H9TUAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA144|year= 2008|page= 144| publisher=A&C Black |isbn = 978-1847252036}}</ref> By September 1862 the Union victory at the [[Battle of Antietam]], Lincoln's preliminary [[Emancipation Proclamation]] and abolitionist opposition in Britain put an end to these possibilities.<ref>Thomas Paterson, et al. ''American foreign relations: A history, to 1920: Volume 1'' (2009) pp. 149–155.</ref> The cost to Britain of a war with the U.S. would have been high: the immediate loss of American grain-shipments, the end of British exports to the U.S., and seizure of billions of pounds invested in American securities. War would have meant higher taxes in Britain, another invasion of Canada, and attacks on the British merchant fleet. In mid-1862, fears of a race war (like the [[Haitian Revolution]] of 1791–1804) led to the British considering intervention for humanitarian reasons.<ref>Howard Jones, ''Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom: The Union and Slavery in the Diplomacy of the Civil War'' (2002), p. 48</ref>

John Slidell, the Confederate States emissary to France, succeeded in negotiating a loan of $15,000,000 from [[Frédéric Émile d'Erlanger|Erlanger]] and other French capitalists for ironclad warships and military supplies.<ref>{{Cite journal |jstor = 2205869|title = A Confederate Success in Europe: The Erlanger Loan|journal = The Journal of Southern History|volume = 36|issue = 2|pages = 157–188|last1 = Gentry|first1 = Judith Fenner|year = 1970|doi = 10.2307/2205869}}</ref> The British government did allow the construction of [[Blockade runners of the American Civil War|blockade runners]] in Britain; they were owned and operated by British financiers and shipowners; a few were owned and operated by the Confederacy. The British investors' goal was to acquire highly profitable cotton.<ref>{{Cite journal |jstor = 2120650|title = Through the Blockade: The Profitability and Extent of Cotton Smuggling, 1861–1865|journal = The Journal of Economic History|volume = 41|issue = 4|pages = 867–888|last1 = Lebergott|first1 = Stanley|year = 1981|doi = 10.1017/S0022050700044946| s2cid=154654909 }}</ref>

Several European nations maintained diplomats in place who had been appointed to the U.S., but no country appointed any diplomat to the Confederacy. Those nations recognized the Union and Confederate sides as [[belligerent]]s. In 1863, the Confederacy expelled European diplomatic missions for advising their resident subjects to refuse to serve in the Confederate army.<ref>Alexander DeConde, ed. ''Encyclopedia of American foreign policy'' (2001) vol. 1 p. 202 and Stephen R. Wise, ''Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running During the Civil War'', (1991), [https://books.google.com/books?id=_kq7diciSsQC&pg=PA86 p. 86].</ref> Both Confederate and Union agents were allowed to work openly in British territories.<ref>Wise, Stephen R. [https://books.google.com/books?id=_kq7diciSsQC ''Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running During the Civil War'']. University of South Carolina Press, 1991 {{ISBN|978-0-87249-799-3}}, [https://books.google.com/books?id=_kq7diciSsQC&pg=PA86 p. 86]. An example of agents working openly occurred in [[Hamilton, Bermuda|Hamilton]] in Bermuda, where a Confederate agent openly worked to help blockade runners.</ref> The Confederacy appointed [[Ambrose Dudley Mann]] as special agent to the [[Holy See]] in September 1863, but the Holy See never released a statement supporting or recognizing the Confederacy. In November 1863, Mann met [[Pope Pius IX]] and received a letter supposedly addressed "to the Illustrious and Honorable Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America"; Mann had mistranslated the address. In his report to Richmond, Mann claimed a great diplomatic achievement for himself, but Confederate Secretary of State [[Judah P. Benjamin]] told Mann it was "a mere inferential recognition, unconnected with political action or the regular establishment of diplomatic relations" and thus did not assign it the weight of formal recognition.<ref>{{cite book|title= The American Catholic Historical Researches|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=m7c7AQAAMAAJ&pg=RA1-PA227|year= 1901|pages= 27–28}}</ref><ref>Don H. Doyle, ''The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American Civil War'' (2014) pp. 257–270.</ref>

Nevertheless, the Confederacy was seen internationally as a serious attempt at nationhood, and European governments sent military observers to assess whether there had been a ''de facto'' establishment of independence. These observers included [[Arthur Lyon Fremantle]] of the British [[Coldstream Guards]], who entered the Confederacy via Mexico, Fitzgerald Ross of the Austrian [[Hussars]], and [[Justus Scheibert]] of the [[Prussian Army]].<ref>"Thomas1979" pp. 219–221</ref> European travelers visited and wrote accounts for publication. Importantly in 1862, the Frenchman [[Charles Frédéric Girard|Charles Girard]]'s ''Seven months in the rebel states during the North American War'' testified "this government ... is no longer a trial government ... but really a normal government, the expression of popular will".<ref>Scholars such as Emory M. Thomas have characterized Girard's book as "more propaganda than anything else, but Girard caught one essential truth", the quote referenced. "Thomas1979" p. 220</ref> Fremantle went on to write in his book ''Three Months in the Southern States'' that he had:

