Editing Battle of Crete (section)

===Intelligence===
====British====
[[Kurt Student|Major-General Kurt Student]] did not add an attack on Crete to Operation Marita until March 1941; supply difficulties delayed the assembly of ''Fliegerkorps'' XI and its {{nowrap|500 Ju 52s,}} then more delays forced a postponement until 20 May 1941. The War Cabinet in Britain had expected the Germans to use paratroops in the Balkans, and on 25 March, British decrypts of Luftwaffe [[Enigma machine|Enigma]] wireless traffic revealed that ''Fliegerkorps'' XI was assembling Ju 52s for glider-towing, and British Military Intelligence reported that {{nowrap|250 aircraft}} were already in the Balkans. On 30 March, ''Detachment Süssmann'', part of the [[1st Parachute Division (Germany)|7th ''Fliegerdivision'']], was identified at Plovdiv. Notice of the target of these units did not arrive, but on 18 April it was found that {{nowrap|250 Ju 52s}} had been withdrawn from routine operations, and on 24 April it became known that Göring had reserved them for a special operation. The operation turned out to be a descent on the Corinth Canal on 26 April, but then a second operation was discovered and that supplies (particularly of fuel), had to be delivered to ''Fliegerkorps'' XI by 5 May; a Luftwaffe message referring to Crete for the first time was decrypted on 26 April.{{sfn|Hinsley|1994|pp=81–82}}

The British Chiefs of Staff were apprehensive that the target could be changed to Cyprus or Syria as a route into Iraq during the [[Anglo-Iraqi War]] {{nowrap|(2–31 May}} 1941) and suspected that references to Crete were a deception, despite having no grounds for this, and on 3 May Churchill thought that the attack might be a decoy. The command in Crete had been informed on 18 April, despite the doubts, and Crete was added to a link from the [[Government Communications Headquarters|GC & CS]] to Cairo, while on 16 and 21 April, intelligence that airborne operations were being prepared in Bulgaria was passed on. On 22 April, the HQ in Crete was ordered to burn all material received through the [[Ultra (cryptography)|Ultra]] link, but Churchill ruled that the information must still be provided. When Freyberg took over on 30 April, the information was disguised as information from a spy in Athens. Remaining doubts about an attack on Crete were removed on 1 May, when the Luftwaffe was ordered to stop bombing airfields on the island and mining [[Souda Bay]] and to photograph all of the island. By 5 May it was clear that the attack was not imminent and, next day, 17 May was revealed as the expected day for the completion of preparations, along with the operation orders for the plan from the D-day landings in the vicinity of Maleme and Chania, Heraklion, and Rethymno.{{sfn|Hinsley|1994|pp=81–82}}

====German====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-452-0985-36, Russland, Generäle Löhr und W. v. Richthofen.jpg|thumb|[[Alexander Löhr]] (left) and [[Wolfram von Richthofen]] (1942)]]
[[Admiral]] [[Wilhelm Canaris]], chief of the ''[[Abwehr]]'', originally reported 5,000 British troops on Crete and no Greek forces. It is not clear whether Canaris, who had an extensive intelligence network at his disposal, was misinformed or was attempting to sabotage Hitler's plans (Canaris was killed much later in the war for supposedly participating in the [[20 July Plot]]). ''Abwehr'' also predicted the Cretan population would welcome the Germans as liberators, due to their strong [[History of the Hellenic Republic|republican]] and anti-[[Greek monarchy|monarchist]] feelings and would want to receive the "...&nbsp;favourable terms which had been arranged on the mainland&nbsp;..."{{sfn|Buckley|1952|p=163}} While [[Eleftherios Venizelos]], the late republican prime minister of Greece, had been a Cretan and support for his ideas was strong on the island, the Germans seriously underestimated Cretan loyalty. King [[George II of Greece|George]] and his entourage escaped from Greece via Crete with the help of Greek and Commonwealth soldiers, Cretan civilians, and even a band of prisoners who had been released from captivity by the Germans. 12th Army Intelligence painted a less optimistic picture, but also underestimated the number of British Commonwealth forces and the number of Greek troops who had been evacuated from the mainland. General [[Alexander Löhr]], the theatre commander, was convinced the island could be taken with two divisions, but decided to keep 6th Mountain Division in [[Athens]] as a reserve.