Editing Battle of Navarino (section)

==Battle==
===Preliminary moves===
[[File:Navarino Bay in Peloponnese.jpg|thumb|Satellite picture of the [[Peloponnese]]. Navarino Bay is visible in the inset in the lower left.]]
[[File:Plan de la Bataille de Navarin.png|thumb|Map of Navarino Bay. The diagram of the order of battle contains inaccuracies]]Vice-Admiral Codrington's instructions were to impose and enforce an armistice on both sides and to interdict the flow of reinforcements and supplies from Asia Minor and Egypt to Ottoman forces in Greece. He was to use force only as a last resort.<ref>''Letter to his senior officers from Codrington Sept 8 1827'' reproduced in James (1837) 473 London</ref>

On 29 August, the Ottomans formally rejected the Treaty of London's stipulations, triggering the dispatch of Allied representatives to Nafplion. On 2 September, the Greek provisional government accepted the armistice. This freed Codrington to concentrate on coercing the Ottoman side.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 58–60</ref>

Navarino Bay is a large [[natural harbour]] on the west coast of [[Messinia]] in the south-west Peloponnese. It is approximately 5&nbsp;km long (between the headlands) and 3&nbsp;km wide. The bay is sheltered from the open sea by a long, narrow islet, [[Sphacteria]]. This islet leaves two entrances to the bay. Because of a sandbank, the northern one is very narrow and shallow, 100&nbsp;m wide and just 1&nbsp;m deep in places, impassable to large boats. The southern one is much wider, 1,500&nbsp;m, with an effective passage of 1,000&nbsp;m width because of rocks. The southern entrance was at that time guarded by the Ottoman-held [[New Navarino fortress]] ([[Pylos]]). During the Greek insurgency, the bay was used by the Ottoman navy as its main operational base in the Peloponnese.

A large Ottoman–Egyptian fleet, which had been warned by the British and French to stay away from Greece, left Alexandria on 5 August 1827 and joined other Ottoman units at Navarino on 8 September.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 56</ref> In response, Codrington arrived with his squadron off Navarino on 12 September. In talks on 25 September with Ibrahim Pasha and the Ottoman admiral, he extracted no explicit verbal promises that they would cease offensive operation. However, Codrington did get the pasha to commit a ceasefire until further instructions from the sultan were given.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mazower |first=Mark |title=The Greek Revolution: 1821 and the making of modern Europe |publisher=[[Penguin Books]] |year=2022 |isbn=9780143110934 |edition=1st |location=United States of America |pages=411 |language=en-us}}</ref> After these talks, Codrington withdrew to the nearby British-controlled Ionian island of [[Zante]] (Zakynthos), leaving a frigate off Navarino to keep watch on the Ottoman fleet.

But the Ottomans soon violated these understandings. Ibrahim was outraged that, while he was expected to observe a ceasefire, Codrington seemingly allowed the Greeks to continue military operations onn his vessels unhindered. The Greeks' British commanders were on the offensive at the entrance of the strategically vital [[Gulf of Corinth]]. Church's army laid siege to the Ottoman-held port of [[Patras]], while Cochrane organised a revolt behind Ottoman lines in [[Epirus]]. By sea, [[Frank Abney Hastings]], a former British naval officer now serving with the Greeks, used a steam-powered warship, the {{ship||Karteria|Greek warship|2}}, to launch a daring night raid on 29/30 September at [[Itea (Phocis)|Itea]] on the northern shore of the gulf, sinking nine Ottoman gunboats. The problem for Codrington was that these officers were acting on their own initiative, largely ignoring the often contradictory directives of their employer, the Greek provisional government. Recognising that appeals to the latter were ineffective, Codrington despatched aides directly to the British commanders to demand that they cease operations, but with little result.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 82–83</ref>
[[File:Action between the Asia, Dartmouth and the Turkish and Egyptian Fleet, 1-6 Oct 1827 PW4841.jpg|thumb|right|Codrington's squadron prevents the Ottoman reinforcements from reaching Patras on 4 October.]]
After a vain protest to Codrington, Ibrahim decided to act. On 1 October, he despatched a naval squadron to reinforce the Patras garrison. It was intercepted by Codrington's squadron at the entrance to the gulf, and forced to return to Navarino, shadowed by Codrington. Ibrahim tried again on the night of 3/4 October, this time leading the squadron in person. Using the darkness, he succeeded in slipping past the British picket ship unobserved, but was prevented from entering the gulf by a strong headwind. His squadron was obliged to anchor in the lee of [[Cape Pappas]] and wait out the storm. This gave Codrington time to catch up, and the British squadron, after a whole day of fighting the wind, arrived off Pappas on the evening of 4 October. Codrington fired a series of warning broadsides, and Ibrahim reluctantly decided to turn back.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 83–86</ref>

