Editing Artificial intelligence (section)

==== Computationalism and functionalism ====
{{Main|Computational theory of mind|Functionalism (philosophy of mind)}}

Computationalism is the position in the [[philosophy of mind]] that the human mind is an information processing system and that thinking is a form of computing. Computationalism argues that the relationship between mind and body is similar or identical to the relationship between software and hardware and thus may be a solution to the [[mind–body problem]]. This philosophical position was inspired by the work of AI researchers and cognitive scientists in the 1960s and was originally proposed by philosophers [[Jerry Fodor]] and [[Hilary Putnam]].{{Sfnp|Horst|2005}}

Philosopher [[John Searle]] characterized this position as "[[Strong AI hypothesis|strong AI]]": "The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds."{{Efn|name="Searle's strong AI"|
Searle presented this definition of "Strong AI" in 1999.{{Sfnp|Searle|1999}} Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states."{{Sfnp|Searle|1980|p=1}} Strong AI is defined similarly by [[Stuart J. Russell|Russell]] and [[Norvig]]: "Stong AI – the assertion that machines that do so are ''actually'' thinking (as opposed to ''simulating'' thinking)."{{Sfnp|Russell|Norvig|2021|p=9817}}
}} Searle challenges this claim with his [[Chinese room]] argument, which attempts to show that even a computer capable of perfectly simulating human behavior would not have a mind.<ref>Searle's [[Chinese room]] argument: {{Harvtxt|Searle|1980}}. Searle's original presentation of the thought experiment., {{Harvtxt|Searle|1999}}.
Discussion: {{Harvtxt|Russell|Norvig|2021|pp=985}}, {{Harvtxt|McCorduck|2004|pp=443–445}}, {{Harvtxt|Crevier|1993|pp=269–271}}</ref>