Editing Alfred Tarski (section)

===Truth in formalized languages===
{{main|Semantic theory of truth}}
In 1933, Tarski published a very long paper in Polish, titled "Pojęcie prawdy w językach nauk dedukcyjnych",<ref>Alfred Tarski, "POJĘCIE PRAWDY W JĘZYKACH NAUK DEDUKCYJNYCH", Towarszystwo Naukowe Warszawskie, Warszawa, 1933. [http://www.archiwum.wfis.uw.edu.pl/bibfis/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=129:a-tarski-pojcie-prawdy-w-jzykach-nauk-dedukcyjnych&catid=56:marginalia&Itemid=106 (Text in Polish in the Digital Library WFISUW-IFISPAN-PTF)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304000353/http://www.archiwum.wfis.uw.edu.pl/bibfis/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=129:a-tarski-pojcie-prawdy-w-jzykach-nauk-dedukcyjnych&catid=56:marginalia&Itemid=106 |date=2016-03-04 }}.</ref> "Setting out a mathematical definition of truth for formal languages." The 1935 German translation was titled "Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen", "The concept of truth in formalized languages", sometimes shortened to "Wahrheitsbegriff". An English translation appeared in the 1956 first edition of the volume ''[[Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics]]''. This collection of papers from 1923 to 1938 is an event in 20th-century [[analytic philosophy]], a contribution to [[Mathematical logic|symbolic logic]], [[semantics]], and the [[philosophy of language]]. For a brief discussion of its content, see [[Convention T]] (and also [[T-schema]]).

A philosophical debate examines the extent to which Tarski's theory of truth for formalized languages can be seen as a [[correspondence theory of truth]]. The debate centers on how to read Tarski's condition of material adequacy for a true definition. That condition requires that the truth theory have the following as theorems for all sentences p of the language for which truth is being defined:

: "p" is true [[if and only if]] p.

(where p is the proposition expressed by "p")

The debate amounts to whether to read sentences of this form, such as

{{blockquote|"Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white}}

as expressing merely a [[deflationary theory of truth]] or as embodying [[truth]] as a more substantial property (see Kirkham 1992).