In the meantime, Ibrahim's scorched-earth policy continued unabated on land. The fires of burning villages and fields were clearly visible from Allied ships standing offshore. A British landing party reported that the population of Messinia was close to mass starvation.<ref>''Report to Codrington from Capt Hamilton ({{HMS|Cambrian|1797|6}})'', reproduced in James (1837) VI. 476</ref>

On 13 October, Codrington was joined off Navarino by a French squadron under Rigny and a Russian squadron under [[Lodewijk van Heiden|L. van Heiden]]. On 18 October, after futile attempts to contact Ibrahim Pasha, Codrington, in conference with his Allied colleagues, took the fateful decision to enter Navarino Bay and anchor his ships face-to-face with the Ottoman/Egyptian fleet. It was decided that with winter approaching, it was impracticable to maintain an effective blockade of Navarino, and that in any event, the population of the Peloponnese had to be safeguarded.<ref>''Protocol of conference of Allied commanders 18 Oct 1827'' reproduced in James (1837) VI. 489</ref> Although this was a highly provocative act, Codrington claimed that there was no intention to engage in battle, but only to make a show of force to induce the Ottomans to respect the armistice and to desist from atrocities against the civilian population.<ref>''Codrington's report on battle to Admiralty 21 Oct 1827'' reproduced in James (1837) VI. 486–488</ref>[[File:Admiral Edward Codrington.jpg|thumb|Vice-Admiral Sir [[Edward Codrington]], Allied commander-in-chief at the Battle of Navarino]]

===Strength of the two fleets===
====Allies====
The Allied navies at this time were still deploying essentially the same technology as during the Napoleonic Wars: sailing ships, unarmoured wooden hulls and [[muzzle-loading]] [[smoothbore]] [[cannon]]. The navies, especially the British one, had ignored the new technologies that were to transform them by the 1850s: [[steam propulsion]], [[ironclad|ironclad hulls]], [[rifling|rifled guns]] and [[shell (projectile)|explosive shells]]. All these had been invented by 1827, but their development for naval warfare, let alone introduction, met dogged resistance from senior naval echelons. In the words of one scholar: "The great admirals of the 18th century would have had no difficulty in taking over Codrington's command at short notice."<ref name="Woodhouse 1965 28">Woodhouse (1965) 28</ref>

However, the Royal Navy's warships had seen some improvements. Ships with triple gun-decks such as [[Horatio Nelson|Nelson]]'s famous {{HMS|Victory}} had been phased out. Triple-deckers had been found to be too unstable and difficult to manoeuvre. The standard {{sclass|Canopus|ship of the line|0}} was a double-deck 74–84 ship of the line, based on the successful "[[Seventy-four (ship)|74]]" French design. In addition, gun-calibres had been upgraded. The Napoleonic-era {{sclass|Fame|ship of the line|0}} had been equipped with 32-pounders on the main gun-deck, 18-pounders on the upper deck and 9- and 12-pounders on the super-structures (quarterdeck and forecastle). In contrast, the guns were now all 24- or 32-pounders (plus a couple of massive 68-pounder [[carronades]] on the super-structures). [[Frigates]] were either double-deckers of 50–60 guns (known as large frigates) or single-deckers with 24–44 guns.<ref name="Woodhouse 1965 28"/>

Most of the Allied ships, however, were still veteran Napoleonic-era warhorses (e.g. {{HMS|Albion|1802|6}}). Codrington's only ''Canopus''-class was his flagship, {{HMS|Asia|1824|6}} (launched 1824), although ''Genoa'' (an impounded French "74") was also post-Napoleonic (1816). In the French squadron, Rigny was so appalled by the state of the three ships of the line sent to him that he decided to keep his flag on the ''Sirène'', a modern frigate.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 70</ref>

