Editing Battle of the Bulge (section)

===Planning===
{{Main|Wehrmacht forces for the Ardennes Offensive}}
{{See also|Battle of the Bulge order of battle}}
{{Wikisource|The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge/Chapter II|Planning the Counteroffensive}}
{{Wikisource|The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge/Chapter III|Troops and Terrain}}
{{Wikisource|The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge/Chapter IV|Preparations}}
{{blockquote|quote= There is a popular impression that the chief trouble in the Ardennes is the lack of good roads. As anyone on the ground will agree, the Ardennes has a fairly good road system. It is not the lack of roads as much as the lack of almost anything else on which to move that matters.|source=Theodore Draper{{sfn|Draper|1946|p=84|loc=Chapter VI}} }}

The OKW decided by mid-September, at Hitler's insistence, that the offensive would be mounted in the Ardennes, as was done in 1940. In 1940 German forces had passed through the Ardennes in three days before engaging the enemy, but the 1944 plan called for battle in the forest itself. The main forces were to advance westward to the Meuse River, then turn northwest for Antwerp and [[Brussels]]. The close terrain of the Ardennes would make rapid movement difficult, though open ground beyond the Meuse offered the prospect of a successful dash to the coast.

Four armies were selected for the operation. Adolf Hitler personally selected for the counter-offensive on the northern shoulder of the western front the best troops available and officers he trusted. The lead role in the attack was given to the [[6th Panzer Army]], commanded by SS {{lang|de|Oberstgruppenführer}} [[Sepp Dietrich]]. It included the most experienced formation of the [[Waffen-SS]]: the [[1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler]]. It also contained the [[12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend]]. They were given priority for supply and equipment and assigned the shortest route to the primary objective of the offensive, Antwerp,{{sfn|Cole|1964|pp=1–64}} starting from the northernmost point on the intended battlefront, nearest the important road network hub of [[Monschau]].{{sfn|Cole|1964|p=86}}

The [[5th Panzer Army|Fifth Panzer Army]] under General [[Hasso von Manteuffel]] was assigned to the middle sector with the objective of capturing Brussels. The [[7th Army (Wehrmacht)|Seventh Army]], under General [[Erich Brandenberger]], was assigned to the southernmost sector, near the Luxembourgish city of [[Echternach]], with the task of protecting the flank. This Army was made up of only four infantry divisions, with no large-scale armored formations to use as a spearhead unit. As a result, they made little progress throughout the battle.

[[File:German Wacht Am Rhein Offensive Plan.png|thumb|upright=1.6|left|The German plan]]

In an indirect, secondary role, the [[15th Army (Wehrmacht)|Fifteenth Army]], under General [[Gustav-Adolf von Zangen]], recently brought back up to strength and re-equipped after heavy fighting during Operation Market Garden, was located just north of the Ardennes battlefield and tasked with holding U.S. forces in place, with the possibility of launching its own attack given favorable conditions.

For the offensive to be successful, four criteria were deemed critical: the attack had to be a complete surprise; the weather conditions had to be poor to neutralize Allied [[air superiority]] and the damage it could inflict on the German offensive and its supply lines;{{sfn|Parker|1994|p=118}} the progress had to be rapid—the Meuse River, halfway to Antwerp, had to be reached by day 4; and Allied fuel supplies would have to be captured intact along the way because the combined Wehrmacht forces were short on fuel. The General Staff estimated they only had enough fuel to cover one third to one half of the ground to Antwerp in heavy combat conditions.

The plan originally called for just under 45 divisions, including a dozen [[panzer division|panzer]] and {{lang|de|[[Panzergrenadier]]}} divisions forming the [[armored spearhead]] and various infantry units to form a defensive line as the battle unfolded. By this time the German Army suffered from an acute manpower shortage, and the force had been reduced to around 30 divisions. Although it retained most of its armor, there were not enough infantry units because of the defensive needs in the East. These 30 newly rebuilt divisions used some of the last reserves of the German Army. Among them were {{lang|de|[[Volksgrenadier]]}} ('People's Grenadier') units formed from a mix of battle-hardened veterans and recruits formerly regarded as too young, too old or too frail to fight. Training time, equipment and supplies were inadequate during the preparations. German fuel supplies were precarious—those materials and supplies that could not be directly transported by rail had to be horse-drawn to conserve fuel, and the mechanized and panzer divisions would depend heavily on captured fuel. As a result, the start of the offensive was delayed from 27 November until 16 December.{{citation needed | date = August 2010}}

Before the offensive the Allies were virtually blind to German troop movement. During the [[liberation of France]], the extensive network of the [[French Resistance]] had provided valuable intelligence about German dispositions. Once they reached the German border, this source dried up. In France, orders had been relayed within the German army using radio messages enciphered by the [[Enigma machine]], and these could be picked up and decrypted by Allied code-breakers headquartered at [[Bletchley Park]], to give the intelligence known as Ultra. In Germany such orders were typically transmitted using telephone and [[teleprinter]], and a special [[radio silence]] order was imposed on all matters concerning the upcoming offensive.{{sfn|MacDonald|1984|p=40}} The major crackdown in the Wehrmacht after the [[20 July plot]] to assassinate Hitler resulted in much tighter security and fewer leaks. The foggy autumn weather also prevented Allied reconnaissance aircraft from correctly assessing the ground situation. German units assembling in the area were even issued charcoal instead of wood for cooking fires to cut down on smoke and reduce chances of Allied observers deducing a troop buildup was underway.{{sfn|Cole|1964|p=21}}

