Editing Chinese room (section)

=== Strong AI vs. biological naturalism ===
Searle holds a philosophical position he calls "[[biological naturalism]]": that consciousness{{efn|name=Consciousness}} and understanding require specific biological machinery that is found in brains. He writes "brains cause minds"{{sfn|Searle|1990a|p=29}} and that "actual human mental phenomena [are] dependent on actual physical–chemical properties of actual human brains".{{sfn|Searle|1990a|p=29}} Searle argues that this machinery (known in [[neuroscience]] as the "[[neural correlates of consciousness]]") must have some causal powers that permit the human experience of consciousness.{{sfn|Searle|1990b}} Searle's belief in the existence of these powers has been criticized.

Searle does not disagree with the notion that machines can have consciousness and understanding, because, as he writes, "we are precisely such machines".{{sfn|Searle|1980|p=11}} Searle holds that the brain is, in fact, a machine, but that the brain gives rise to consciousness and understanding using specific machinery. If neuroscience is able to isolate the mechanical process that gives rise to consciousness, then Searle grants that it may be possible to create machines that have consciousness and understanding. However, without the specific machinery required, Searle does not believe that consciousness can occur.

Biological naturalism implies that one cannot determine if the experience of consciousness is occurring merely by examining how a system functions, because the specific machinery of the brain is essential. Thus, biological naturalism is directly opposed to both [[behaviorism]] and [[functionalism (philosophy of mind)|functionalism]] (including "computer functionalism" or "strong AI").{{sfn|Hauser|2006|p=8}} Biological naturalism is similar to [[identity theory of mind|identity theory]] (the position that mental states are "identical to" or "composed of" neurological events); however, Searle has specific technical objections to identity theory.{{sfn|Searle|1992|loc=chpt. 5}}{{efn|Larry Hauser writes that "biological naturalism is either confused (waffling between identity theory and dualism) or else it ''just is'' identity theory or dualism."{{sfn|Hauser|2006|p=8}}}} Searle's biological naturalism and strong AI are both opposed to [[Cartesian dualism]],{{sfn|Hauser|2006|p=8}} the classical idea that the brain and mind are made of different "substances". Indeed, Searle accuses strong AI of dualism, writing that "strong AI only makes sense given the dualistic assumption that, where the mind is concerned, the brain doesn't matter".{{sfn|Searle|1980|p=13}}