====Ottomans====
[[File:IbrahimBaja.jpg|thumb|right|[[Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt|Ibrahim Pasha]], the commander of the Egyptian expedition to the Peloponnese. The atrocities committed by his forces against the Greek population made him one of the most reviled figures in Europe.]]Overall at Navarino, the Allies had 22 ships and 1,258 guns against the Ottomans' 78 ships with 2,180 guns (figures exclude smaller boats and fireships).<ref>James (1837) VI. 473–489</ref> But the numbers masked major Allied advantages in ship-types, gun-calibres and crew quality. As a result of these, Allied gun-crews could fire more powerful, more frequent and more accurate cannonades than their Ottoman counterparts.

The Allies had a substantial superiority in front-line combat vessels: 10 ships of the line to the Ottomans' three. This advantage was only partially offset by the Ottomans' seven double-deck frigates against one Allied vessel of this kind. The great majority of the Ottoman–Egyptian fleet were smaller vessels&nbsp;– 58 [[corvettes]] and [[brigs]]&nbsp;– which were of little use against the Allied heavyweights: they had much smaller firepower, and, their decks being lower, could easily be dismasted by raking fire. In addition, the Ottoman–Egyptians mainly deployed smaller-calibre guns than the Allies (often the guns discarded by the Allies when they upgraded their own calibres). Most of the Allied crews had gained extensive combat experience in the Napoleonic Wars, which had only ended 12 years previously, and were service professionals. In contrast, the Ottoman crews only had combat experience against the Greek revolutionary naval forces, which although gallant and effective, bore no resemblance to the navies of the Great Powers. In many cases, Ottoman crews practiced [[impressment]] to fill their ships' complements. Some Ottoman crew were even found, after the battle, to have been shackled at their posts (convicts, Greek prisoners or other involuntary recruits).<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 121</ref>

The Egyptian contingent, the largest and best-equipped of the Ottoman fleet at Navarino, had been trained by a team of French officers, under the overall direction of Capt J-M. Letellier. These officers acted as "shadow-captains" of the large Egyptian vessels, each advising the nominal Egyptian captain. The day before the battle, Rigny persuaded these officers to withdraw from the Egyptian fleet so as to avoid the possibility of fighting against their own navy (they moved to an Austrian brig that was in the bay, ostensibly neutral but in reality providing logistical support for Ottoman operations). Letellier himself was sick and also took no part.<ref name="Woodhouse 1965 108">Woodhouse (1965) 108</ref> This deprived the Egyptians of experienced command.

For the Allies, probably the Ottomans' most dangerous weapon were their [[fireships]]. These had long been deployed to devastating effect by the Greek revolutionaries against the Ottomans, who had learnt how to use them through hard experience.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 22, 117</ref> Fireships were posted on the wings of the Ottoman formation, and could, if effectively deployed, wreak mayhem on Allied boats concentrated in enclosed waters, especially as Allied sailors had no experience of this kind of warfare. The danger was graphically demonstrated in the early phase of the battle, when the French ship of the line ''Scipion'' narrowly escaped being destroyed by a fireship.<ref name="Woodhouse 1965 117-8">Woodhouse (1965) 117–118</ref>

The Ottomans possessed a [[shore battery]] on each side of the main entrance to the bay, in Navarino fort and on the southern tip of Sphacteria island. These could have seriously impeded Allied entry into the bay, but Codrington was clearly confident that the Ottomans would not start a shooting war. (Or, in an alternative interpretation, he hoped that they would, to give him an excuse to destroy the Ottoman fleet.)

