Editing Battle of Leipzig (section)

===Coalition plans===
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|image1=Alexander I of Russia by G.Dawe (1826, Peterhof).jpg
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|caption1=[[Alexander I of Russia|Alexander I]], Emperor of Russia and supreme commander of the Coalition armies
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|caption2=[[Karl Philipp, Prince of Schwarzenberg|Karl von Schwarzenberg]] of Austria, commander-in-chief of the Coalition armies
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The three monarchs of the Coalition powers were present in the field, with Emperor [[Alexander I of Russia]] at the head of the three alongside King [[Frederick William III of Prussia]] and Emperor [[Francis II, Holy Roman Emperor|Francis I]] of Austria. The Swedish regent and crown prince [[Charles XIV John|Charles John]] was also present. Alexander was the supreme commander of the Coalition forces in the eastern front of the war, while Prince Karl von Schwarzenberg of Austria was the commander-in-chief of all Coalition forces in the German theatre.{{sfn|Chandler|1966|p=924}}

There was a drafting of the battle plan, with Marshals [[Pyotr Mikhailovich Volkonsky|Prince Volkonsky]] of Russia, [[Johan Christopher Toll]] of Sweden and [[Karl Friedrich von dem Knesebeck]] of Prussia taking part in the planning. After the first plan was drafted, Schwarzenberg submitted it to the monarchs. However, Alexander complained about his incompetence in terms of battle planning upon seeing the plan for himself. Upon learning of Schwarzenberg's main plan – to call for a secondary attack on the bridge between Leipzig and Lindenau to be led by Blücher and [[Ignác Gyulay|Gyulay]], and a main attack astride the Pleiße River to be led by General [[Maximilian, Count of Merveldt|Merveldt]], Hessen-Homburg and the Prussian Guard, he insisted that this was a disastrous tactic as it would not permit the Coalition armies to outflank and encircle Napoleon's army and destroy it. Alexander thought the plan would potentially allow Napoleon to break the Coalition battle line at one point and then concentrate his forces in the gap created and the weakened sectors. This would possibly give Napoleon a chance to regain the strategic initiative in Germany. Frederick William III attempted to opine to Alexander but could do nothing so he treated the discussion as if it was none of his concern. Later events in the battle proved the Russian emperor's judgments correct. The action he had ordered Blücher to take met with great success north of Leipzig and the actions of the Russian Guard were decisive in halting the all-out French attack on Gulden Gossa in the south. On the other hand, the actions of the Austrians along the Pleiße River, part of Schwarzenberg's initial plan, ended in failure.{{sfn|Chandler|1966|pp=924–926}}

However, not willing to plan the battle by himself as he had done during his disastrous defeat at Austerlitz almost a decade earlier, Alexander had Schwarzenberg draft another battle plan based on his thoughts and views. Schwarzenberg then drafted another plan that was largely designed to let everyone do as they pleased. The plan was as follows: Blücher's axis of advance was to be shifted northward to the Halle road, the Russian and Prussian guards and the Russian heavy cavalry was to be amassed at [[Rotha]] in general reserve.{{sfn|Chandler|1966|p=925}} The Austrian [[grenadier]]s and [[cuirassier]]s would advance between the rivers. This strategy would ensure the encirclement of the French army in Leipzig and its vicinity, or at least inflict heavy losses upon them to assure the needed decisive results. Seemingly, though somewhat reluctantly, convinced, Alexander soon agreed to his plan, and he then ordered him to tell the other commanders to follow the plan.{{sfn|Esposito|Elting|1999}}