Editing Blitzkrieg (section)

===Britain===
[[File:IWM-Q-12329-armoured-car-Megiddo-1918.jpg|thumb|right|British armoured car and motorcycle at the [[Battle of Megiddo (1918)]]]]
The British Army took lessons from the successful infantry and artillery offensives on the Western Front in late 1918. To obtain the best co-operation between all arms, emphasis was placed on detailed planning, rigid control and adherence to orders. Mechanization of the army, as part of a combined-arms theory of war, was considered a means to avoid mass casualties and the indecisive nature of offensives.{{sfn|French|2000|pp=17–18}}{{sfn|Sheffield|2011|p=121}} The four editions of ''Field Service Regulations'' that were published after 1918 held that only combined-arms operations could create enough fire power to enable mobility on a battlefield. That theory of war also emphasised consolidation and recommended caution against overconfidence and ruthless exploitation.{{sfn|French|2000|pp=18–20, 22–24}}

During the [[Sinai and Palestine campaign]], operations involved some aspects of what would later be called blitzkrieg.{{sfn|Liddell Hart|1970|pp=435–438}} The decisive [[Battle of Megiddo (1918)|Battle of Megiddo]] included concentration, surprise and speed. Success depended on attacking only in terrain favouring the movement of large formations around the battlefield and tactical improvements in the British artillery and infantry attack.{{sfn|Woodward|2006|p=191}}{{sfn|Erickson|2001|p=200}} General [[Edmund Allenby]] used infantry to attack the strong [[Ottoman Empire|Ottoman]] front line in co-operation with supporting artillery, augmented by the guns of two destroyers.{{sfn|Wavell|1968|p=206}}{{sfn|Falls|Becke|1930|pp=470–1, 480–1, 485}} Through constant pressure by infantry and cavalry, two Ottoman armies in the [[Judea]]n Hills were kept off-balance and virtually encircled during the [[Battle of Sharon|Battles of Sharon]] and [[Battle of Nablus (1918)|Nablus]] (Battle of Megiddo).{{sfn|Hill|1978|pp=171–172}}

The British methods induced "strategic paralysis" among the Ottomans and led to their rapid and complete collapse.{{sfn|Liddell Hart|1970|pp=435}} In an advance of {{convert|65|mi|km}}, captures were estimated to be "at least {{formatnum:25000}} prisoners and 260 guns".{{sfn|Hughes|2004|pp=181–183}} Liddell Hart considered that important aspects of the operation had been the extent to which Ottoman commanders were denied intelligence on the British preparations for the attack through British air superiority and air attacks on their headquarters and telephone exchanges, which paralyzed attempts to react to the rapidly-deteriorating situation.{{sfn|Liddell Hart|1970|pp=435–438}}