===Strategies for battle===
Following an elaborate defensive plan proposed by Letellier, the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet was anchored in a horseshoe formation, in three lines, extending from Navarino fort to the southern tip of Sphacteria island, where the Ottoman shore battery lay. The front line consisted of the ships of the line and large frigates; the second line contained the remaining frigates and larger corvettes; the third consisted of the remaining smaller vessels. The idea was that the smaller vessels could fire through the gaps in the frontline, whilst being protected by the larger ships from Allied attack. On the ends of the horseshoe were stationed corvettes and fireships.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 98</ref> The latter could be towed by boats into position covered by the smaller corvettes and shore batteries.<ref>''Codrington's report'' reproduced in James (1837) VI. 486</ref><ref>Woodhouse (1965) 100</ref>

The Allied plan was to anchor in the free water inside the crescent. Codrington's squadron would take up position facing the centre of the Ottoman line; the French and Russian squadrons would face the Ottoman left and right wings respectively. The French position in the line had been specifically determined so that they would face the Egyptian fleet, which had been trained by the French and might be reluctant to fight against Egypt's closest European ally.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 106</ref> In conventional naval doctrine, Codrington's plan would have been regarded as an unacceptable risk, as it would have invited the enemy to try to surround the Allies.<ref>James (1837) VI. 483</ref> Furthermore, with the prevailing wind blowing from the SW, straight up the entrance, Codrington risked becoming trapped, unable to extricate his squadrons quickly if necessary. The adoption of this high-risk plan shows the total confidence of the Allied commanders in the [[Military tactics|tactical]] superiority of their vessels.

===Engagement===
[[File:Navarino.jpg|thumb|Ottoman fleet ablaze in Navarino bay, 20 Oct 1827]]
At 1.30 p.m., on 20 October 1827, off the entrance to Navarino Bay, Codrington signalled to the Allied fleet: "PREPARE FOR ACTION" and Allied crews were ordered to stand to their guns.<ref name="Woodhouse 1965 112">Woodhouse (1965) 112</ref> Gun-ports were left half-open, but Allied captains were under strict orders to open fire only if attacked. At 2.00 p.m., Allied warships, with Codrington in the lead in ''Asia'', began filing into the bay through the southern entrance, proceeding in two lines, British followed by French to starboard (SE, closest to Navarino) and Russians to port abreast but slightly behind the French. There was no attempt to prevent their entry by the Ottoman shore batteries or their corvettes posted at the entrance, but Codrington received a launch carrying a message from Ibrahim Pasha. This stated that he had not given permission for the Allies to enter the bay, and demanded that they withdraw. Codrington dismissed Ibrahim's objection, replying that he had come to give orders, not to take them. He warned that if the Ottomans opened fire, their fleet would be destroyed.<ref name="Woodhouse 1965 112"/><ref>James (1837) VI. 480</ref>
[[File:Navarino.JPG|thumb|Action at close quarters during the battle. This detail shows Codrington's flagship, HMS ''Asia'' (centre, flying [[Blue Ensign]]), simultaneously demolishing two Ottoman flagships]]
[[File:Russians at navarino.jpg|thumb|''Battle of Navarino'', by [[Ivan Aivazovsky]], showing the Russian squadron, in line ahead (left-centre, white flags with blue transversal crosses) bombarding the Ottoman fleet (right, with red flags)]]As his flagship dropped anchor in the middle of the Ottoman line, Codrington ordered a brass band to play on deck to emphasize his peaceful intentions. By 2.15 p.m., the three British ships of the line had dropped anchor in their allotted positions.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 114</ref> Meanwhile, as the Allied vessels moved into position, along the Ottoman lines trumpets sounded action stations. Ottoman crews scrambled to meet the unexpected intrusion into their base.

At this point, at the entrance, fighting broke out. Codrington claimed that hostilities were started by the Ottomans. The outbreak, according to Allied sources, occurred in the following manner:

At the entrance to the bay, Capt [[Thomas Fellowes (1778-1853)|Thomas Fellowes]] on the frigate ''Dartmouth'' had been detailed, with six smaller vessels (2 brigs and 4 schooners) to keep watch on the group of Ottoman corvettes and fireships on the left flank of the Ottoman line. As the Allied ships continued moving into the bay, Fellowes noticed that an Ottoman crew was preparing a fireship and sent a boat to instruct them to desist. The Ottomans fired on the boat and lighted the fireship. Fellowes sent a [[cutter (ship)|cutter]] to tow the fireship to a safe distance, but the Ottomans fired on the cutter, inflicting casualties. Fellowes opened musket fire on the fireship crew to cover his men. At this point the French [[flagship]] ''Sirène'', which was just then entering the bay on the tail of the British-French line, opened fire with muskets to support ''Dartmouth''. An Ottoman corvette then attacked ''Sirène'' with its guns. This chain reaction spread along the line, so that within a short time, there was general engagement.<ref>''Codrington's report'' reproduced in James (1837) VI. 486–488; Dakin (1973)</ref>

