Editing Hate crime (section)

===Support===
Justifications for harsher punishments for hate crimes focus on the notion that hate crimes cause greater individual and societal harm.<ref name="Palgrave Macmillan UK">{{Citation|last1=Duggan|first1=Marian|title=Prioritized Political Focus: ASB and Hate Crime|date=2014|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137409270_4|work=Administrating Victimization|pages=59–90|place=London|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK|isbn=978-1-349-48857-5|access-date=2021-05-01|last2=Heap|first2=Vicky|doi=10.1057/9781137409270_4}}</ref> In a 2014 book, author Marian Duggan asserts that when the core of a person's identity is attacked, the degradation and [[dehumanization]] is especially severe, and additional emotional and physiological problems are likely to result. Wider society can suffer from the [[empowerment|disempowerment]] of a group of people.<ref name="Palgrave Macmillan UK"/> Furthermore, it is asserted that the chances for retaliatory crimes are greater when a hate crime has been committed. The [[1992 Los Angeles riots|riots]] in [[Los Angeles]], California, that followed the beating of [[Rodney King]], a [[black people|black]] motorist, by a group of [[white people|white]] police officers are cited as support for this argument.<ref name = "tvccce"/> The beating of white truck driver [[Reginald Oliver Denny|Reginald Denny]] by black rioters during the same riot is also an example that supports this argument.

In ''[[Wisconsin v. Mitchell]],'' the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] unanimously found that ''penalty-enhancement'' hate crime statutes do not conflict with [[free speech]] rights, because they do not punish an individual for exercising [[freedom of expression]]; rather, they allow courts to consider [[motive (law)|motive]] when sentencing a criminal for conduct which is not protected by the [[First Amendment to the United States Constitution|First Amendment]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.enotes.com/supreme-court-drama/wisconsin-v-mitchell|access-date=12 October 2011|title=Wisconsin v. Mitchell|publisher=Enotes.com}}</ref> In the case of ''[[Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire]],'' the court defined "fighting words" as "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."<ref>{{citation | last = Sumner | first = L.W. | author-link = L. W. Sumner | contribution = Hate crimes, literature, and speech | editor-last1 = Frey | editor-first1 = R.G. | editor-last2 = Heath Wellman | editor-first2 = Christopher | title = A companion to applied ethics | pages = [https://archive.org/details/companiontoappli0000unse/page/89 89–101] | publisher = Blackwell Publishing | series = Blackwell Companions to Philosophy | location = Oxford, UK Malden, Massachusetts | year = 2005 | doi = 10.1002/9780470996621.ch11 | isbn = 9781405133456 | postscript = . | url = https://archive.org/details/companiontoappli0000unse/page/89 }}</ref>

David Brax argues that critics of hate-crime laws are wrong in claiming that hate crimes punish thoughts or motives; he asserts they do not do this, but instead punish people for choosing these reasons to commit a criminal act.<ref>Brax, David. "Motives, reasons, and responsibility in hate/bias crime legislation." Criminal Justice Ethics 35, no. 3 (2016): 230-248.</ref> Similarly, Andrew Seidel writes, "Hate crime or bias intimidation crimes are not thoughtcrimes. Most crimes require two things: an act and an intent... If you simply hate someone based on race, sexuality, or creed, that thought is not punishable. Only the thought combined with an illegal action is criminal."<ref>{{cite book |last1=Seidel |first1=Andrew |title=The Founding Myth |date=14 May 2019 |publisher=Sterling Publishing Co., Inc. |location=United States of America |isbn=978-1-4549-4391-4 |page=338 |edition=2021}}</ref>