Editing Battle of Midway (section)

===Japanese shortcomings===
[[File:AkagiDeckApril42.jpg|thumb|{{Ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Akagi||2}} (April 1942)]]

During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier, the Japanese [[light carrier]] {{ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Shōhō||2}} had been sunk, while the fleet carrier {{Ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Shōkaku||2}} had been severely damaged and was in [[drydock]] for months of repair. Although the fleet carrier {{Ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Zuikaku||2}} escaped the battle undamaged, she had lost almost half her air group and was in port at the [[Kure Naval District]] in Hiroshima, awaiting replacement planes and pilots. That there were none immediately available can be attributed to the growing inability of the IJN to properly train pilots faster than they were killed in action. In desperation, instructors from the [[Yokosuka Air Corps]] were relieved of their duties to plug the gap.<ref name=Willmott101>{{Harvnb|Willmott|1983|p=101}}</ref>

Historians Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully believe that by combining the surviving aircraft and pilots from ''Shōkaku'' and ''Zuikaku'', ''Zuikaku'' likely could have been equipped with almost a full composite air group. They note, however, that doing so would have violated Japanese carrier doctrine, which stressed that carriers and their air groups must train as a single unit. (In contrast, American air squadrons were considered interchangeable between carriers allowing for more flexibility.) The Japanese apparently made no serious attempt to get ''Zuikaku'' ready for the forthcoming battle.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=65–67}}</ref>

Thus, [[Fifth Carrier Division|Carrier Division 5]], consisting of the two most advanced aircraft carriers of the ''Kido Butai'', was not available which meant that Vice-Admiral Nagumo had only two-thirds of the fleet carriers at his disposal: {{Ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Kaga||2}} and {{Ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Akagi||2}} forming [[First Carrier Division|Carrier Division 1]] and {{Ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Hiryū||2}} and {{Ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Sōryū||2}} making up [[Second Carrier Division|Carrier Division 2]]. This was partly due to fatigue; Japanese carriers had been constantly on operations since 7 December 1941 including raids on [[Bombing of Darwin|Darwin]] and [[Indian Ocean raid|Colombo]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=63–64, 91}}</ref> Nonetheless, the First Carrier Strike Force sailed with 248 available aircraft on the four carriers (60 on ''Akagi'', 74 on ''Kaga'' (B5N2 squadron oversized), 57 on ''Hiryū'' and 57 on ''Sōryū'').<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=450–451}}</ref>

The main Japanese carrier-borne strike aircraft were the [[Aichi D3A]]1 "Val" [[dive bomber]] and the [[Nakajima B5N]]2 "Kate", which was used either as a [[torpedo bomber]] or as a level bomber. The main carrier fighter was the fast and highly maneuverable [[Mitsubishi A6M Zero]]. For a variety of reasons, production of the "Val" had been drastically reduced, while that of the "Kate" had been stopped completely and, as a consequence, there were none available to replace losses.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=89}}</ref> In addition, many of the aircraft being used during the June 1942 operations had been operational since late November 1941 and, although they were well-maintained, many were almost worn out and had become increasingly unreliable. These factors meant all carriers of the ''Kidō Butai'' had fewer aircraft than their normal complement, with few spare aircraft or parts in the carriers' hangars.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=89–91}}</ref>{{refn|The code names "Val", "Kate" and "Zeke", which are often applied to these aircraft, were not introduced until late 1943 by the Allied forces. The D3A was normally referred to by the Japanese as ''Type 99 Navy dive bomber'', the B5N as the ''Type 97 Navy torpedo bomber'' and the A6M as the ''Type 0 Navy fighter''; the latter was colloquially known as the "Zero".<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=78–80}}</ref>|group=nb}}

In addition, Nagumo's carrier force suffered from several defensive deficiencies which gave it, in [[Mark Peattie]]'s words, a {{" '}}[[wikt:glass jaw|glass jaw]]': it could throw a punch but couldn't take one."{{sfn|Peattie|2007|p=159}} Japanese carrier anti-aircraft guns and associated fire control systems had several design and configuration change deficiencies{{clarify|date=May 2023|reason=What does "changes deficiences" mean?}} which limited their effectiveness. The IJN's fleet [[combat air patrol]] (CAP) had too few fighter aircraft and was hampered by an inadequate early warning system, including a lack of [[radar]]. Poor radio communications with the fighter aircraft inhibited effective command and control. The carriers' escorting warships were deployed as visual scouts in a ring at long range, not as close anti-aircraft escorts, as they lacked training, doctrine, and sufficient anti-aircraft guns.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=85, 136–145}}; {{Harvnb|Peattie|2007|pp=155–159}}; {{Harvnb|Stille|2007|pp=14–15, 50–51}}</ref>

Japanese strategic scouting arrangements prior to the battle were also in disarray. A [[Picket (military)|picket]] line of Japanese submarines was late getting into position (partly because of Yamamoto's haste), which let the American carriers reach their assembly point northeast of Midway (known as "Point Luck") without being detected.<ref>{{Harvnb|Willmott|1983|p=351}}; {{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=98–99}}</ref> A second attempt at reconnaissance, using four-engine [[Kawanishi H8K|H8K]] "Emily" [[flying boat]]s to scout Pearl Harbor prior to the battle and detect whether the American carriers were present, part of [[Operation K]], was thwarted when Japanese submarines assigned to refuel the search aircraft discovered that the intended refueling point—a hitherto deserted bay off [[French Frigate Shoals]]—was occupied by American warships because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March. Thus, Japan was deprived of any knowledge concerning the movements of the American carriers immediately before the battle.<ref>{{Harvnb|Lord|1967|pp=37–39}}; {{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|p=99}}</ref>

Japanese radio intercepts did notice an increase in American submarine activity and message traffic. This information was in Yamamoto's hands prior to the battle. Japanese plans were not changed; Yamamoto, at sea in {{Ship|Japanese battleship|Yamato||2}}, assumed Nagumo had received the same signal from Tokyo and did not communicate with him by radio, so as not to reveal his position.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=102–104}}; {{Harvnb|Willmott|1983|pp=349–351}}</ref> These messages were, contrary to earlier historical accounts, also received by Nagumo before the battle began. For reasons that remain unclear, Nagumo did not alter his plans or take additional precautions.<ref>{{Harvnb|Parshall|Tully|2005|pp=101–102}}</ref>