The battle thus began before the Allies could complete their deployment. In fact, this proved to be a tactical advantage, as it meant some Allied ships were not yet at anchor and could therefore manoeuvre more swiftly. Nevertheless, most ships fought at anchor. There was naturally very little scope for manoeuvre, except to change the orientation of the ship by hauling on the springs on the anchor chains.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 127</ref> With ships blasting each other at very close range, the encounter was mostly a matter of attrition, in which superior Allied firepower and gunnery were critical.

Combat action may be summarised as follows:
[[File:Battle of Navarino. Vladimir Kosov.jpg|alt=Battle of Navarino. Vladimir Kosov|thumb|285x285px|Battle of Navarino. Vladimir Kosov]]
# The French ship [[French ship Scipion (1813)|''Scipion'']] (80 guns), behind Rigny's [[French frigate Sirène (1823)|''Sirène'']] (60), immediately came under intense attack, by a combination of Egyptian frigates on both sides, the shore batteries and a fireship. The latter was nearly fatal. The fireship jammed under ''Scipion''{{'}}s bowsprit, the fore sails caught fire and the fire spread onto the upper gun-deck. Men flung themselves on the fire to prevent it spreading to the forward powder magazine, with inevitable horrendous burn injuries. Nevertheless, the gunners continued to fire on the attackers. ''Scipion'' was saved from destruction by her sister ship [[French ship Trident (1811)|''Trident'']] (74), which succeeded in attaching a tow-line to the fireship and, with the assistance of ''Dartmouth'' and two other British boats<!-- Were these boats as in small vessels propelled by oars, or were these larger vessels such as frigates, corvettes or schooners? -->, pulling it clear.<ref name="Woodhouse 1965 117-8"/>
# Rigny's ''Sirène'' fought a lengthy duel with the 64-gun frigate ''Ihsania'', which finally blew up. ''Sirène'' suffered significant casualties and damage. ''Sirène'', with the support of ''Trident'' and ''Scipion'', then bombarded the fort of Navarino and eventually silenced its shore battery.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 119</ref>
# The captain of French [[French ship Breslaw (1808)|''Breslaw'']] (84), Captain [[Valdémar Guillaume Nème Botherel de La Bretonnière|Botherel de La Bretonnière]], seeing that Rigny did not need further support, decided on his own initiative to break away from the French formation and move into the centre of the bay, at the junction of the British and Russian lines, to reinforce British ''Albion'' (74) and Russian ''Azov'' (80). Both were hard pressed. ''Albion'', which had wrecked an Ottoman frigate as she anchored, was under fire from all three Ottoman ships of the line simultaneously. Fortunately for her, the enemy gunnery was inept. Even so, ''Breslaw''{{'}}s intervention was later acknowledged by the captain of ''Albion'' as having saved his ship from annihilation. ''Breslaw'' then proceeded to play a leading role in the destruction of Ottoman admiral Tahir Pasha's flagship, the ''Ghiuh Rewan'' (84), and at least four frigates.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 120</ref>
# Codrington's ''Asia'' (84) was anchored between Ottoman admiral Capitan Bey's flagship, ''Fahti Bahri'' (74), and Egyptian Moharram Bey's frigate ''Guerrière'' (60). Capitan Bey opened fire, but Moharram Bey sent word to Codrington that he was not going to attack. This enabled ''Asia'' to concentrate its fire on ''Fahti Bahri'', which was in a poor condition and inadequately manned. ''Asia''{{'}}s deadly fire shortly disabled her. Codrington then sent an interpreter, a Greek, P. Mikelis, to parley with Moharram Bey; but Mikelis was shot dead as he went aboard. ''Guerrière'' then opened fire, but was reduced to a burning wreck within 20 minutes by crushing broadsides from ''Asia'' and ''Azov''.<ref>''Codrington's report'' reproduced in James (1837) VI. 486–488</ref> However, ''Asia'' suffered severe casualties and damage due to a concentration of heavy fire from smaller Ottoman boats in the second and third lines of the Ottoman formation: as Letellier had planned, these boats fired through the gaps in the front line. Codrington also believed that ''Asia'' had taken serious hits by mistake from sister ''Genoa''.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 134</ref>[[File:Battle of Navarin (4552424940).jpg|thumb|Battle of Navarin, National Historical Museum, Athens, Greece]]
# The Russians under Van Heiden were the last to take up station, as was planned. Their position, on the right end of the Ottoman crescent, was the most exposed. The fighting in this sector was even more intense than elsewhere. ''Azov'' sank or disabled three large frigates and a corvette, but herself took 153 hits, several below the waterline.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 137</ref>
# The British frigates ''Armide'' and ''Talbot'' initially had to face the frigates on the Ottoman right wing and the island shore battery unsupported, as the other two frigates were away and arrived later. They were saved from annihilation by the arrival of the Russian frigates.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 139</ref>
# The smaller British and French vessels (brigs and the schooners ''Alcyone'' and ''Daphné''), under the overall direction of frigate ''Dartmouth'', had been allotted the vital task of preventing fireship attacks. Their success was complete: apart from the initial fireship attack on ''Scipion'', not a single fireship struck a target during the battle. A number of the smaller vessels greatly distinguished themselves, suffering casualties as great, in proportion, as the ships of the line.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 139–140</ref>
By about 4 p.m., all three Ottoman ships of the line and most of the large frigates of the first line had been despatched. This left the mass of smaller vessels in the second and third lines at the mercy of the Allied ships of the line, all of which were still operational. During the ensuing massacre, Codrington tried twice to order a ceasefire, but his signals were either invisible because of the thick smoke or ignored in the heat of the battle.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 124</ref> Within the following two hours, virtually the entire Ottoman fleet was destroyed, despite the signal bravery of the Ottoman crews, which was praised by Codrington himself in his despatches. Three quarters were sunk: many of them, dismasted but still afloat and reparable, were blown up or set on fire by their own crews to prevent them falling into Allied hands.<ref>''Codrington's report'' rep. in James  (1837) VI. 486–488.</ref>

