Editing Behavioral economics (section)

=== Criticisms ===

Cass Sunstein has responded to critiques at length in his ''The Ethics of Influence''<ref>{{Cite book|url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=TlvWDAAAQBAJ|page=8}} |title=The Ethics of Influence: Government in the Age of Behavioral Science|last=Sunstein|first=Cass R.|date=2016-08-24|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-107-14070-7|language=en}}</ref> making the case in favor of nudging against charges that nudges diminish autonomy,<ref>{{cite report |last=Schubert|first=Christian|date=2015-10-12|title=On the Ethics of Public Nudging: Autonomy and Agency|location=Rochester, NY|ssrn=2672970 |type=unpublished manuscript}}</ref> threaten dignity, violate liberties, or reduce welfare. Ethicists have debated this rigorously.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Barton|first1=Adrien|last2=Grüne-Yanoff|first2=Till|date=2015-09-01|title=From Libertarian Paternalism to Nudging—and Beyond|journal=Review of Philosophy and Psychology|language=en|volume=6|issue=3|pages=341–359|doi=10.1007/s13164-015-0268-x|issn=1878-5158|doi-access=free}}</ref> These charges have been made by various participants in the debate from Bovens<ref>{{Cite book|title=Preference Change|last=Bovens|first=Luc|date=2009|publisher=Springer, Dordrecht|isbn=9789048125920|series=Theory and Decision Library|pages=207–219|language=en|doi=10.1007/978-90-481-2593-7_10|chapter = The Ethics of Nudge|s2cid=141283500 }}</ref> to Goodwin.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Goodwin|first=Tom|date=2012-06-01|title=Why We Should Reject 'Nudge'|journal=Politics|language=en|volume=32|issue=2|pages=85–92|doi=10.1111/j.1467-9256.2012.01430.x|s2cid=153597777|issn=0263-3957}}</ref> Wilkinson for example charges nudges for being manipulative, while others such as Yeung question their scientific credibility.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Yeung|first=Karen|date=2012-01-01|title=Nudge as Fudge|journal=The Modern Law Review|language=en|volume=75|issue=1|pages=122–148|doi=10.1111/j.1468-2230.2012.00893.x|issn=1468-2230}}</ref>

Some, such as Hausman & Welch<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Hausman|first1=Daniel M.|last2=Welch|first2=Brynn|date=2010-03-01|title=Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge*|journal=Journal of Political Philosophy|language=en|volume=18|issue=1|pages=123–136|doi=10.1111/j.1467-9760.2009.00351.x|issn=1467-9760}}</ref> have inquired whether nudging should be permissible on grounds of ([[Distributive justice|distributive]]{{clarify|date=February 2018}}) justice; Lepenies & Malecka<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Lepenies|first1=Robert|last2=Małecka|first2=Magdalena|date=2015-09-01|title=The Institutional Consequences of Nudging – Nudges, Politics, and the Law|journal=Review of Philosophy and Psychology|language=en|volume=6|issue=3|pages=427–437|doi=10.1007/s13164-015-0243-6|s2cid=144157454|issn=1878-5158}}</ref> have questioned whether nudges are compatible with the rule of law. Similarly, legal scholars have discussed the role of nudges and the law.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Alemanno|first1=A.|last2=Spina|first2=A.|date=2014-04-01|title=Nudging legally: On the checks and balances of behavioral regulation|journal=International Journal of Constitutional Law|language=en|volume=12|issue=2|pages=429–456|doi=10.1093/icon/mou033|issn=1474-2640|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last1=Kemmerer|first1=Alexandra|last2=Möllers|first2=Christoph|last3=Steinbeis|first3=Maximilian|last4=Wagner|first4=Gerhard|date=2016-07-15|title=Choice Architecture in Democracies: Exploring the Legitimacy of Nudging - Preface|location=Rochester, NY|publisher=Hart Publishing|ssrn=2810229}}</ref>

Behavioral economists such as Bob Sugden have pointed out that the underlying normative benchmark of nudging is still [[homo oeconomicus|homo economicus]], despite the proponents' claim to the contrary.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sugden|first=Robert|date=2017-06-01|title=Do people really want to be nudged towards healthy lifestyles?|journal=International Review of Economics|language=en|volume=64|issue=2|pages=113–123|doi=10.1007/s12232-016-0264-1|issn=1865-1704|doi-access=free}}</ref>

Recent scholarship has raised concerns about the use of vibrational nudges in digital consumer environments, suggesting that haptic feedback—such as subtle mobile phone vibrations—can increase purchasing behavior without conscious awareness. The study questions whether such subliminal tactics cross ethical boundaries by manipulating impulse control in ways that blur the line between persuasion and coercion.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Hampton |first1=William |last2=Zhao |first2=Xin |last3=Goldsmith |first3=Kelly |date=2024 |title=Subtle Haptic Cues Increase Online Purchasing by Activating Reward Mechanisms |journal=Journal of Consumer Research |doi=10.1093/jcr/ucaf025}}</ref>

It has been remarked that nudging is also a [[euphemism]] for [[psychological manipulation]] as practiced in [[social engineering (political science)|social engineering]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Sunstein_809.pdf|title=NUDGING AND CHOICE ARCHITECTURE: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS|author=Cass R. Sunstein|website=Law.harvard.edu|access-date=11 October 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-12-01/berg-a-nudge-in-the-right-direction/6988786|title=A nudge in the right direction? How we can harness behavioural economics|newspaper=ABC News|date=1 December 2015}}</ref>

There exists an anticipation and, simultaneously, implicit criticism of the nudge theory in works of Hungarian social psychologists who emphasize the active participation in the nudge of its target (Ferenc Merei<ref>{{cite journal|last =MÉREI|first= Ferenc |year =1987|title = A perem-helyzet egyik változata: a szociálpszichológiai kontúr |trans-title=A variant of the edge-position: the contour social psychological |language = hu|journal = Pszichológia |volume =1|pages = 1–5}}</ref> and Laszlo Garai<ref name="Garai">{{cite book|last =Garai|first = Laszlo|chapter= The Double-Storied Structure of Social Identity|title = Reconsidering Identity Economics|publisher = Palgrave Macmillan|location= New York|date = 2017|isbn = 978-1-137-52561-1}}</ref>).