Editing Robert McNamara (section)

====Micromanagement====
{{main|Micromanagement}}
Admiral George Anderson would later accuse McNamara of micromanagement during the Cuban Missile Crisis:

{{blockquote|I think when you have dominant people like McNamara playing, they throw the whole thing off balance...For example, I sent out a directive to make sure that there were qualified Russian-language officers on each ship involved in the quarantine—in case there had to be interrogations. As CNO, I didn’t go around and personally try to check every ship to find out if a Russian-language officer was on board. After all, I had a four-star, experienced CinC in [[Robert Dennison (United States Navy officer)|Admiral Dennison]], I had a good organization, and I had no thought of saying, “Well, did you carry out my order? Did each one arrive on each ship?” Dennison said he’d get them on there, and that was enough for me. But McNamara wanted me to get into every detail, he wanted me to interrogate each ship as to whether language officers were actually on board. This was an overpreoccupation with detail that I don’t think the civilian authorities should get involved with in a case of this sort.{{sfn|Anderson|1987|p=1015}}}}

As a consequence of incidents such as this, his designation of aircraft 'times-over-targets' [TOTs],{{sfn|Tierney|1999|p=1157}} and the White House selection of targets during Operation Rolling Thunder, the US military would attempt to resist civilian micromanagement in future operations.{{sfn|Van Staaveren|2002}}