[[File:Le soir de la bataille de Navarin en 1827 (Grèce).jpg|thumb|Burning and beached hulks of Ottoman warships under the cliffs of Navarino. Painting by [[Auguste Mayer]]]]
This contributed to the horrendous Ottoman and Egyptian casualty figures, as many men were trapped in burning or exploding vessels. Some, as mentioned, were shackled to their posts. Ottoman casualties given to Codrington by Letellier were approx. 3,000 killed, 1,109 wounded, although Codrington claimed the reverse was more likely. Of the entire Ottoman-Egyptian armada of 78 vessels, just eight remained seaworthy: one dismasted ship of the line, two frigates, and five corvettes.

Allied casualties were given by Codrington as 181 killed, 480 wounded (including Codrington's youngest son, midshipman H. Codrington, serving on ''Asia'' under his father, who was badly injured but made a full recovery).<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 33</ref> Several Allied ships were severely damaged: the Russian ships ''Azov'', ''Gangut'' and ''Iezekiil'' were disabled. The three British ships of the line had to be sent back to the United Kingdom for repairs.<ref>Codrington's report rep. James (1837) VI. 486–488</ref> According to one source, despite the rough handling all the ships of the line had endured and the danger from exploding Ottoman vessels, not a single Allied vessel was sunk.{{citation needed|date=July 2015}}

As the guns fell silent at dusk in Navarino Bay, news of the outcome raced over the Peloponnese and to the rest of Greece. In village after village, church bells started a continuous peal in the night. People rushed into village squares, to be greeted by the news that the Ottoman Sultan and his hated vassal Ibrahim Pasha no longer possessed a Mediterranean fleet. In a maritime country like Greece, the implication was evident—the fledgling Greek state was saved. Wild rejoicing broke out, and lasted through the night and for days after. Huge bonfires were lit on the mountaintops of the Peloponnese and [[Mount Parnassus|Mount Parnassos]] in central Greece.<ref>Dakin (1973) 230</ref> Celebrations swept even the occupied regions, which the demoralised Ottoman garrisons made little effort to prevent.