Editing Argument from nonbelief (section)

=== Would a perfectly loving God prevent nonresistant nonbelief? ===
The most serious criticisms of the hiddenness argument have been leveled against the idea that a perfectly loving God would prevent nonresistant nonbelief. Schellenberg argues in two steps, by first claiming that a loving God would enable humans to partake in a relationship with it, and then, assuming that belief in that god is a necessary condition for such relationships to occur, inferring that a loving God would not permit nonbelief. He states:

{{blockquote|There is, first of all, the claim that if there is a personal God who is perfectly loving, creatures capable of explicit and positively meaningful relationship with God, who have not freely shut themselves off from God, are always in a position to participate in such relationship—able to do so just by trying to.<ref name="jl2005a" />}}

He justifies this claim by arguing that a conception of divine love can best be formed by extrapolating the best aspects of love in human relations, and draws an analogy with perfect parental love:
{{blockquote|The perfectly loving parent, for example, from the time the child can first respond to her at all until death separates them, will, insofar as she can help it, see to it that nothing ''she'' does ever puts relationship with herself out of reach for her child.<ref name="jl2005a" />}}
But, says Schellenberg, belief in God's existence is necessary for engaging in such a meaningful relationship with God. He therefore concludes that if there is a perfectly loving God, such creatures will always believe in it. He further argues that since belief is involuntary, these creatures should always have evidence "causally sufficient" for such belief:

{{blockquote|The presence of God will be for them like a light that—however much the degree of its brightness may fluctuate—remains on unless they close their eyes.<ref name="jl2005a" />}}