Editing Camp David Accords (section)

== Proceedings of the Camp David meeting ==
Accompanied by their capable negotiating teams and with their respective interests in mind, the Israeli and Egyptian leaders [[Menachem Begin]] and [[Anwar Sadat]] converged on Camp David for 13 days of tense and dramatic negotiations from 5 to 17 September 1978.

Carter's advisers insisted on the establishment of an Egyptian–Israeli agreement which would lead to an eventual solution to the Palestine issue. They believed in a short, loose, and overt linkage between the two countries amplified by the establishment of a coherent basis for a settlement. However, Carter felt they were not "aiming high enough" and was interested in the establishment of a written "land for peace" agreement with Israel returning the [[Sinai Peninsula]] and [[West Bank]].<ref>{{cite news |url= http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc1482.html | title=Camp David Accords: Jimmy Carter Reflects 25 Years Later|access-date=1 February 2015 |date= 17 September 2003 |work=[[Carter Center]]}}</ref> Numerous times both the Egyptian and Israeli leaders wanted to scrap negotiations, only to be lured back into the process by personal appeals from Carter.

Begin and Sadat had such mutual antipathy toward one another that they only seldom had direct contact; thus Carter had to conduct his own microcosmic form of shuttle diplomacy by holding one-on-one meetings with either Sadat or Begin in one cabin, then returning to the cabin of the third party to relay the substance of his discussions. Begin and Sadat were "literally not on speaking terms," and "claustrophobia was setting in."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Quandt |first=William |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VRZ937MPRkoC |title=Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics |year=2011|publisher=Brookings Institution Press |isbn=978-0-8157-1344-9 |page=235}}</ref>

[[File:Carter, Brzezinski and Vance at Camp David, 1977.jpg|thumb|left|President Carter, National Security Advisor [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], and Secretary of State [[Cyrus Vance]] at Camp David]]
A particularly difficult situation arose on the tenth stalemated day of the talks. The issues of [[Israeli settlement]] withdrawal from the Sinai and the status of the West Bank created what seemed to be an impasse. In response, Carter had the choice of trying to salvage the agreement by conceding the issue of the West Bank to Begin, while advocating Sadat's less controversial position on the removal of all settlements from the Sinai Peninsula. Or he could have refused to continue the talks, reported the reasons for their failure, and allowed Begin to bear the brunt of the blame.

Carter chose to continue and for three more days negotiated. During this time, Carter even took the two leaders to the nearby [[Gettysburg National Military Park]] in the hopes of using the [[American Civil War]] as a simile to their own struggle.<ref name="Conant2015">{{cite book|author=Sean Conant|title=The Gettysburg Address: Perspectives on Lincoln's Greatest Speech|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_bmyBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA315|year=2015|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-022746-3|pages=315–}}</ref>

Consequently, the 13 days marking the Camp David Accords were considered a success, in part due to Carter's determination in obtaining an Israeli–Egyptian agreement, which represented considerable time focused on a singular international problem. Additionally, Carter was beneficiary to a fully pledged American foreign team. Likewise, the Israeli delegation had a stable of excellent talent in Ministers [[Moshe Dayan|Dayan]] and [[Ezer Weizman|Weizman]] and legal experts Dr. [[Meir Rosenne]] and [[Aharon Barak]]. Furthermore, the absence of the media contributed to the Accord's successes: there were no possibilities provided to either leader to reassure his political body or be driven to conclusions by members of his opposition. An eventual scrap of negotiations by either leader would have proven disastrous, resulting in taking the blame for the summit's failure as well as a disassociation from the White House. Ultimately, neither Begin nor Sadat was willing to risk those eventualities. Both of them had invested enormous amounts of political capital and time to reach an agreement.<ref>Stein 1999, p. 252.</ref>