Editing Economy of Egypt (section)

==Challenges==
=== Poverty === 
[[File:Street Vendors of Cairo.webm|thumb|Street vendors in Cairo.]]
Egypt has struggled to implement effective policies to address poverty. Past efforts to alleviate economic burdens often benefited wealthier segments of society. For example, food, electricity, and petroleum subsidies have historically disproportionately aided the non-poor.<ref name=autogenerated39>{{cite web|last=Sayed|first=Attia|title=Poverty Eradication in Egypt|url=http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/921/op13.htm|access-date=10 February 2012}}</ref>

Egypt’s fertility rate has dropped from 6.6 children per woman in the 1960s to 3.2 children per woman in 2021, though it remains high relative to global standards. The population increased from 44 million in 1981 to over 106 million today. Overpopulation remains one of the biggest challenges to confronting poverty.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Egypt Fertility Rate 1950-2021|url=https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/EGY/egypt/fertility-rate|access-date=2021-03-07|website=www.macrotrends.net}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Egypt Population 1950-2022|url=https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/EGY/egypt/population|access-date=2022-01-07|website=www.macrotrends.net}}</ref>
[[File:Egypt Poverty.jpg|thumb|Cairo slums.]]
The country’s reliance on international loans, such as from the IMF, has sometimes resulted in increased hardship for the population. In August 2022, Egypt sought another loan amid rising prices, triggering criticism of economic policies that primarily benefited elites.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/19/egypt-seeks-exceptional-treatment-imf|title=Egypt Seeks 'Exceptional' Treatment by the IMF|access-date=19 August 2022|website=Human Rights Watch|date=19 August 2022}}</ref>

The poverty rate in Egypt increased from 19 percent in 2005 to 21 percent in 2009, as reported by then Minister of Economic Development, Othman Mohamed Othman.<ref>{{cite web|last=Saleh|first=Amirah|title=Govt: Poverty rate up 2%|url=http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/govt-poverty-rate-2|date=10 October 2009|access-date=1 May 2013}}</ref> The national poverty rate stood at 24.3% in 2010, rising to approximately 30% by 2015. Additionally, a 2019 World Bank report indicated that 60% of Egypt’s population was either poor or vulnerable.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/04/30/world-bank-group-to-extend-current-strategy-in-egypt-to-maintain-momentum-on-reforms|title=World Bank Group to Extend Current Strategy in Egypt to Maintain Momentum on Reforms|access-date=30 April 2019|publisher=World Bank}}</ref> 

As of 2020, Egypt's population stood at 102 million, with 33% under the age of 14. Approximately 30% of the population lived below the poverty line.<ref>{{Cite web|title=StackPath|url=https://dailynewsegypt.com/2020/09/08/egypts-illiteracy-rate-decreased-to-24-6-in-july-2019-capmas/|access-date=2021-03-07|website=dailynewsegypt.com|date=8 September 2020}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Overview|url=https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/egypt/overview|access-date=2021-03-07|website=World Bank|language=en}}</ref> By 2021, this figure had declined slightly to 29.7% of the population.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Egypt's poverty rate declines to 29.7%: CAPMAS - Economy - Business|url=http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/396107/Business/Economy/Egypt%E2%80%99s-poverty-rate-declines-to--CAPMAS.aspx|access-date=2021-03-07|website=Ahram Online|language=en|archive-date=13 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210313123200/https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/396107/Business/Economy/Egypt%E2%80%99s-poverty-rate-declines-to--CAPMAS.aspx|url-status=dead}}</ref>

=== Role of the military ===
{{Main|Economy of the Egyptian Armed Forces}}

The [[Egyptian Armed Forces|Egyptian armed forces]] have wielded substantial influence over Egypt's economy. Military-run companies play a pivotal role across various industries, contributing significantly to public spending on housing and infrastructure, including activities such as cement and food production, as well as infrastructure development like roads and bridges. According to a study by the [[The Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center|Carnegie Middle East Centre]], the Egyptian army has control over about 25% of public spending allocated to housing and infrastructure.<ref name=":3">{{Cite news |date=2023-04-13 |title=Egypt's army seems to want to make pasta as well as war |url=https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/04/13/egypts-army-seems-to-want-to-make-pasta-as-well-as-war |access-date=2024-01-04 |newspaper=The Economist |issn=0013-0613}}</ref>

Despite Egypt's commitment to reducing the military's economic impact per its agreement with the [[International Monetary Fund]] (IMF), recent developments indicate an opposing trend. The [[National Service Products Organization]] (NSPO), a firm under military ownership, is currently constructing new factories for the production of fertilizers, irrigation machines, and veterinary vaccines. The government discussed selling stakes in military-run companies Safi and Wataniya for two years. Despite claims of receiving offers, there are visible asset transfers, like the rebranding of Wataniya franchises into ChillOut stations.<ref name=":3" /> The army's expanding economic influence, from petrol stations to media, has stifled competition, hindered private investment and contributing to slower growth, higher prices, and limited opportunities for ordinary Egyptians.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2023-01-26 |title=To save Egypt's economy, get the army out of it |url=https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/01/26/to-save-egypts-economy-get-the-army-out-of-it |access-date=2024-01-04 |newspaper=The Economist |issn=0013-0613}}</ref>

In 2022, responding to international calls for economic reform, Egypt introduced the State Ownership Policy Document in collaboration with the [[International Monetary Fund|IMF]]. The document outlines Egypt’s strategy to reduce state and military involvement in the economy, withdrawing entirely from certain industries within three years while maintaining or expanding a presence in strategic sectors. It also seeks to increase private sector participation by clearly defining the state's economic role, enhancing governance of state-owned enterprises according to [[OECD]] standards, and promoting competitive neutrality.<ref name=sopd>{{cite web | url=https://www.cabinet.gov.eg/conference/pdf/property-policy-document-eng.pdf | title=State Ownership Policy Document | publisher=Government of Egypt | date=June 2022 | access-date=1 March 2025 }}</ref> By the final quarter of 2024, these reforms had led private investment to exceed public investment for the second consecutive quarter, representing over half of total investments. During this period, private investments increased by 35.4% year-on-year, whereas public investments declined by 25.7%,<ref>{{cite news |title=Egyptian Economy Grows at Quickest Quarterly Pace Since 2022 |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-26/egyptian-economy-grows-at-quickest-quarterly-pace-since-2022?embedded-checkout=true |work=Bloomberg |date=26 March 2025 |access-date=27 March 2025}}</ref> marking a significant departure from Egypt’s recent history of public investment dominance.

=== Opportunity cost of conflict ===
A report<ref name="strategicforesight.com">[http://www.strategicforesight.com/publication_pdf/39166Cost%20of%20Conflict%20in%20the%20Middle%20East.pdf], Strategic Foresight Group report: Cost of Conflict in the Middle East 2009</ref> by [[Strategic Foresight Group]] has calculated the opportunity [[cost of conflict]] for Egypt since 1991 is almost US $800 billion. In other words, had there been peace since 1991, an average Egyptian citizen would be earning over US $3,000 a year instead of US $1,700.