For these reasons Allied High Command considered the Ardennes a quiet sector, relying on assessments from their intelligence services that the Germans were unable to launch any major offensive operations this late in the war. What little intelligence they had led the Allies to believe precisely what the Germans wanted them to believe-–that preparations were being carried out only for defensive, not offensive, operations. The Allies relied too much on Ultra, not human reconnaissance. In fact, because of the Germans' efforts, the Allies were led to believe that a new defensive army was being formed around [[Düsseldorf]] in the northern Rhineland, possibly to defend against British attack. This was done by increasing the number of [[flak]] ({{lang|de|Flugabwehrkanonen}}, i.e., anti-aircraft cannons) in the area and the artificial multiplication of radio transmissions in the area. All of this meant that the attack, when it came, completely surprised the Allied forces. Remarkably, the U.S. First Army intelligence chief, U.S. Third Army intelligence chief Colonel [[Oscar Koch]], and SHAEF intelligence officer Brigadier General [[Kenneth Strong]] all correctly predicted the German offensive capability and intention to strike the U.S. VIII Corps area. These predictions were largely dismissed by the U.S. 12th Army Group.{{sfn|Dougherty|2002}} Strong had informed [[Walter Bedell Smith|Bedell Smith]] in December of his suspicions. Bedell Smith sent Strong to warn Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, the commander of the 12th Army Group, of the danger. Bradley's response was succinct: "Let them come."{{sfn|Pogue|1954|pp=362–366}} Historian Patrick K. O'Donnell writes that on 8 December 1944 U.S. Rangers at great cost took Hill 400 during the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest. The next day GIs who relieved the Rangers reported a considerable movement of German troops inside the Ardennes in the enemy's rear, but that no one in the chain of command connected the dots.{{sfn|O'Donnell|2012}}{{page needed|date=July 2021}}

Because the Ardennes was considered a quiet sector, considerations of [[economy of force]] led it to be used as a training ground for new units and a rest area for units that had seen hard fighting. The U.S. units deployed in the Ardennes thus were a mixture of inexperienced troops (such as the [[99th Infantry Division (United States)|99th]] and [[106th Infantry Division (United States)|106th "Golden Lions" Divisions]]), and battle-hardened troops sent to that sector to recuperate (the [[28th Infantry Division (United States)|28th Infantry Division]]).

Two major [[special operations]] were planned for the offensive. By October it was decided that [[Otto Skorzeny]], the German SS-commando who [[Gran Sasso raid|had rescued]] the former Italian dictator [[Benito Mussolini]], was to lead a task force of English-speaking German soldiers in [[Operation Greif]]. These soldiers were to be dressed in American and British uniforms and wear [[dog tag (identifier)|dog tags]] taken from corpses and prisoners of war. Their job was to go behind American lines and change signposts, misdirect traffic, generally cause disruption and seize bridges across the Meuse River. By late November another ambitious special operation was added: Col. [[Friedrich August von der Heydte]] was to lead a {{lang|de|[[Fallschirmjäger (Nazi Germany)|Fallschirmjäger]]-[[Kampfgruppe]]}} (paratrooper combat group) in [[Operation Stösser]], a night-time paratroop drop behind the Allied lines aimed at capturing a vital road junction near [[Malmedy]].{{sfn|MacDonald|1984|pp=86–89}}{{sfn|Toland|1999|pp=16, 19}}

German intelligence had set 20 December as the expected date for the start of the [[Vistula–Oder Offensive|upcoming Soviet offensive]], aimed at crushing what was left of German resistance on the Eastern Front and thereby opening the way to Berlin. It was hoped that Soviet leader [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin]] would delay the start of the operation once the German assault in the Ardennes had begun and wait for the outcome before continuing.

After the [[20 July Plot|20 July 1944 attempt to assassinate Hitler]], and the close advance of the Red Army which would seize the site on 27 January 1945, Hitler and his staff had been forced to abandon the {{lang|de|[[Wolfsschanze]]}} headquarters in [[East Prussia]], in which they had coordinated much of the fighting on the Eastern Front. After a brief visit to Berlin, Hitler traveled on his {{lang|de|[[Führersonderzug]]}} ('Special Train of the Führer') to [[Giessen]] on 11 December, taking up residence in the [[Adlerhorst]] (eyrie) command complex, co-located with OB West's base at Kransberg Castle. Believing in omens and the successes of his early war campaigns that had been planned at Kransberg, Hitler had chosen the site from which he had overseen the successful 1940 campaign against France and the Low Countries.

Von Rundstedt set up his operational headquarters near [[Limburg an der Lahn|Limburg]], close enough for the generals and Panzer Corps commanders who were to lead the attack to visit Adlerhorst on 11 December, traveling there in an SS-operated bus convoy. With the castle acting as overflow accommodation, the main party was settled into the Adlerhorst's Haus 2 command bunker, including Gen. [[Alfred Jodl]], Gen. [[Wilhelm Keitel]], Gen. [[Günther Blumentritt|Blumentritt]], von Manteuffel and Dietrich.

In a personal conversation on 13 December between Walter Model and [[Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte|Friedrich von der Heydte]], who was put in charge of Operation Stösser, von der Heydte gave Operation Stösser less than a 10% chance of succeeding. Model told him it was necessary to make the attempt: "It must be done because this offensive is the last chance to conclude the war favorably."{{sfn|Parker|2004|p=132}}