{{Blockquote|...not attempted to conceal any of the peculiarities or defects of the Southern people. Many persons will doubtless highly disapprove of some of their customs and habits in the wilder portion of the country; but I think no generous man, whatever may be his political opinions, can do otherwise than admire the courage, energy, and patriotism of the whole population, and the skill of its leaders, in this struggle against great odds. And I am also of opinion that many will agree with me in thinking that a people in which all ranks and both sexes display a unanimity and a heroism which can never have been surpassed in the history of the world, is destined, sooner or later, to become a great and independent nation.<ref>{{cite book |last= Fremantle |first= Arthur |date= 1864 |title= Three Months in the Southern States|publisher= University of Nebraska Press|page= 124 |isbn= 978-1429016667}}</ref>}}

French Emperor Napoleon III assured Confederate diplomat John Slidell that he would make "direct proposition" to Britain for joint recognition. The Emperor made the same assurance to British Members of Parliament [[John A. Roebuck]] and John A. Lindsay. Roebuck in turn publicly prepared a bill to submit to Parliament supporting joint Anglo-French recognition of the Confederacy. "Southerners had a right to be optimistic, or at least hopeful, that their revolution would prevail, or at least endure." Following the disasters at Vicksburg and Gettysburg in July 1863, the Confederates "suffered a severe loss of confidence in themselves" and withdrew into an interior defensive position.<ref>"Thomas1979" p. 243</ref> By December 1864, Davis considered sacrificing slavery in order to enlist recognition and aid from Paris and London; he secretly sent [[Duncan F. Kenner]] to Europe with a message that the war was fought solely for "the vindication of our rights to self-government and independence" and that "no sacrifice is too great, save that of honor". The message stated that if the French or British governments made their recognition conditional on anything at all, the Confederacy would consent to such terms.<ref>{{cite book |title= A compilation of the messages and papers of the Confederacy: including the diplomatic correspondence, 1861–1865 |url= https://archive.org/details/acompilationmes74richgoog |editor= Richardson, James D. |others= Volume II |publisher= United States Publishing Company |location= Nashville |year= 1905 |page =[https://archive.org/details/acompilationmes74richgoog/page/n715 697] |access-date= March 18, 2013}}</ref> European leaders all saw that the Confederacy was on the verge of defeat.<ref name="levine-248">{{cite book|last= Levine|first= Bruce|title= The Fall of the House of Dixie|year= 2013|publisher= Random House|page= 248}}</ref>

The Confederacy's biggest foreign policy successes were with [[Empire of Brazil|Brazil]] and [[Captaincy General of Cuba|Cuba]]. Militarily this meant little. Brazil represented the "peoples most identical to us in Institutions",<ref name=Spain/> in which [[Slavery in Brazil|slavery remained legal]] until the 1880s and the abolitionist movement was small. Confederate ships were welcome in Brazilian ports.<ref>{{cite book|title=The Public Life and Diplomatic Correspondence of James M. Mason|last=Mason|first=Virginia|year=1906|page=203|publisher=New York and Washington, The Neale Publishing Company|url=https://archive.org/details/publiclifediplom00masonva/page/202/mode/2up}}</ref> After the war, Brazil was the primary destination of those Southerners who wanted to continue living in a slave society, where, as one immigrant remarked, ''[[Confederados|Confederado]]'' slaves were cheap. The Captain–General of Cuba declared in writing that Confederate ships were welcome, and would be protected in Cuban ports.<ref name=Spain>{{cite news|title=Spain and the Confederate States|newspaper=[[Charleston Mercury]] ([[Charleston, South Carolina]])|date=September 12, 1861|page=1|via=accessiblearchives.com|url=https://accessible.com/accessible/docButton?AAWhat=builtPage&AAWhere=THECHARLESTONMERCURY.18610912_001.image&AABeanName=toc1&AANextPage=/printBuiltImagePage.jsp}}</ref> Historians speculate that if the Confederacy had achieved independence, it probably would have tried to acquire Cuba as a base of expansion.<ref>Robert E. May, "The irony of confederate diplomacy: visions of empire, the Monroe doctrine, and the quest for nationhood." ''Journal of Southern History'' 83.1 (2017): 69–106 [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/647290/summary excerpt]</ref>