Editing Bank of Italy (section)

=== The postwar period ===
[[File:Facciata ingresso principale.jpg|thumb|Bank of Italy building in [[Trieste]]]]

The post-war inflation, also due to the Am-lire, was fought with the credit crunch desired by the governor Luigi Einaudi, which was obtained through the compulsory reserve on deposits. In particular, the instrument of compulsory reserves of banks at the central bank was used, introduced in 1926 but never really applied. In 1948 the governor was given the task of regulating the money supply and deciding the discount rate.<ref>Art. 25 comma 4 D.P.R. 19 aprile 1948 n. 482</ref>

The universal banks were the ones that had gained the most from war and inflation (under the Authorization Regime of the Interministerial Credit Committee), with the greatest growth in deposits.<ref>''Storia della Banca d'Italia'', pag. 60</ref>

Along with the recovery, speculative stocks and capital flight abroad appeared. Credit limits were no longer tied to equity, as equity figures were completely distorted by inflation.

The squeeze on lending, the liquidity crisis and the Eenaudian deflation pushed operators to finance themselves by placing stocks on the market and returning capital, thus blocking the rise in prices; and by resorting to self-financing (even without distributing profits), aided by the fact that inflation had made it possible to quickly amortize fixed assets whose book value was now nominal.<ref>''Storia della Banca d'Italia'', pagg. 58 e 63</ref>

During the years of the Reconstruction, governor Donato Menichella governed the issue in a gradual and balanced way: he did not implement expansionary manoeuvres to encourage growth but was careful to avoid the creation of credit crunches. In this, he was helped by the low public debt. Its monetary policy program was stability for development.

A part of the available bank savings was channelled annually to the Treasury to cover the budget deficit (in the current year), while during his tenure the public debt of the state never rose above 1% of GDP, until 1964.<ref>''Storia della Banca d'Italia'', pag. 62</ref>

In July 1981, a "divorce" between the State (Ministry of the Treasury) and its central bank was initiated by the decision of the then Treasury Minister Beniamino Andreatta.<ref>Epstein, Gerald A., and Juliet B. Schor. The divorce of the Banca d'Italia and the Italian Treasury: a case study of central bank independence. Harvard Institute of Economic Research, 1986.</ref> From that moment on, the institute was no longer required to purchase the bonds that the government was unable to place on the market, thus ceasing the monetization of the Italian public debt that it had carried out since the Second World War up to that moment. This decision was opposed by the Minister of Finance Rino Formica, who would have liked the Bank of Italy to be required to repay at least a portion of these securities, and from the summer of 1982 a series of intra-government verbal clashes between the two ministers known as the wives' quarrel, which was followed by the fall of the second Spadolini government a few months later.

The divorce between the Ministry of the Treasury and the Bank of Italy is still considered by economic doctrine as a factor of great stabilization of inflation (which went from over 20% in 1980 to less than 5% in the following years) and a central prerequisite for guarantee the full independence of the technical monetary policy body (central bank) from the choices related to fiscal policy (under the responsibility of the government), but also a factor of considerable incidence of growth of the Italian public debt.<ref>{{cite news |title=Perché Banca Centrale e Governo devono essere separati? {{!}} Banche, Risparmio, Investimenti e Trading|url=http://www.banknoise.com/2011/02/perch-banca-centrale-e-governo-devono-essere-separati.html|magazine=Banche, Risparmio, Investimenti e Trading|date=16 February 2011|access-date=15 October 2018}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=2013-12-04|title="Andreatta e Ciampi seppero guardare avanti", condannando l'Italia alla deindustrializzazione.|url=https://formiche.net/2013/12/andreatta-ciampi-seppero-guardare-avanti-condannando-litalia-alla-deindustrializzazione/|access-date=2021-12-18|website=Formiche.net|language=it-IT}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://keynesblog.com/2012/08/31/le-vere-cause-del-debito-pubblico-italiano/|title=Le vere cause del debito pubblico italiano|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180314162115/https://keynesblog.com/2012/08/31/le-vere-cause-del-debito-pubblico-italiano/|archive-date=14 Mar 2018}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.avantionline.it/2014/12/debito-pubblico-tutto-comincio-con-un-divorzio/|title=Debito Pubblico, tutto cominciò con un 'divorzio'|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181014165402/http://www.avantionline.it/2014/12/debito-pubblico-tutto-comincio-con-un-divorzio/|archive-date=14 Oct 2018}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=keynesblog|date=2013-06-11|title=L'incoerenza della Lettanomics|url=https://keynesblog.com/2013/06/11/lincoerenza-della-lettanomics/|access-date=2021-12-18|website=Keynes blog|language=it-IT}}</ref>

The law of 7 February [[1992]] n. 82, proposed by the then  Minister of the Treasury [[Guido Carli]], clarifies that the decision on the discount rate is the exclusive competence of the governor and must no longer be agreed in concert with the Minister of the Treasury (the previous decree of the President of the Republic is modified in relation to the new law with the Presidential Decree of 18 July).