Editing Clark Clifford (section)

===Vietnam===
[[File:VietnamOMC.png|thumb|300px|Political map of Vietnam in 2007 with latitudes]]

Clifford took office committed to rethinking Johnson's Vietnam policies, and Vietnam policy consumed most of his time.   He had argued against escalation in 1965 in private counsel with the president, but then provided public support for the president's position once the decision was made.  At his confirmation hearing, he told the [[United States Senate Committee on Armed Services|Armed Services Committee]] of the U.S. Senate that the limited objective of the U.S. was to guarantee to the people of South Vietnam the right of self-determination. He opposed ending the U.S. bombing of [[North Vietnam]] at the time, but acknowledged that the situation could change.<ref>Acacia, ''Clark Clifford'' pp 236-328.</ref>

In fact, on March 31, 1968, just a month after Clifford arrived at the Pentagon, Johnson, in an effort to get peace talks started, ordered the cessation of bombing north of the [[20th parallel north|20th parallel]], an area comprising almost 80 percent of North Vietnam's land area and 90 percent of its population. In the same address, Johnson announced that he would not be a candidate for reelection in 1968, surprising everyone, Clifford included. Soon the North Vietnamese agreed to negotiations, which began in Paris in mid-May 1968. Later, on October 31, 1968, to encourage the success of these talks, the President, with Clifford's strong support, ordered an end to all bombing in North Vietnam.

Clifford, like McNamara, had to deal with frequent requests for additional troops from military commanders in Vietnam. When he became secretary, the authorized force in Vietnam was 525,000. Soon after moving into his Pentagon office, Clifford persuaded Johnson to deny General [[William Westmoreland]]'s request for an additional 206,000 American troops in Vietnam.

At the end of March 1968, however, Johnson agreed to send 24,500 more troops on an emergency basis, raising authorized strength to 549,500, a figure never reached. Even as he oversaw a continued buildup, Clifford preferred to emphasize the points Johnson had made in his March 31, 1968, address: that the [[Army of the Republic of Vietnam|South Vietnamese army]] could take over a greater share of the fighting, that the administration would place an absolute limit on the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam, and that it would take steps, including the bombing restrictions, to reduce the combat level.

Eventually Clifford moved very close, with Johnson's tacit support, to the views McNamara held on Vietnam just before he left office—no further increases in U.S. troop levels, support for the bombing halt and gradual disengagement from the conflict.<ref name="Gelb1">Gelb, Les and Gladstone, Brooke (January 12, 2018). [https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/what-post-missed-episode What the Press and "The Post" Missed] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190801024730/https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/what-post-missed-episode |date=August 1, 2019 }}. [[On The Media]]. WNYC Studios. Accessed June 25, 2023.</ref> By this time Clifford clearly disagreed with Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]], who believed, according to ''[[The Washington Post]],'' "that the war was being won by the allies" and that it "would be won if America had the will to win it."  He later recalled how he turned against the war: "I found out that we couldn't win the war with the limitations that we had, which I thought were correct limitations, and I thought all we were going to do was just waste the lives of our men and our treasure out in the jungles of North and South Vietnam."<ref>[http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/org.wgbh.mla:348bd4b1ae559bcd90abab7b114328312a4bf800 “Interview with Clark M. Clifford, 1981.”] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110114122644/http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/org.wgbh.mla%3A348bd4b1ae559bcd90abab7b114328312a4bf800 |date=January 14, 2011 }} May 18, 1981. WGBH Media Library & Archives. Retrieved November 23, 2010.</ref>

After he left office, Clifford, in the July 1969 issue of ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'', made his views very clear: "Nothing we might do could be so beneficial&nbsp;... as to begin to withdraw our combat troops. Moreover&nbsp;... we cannot realistically expect to achieve anything more through our military force, and the time has come to begin to disengage. That was my final conclusion as I left the Pentagon&nbsp;...".<ref>Clark M. Clifford, "A Viet Nam Reappraisal: The Personal History of One Man's View and How It Evolved." ''Foreign Affairs'' 47.4 (1969): 601-622.</ref>

Although the Johnson Administration ended under the cloud of the Vietnam War, Clifford concluded his short term as Secretary of Defense with his reputation actually enhanced. He got along well with the [[United States Congress|U.S. Congress]], and this helped him to secure approval of at least some of his proposals. He settled into his duties quickly and efficiently, and capably managed the initial de-escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam; indeed, he apparently strongly influenced Johnson in favor of a de-escalation strategy. As he left office to return to his law practice in Washington, Clifford expressed the hope and expectation that international tensions would abate, citing the shift in the Vietnam confrontation from the battlefield to the conference table, and the evident willingness of the Soviet Union to discuss limitations on strategic [[nuclear weapons]].