Editing History of Australia (section)

===Alliances 1950–1972===

In the early 1950s, the Menzies government saw Australia as part of a "triple alliance" in concert with both the US and traditional ally Britain.<ref>Glen Barclay and Joseph Siracusa (1976) ''Australian American Relations Since 1945'', pp. 35–49. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Sydney. {{ISBN|0-03-900122-9}}</ref> At first, "the Australian leadership opted for a consistently pro-British line in diplomacy", while at the same time looking for opportunities to involve the US in South East Asia.<ref>Glen Barclay and Joseph Siracusa (1976) p. 35</ref> Thus, the government committed military forces to the [[Korean War]] and the [[Malayan Emergency]] and hosted British [[British nuclear tests at Maralinga|nuclear tests]] after 1952.<ref>See Adrian Tame and F.P.J. Robotham (1982) ''Maralinga; British A-Bomb, Australian legacy'', p. 179, Fontana Books, Melbourne, {{ISBN|0-00-636391-1}}</ref> Australia was also the only Commonwealth country to offer support to the British during the [[Suez Crisis]].<ref>E.M. Andrews (1979) ''A History of Australian Foreign Policy'', p. 144, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne. {{ISBN|0-582-68253-3}}</ref>

Menzies oversaw an effusive welcome to Queen [[Elizabeth II]] on the first visit to Australia by a [[Monarchy of Australia|reigning monarch]], in 1954. He made the following remarks during a light-hearted speech to an American audience in New York, while on his way to attend her coronation in 1953: "We in Australia, of course, are British, if I may say so, to the boot heels...but we stand together – our people stand together – till the crack of doom."<ref>cited in Glen Barclay and Joseph Siracusa (1976) pp. 36–38</ref>

[[File:John F. Kennedy and Harold Holt.jpg|thumb|right|[[Harold Holt]] and US President [[John F. Kennedy]] in the [[Oval Office]] in Washington, D.C., 1963. By the 1960s, Australian defence policy had shifted from Britain to the US as key ally.]]

As British influence declined in South East Asia, the US alliance came to have greater significance for Australian leaders and the Australian economy. British investment in Australia remained significant until the late 1970s, but trade with Britain declined through the 1950s and 1960s. In the late 1950s the Australian Army began to re-equip using US military equipment. In 1962, the US established a naval communications station at [[Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt|North West Cape]], the first of several built during the next decade.<ref>Glen Barclay and Joseph Siracusa (1976) p. 63</ref><ref>Also see Desmond Ball (1980) ''A suitable piece of real estate; American Installations in Australia''. Hale and Iremonger. Sydney. {{ISBN|0-908094-47-7}}</ref> Most significantly, in 1962, [[Australian Army Training Team Vietnam|Australian Army advisors]] were sent to help train South Vietnamese forces, in a developing conflict in which the British had no part.

According to diplomat [[Alan Renouf]], the dominant theme in Australia's foreign policy under Australia's Liberal–Country Party governments of the 1950s and 1960s was anti-communism.<ref>Alan Renouf (1979) ''The Frightened Country''. pp. 2–3.</ref> Another former diplomat, Gregory Clark, suggested that it was specifically a fear of China that drove Australian foreign policy decisions for twenty years.<ref>See Gregory Clark (1967) ''In fear of China''. Lansdowne Press.</ref> The [[ANZUS]] security treaty, which had been signed in 1951, had its origins in Australia's and New Zealand's fears of a rearmed Japan. Its obligations on the US, Australia and New Zealand are vague, but its influence on Australian foreign policy thinking, at times has been significant.<ref>See discussion on the role of ANZUS in Australia's commitment to the Vietnam War in Paul Ham (2007) ''Vietnam; The Australian War''. pp. 86–87 HarperCollins Publishers, Sydney. {{ISBN|978-0-7322-8237-0}}</ref> The [[SEATO]] treaty, signed only three years later, clearly demonstrated Australia's position as a US ally in the emerging [[Cold War]].<ref name="Cambridge University Press">{{Cite book|last1=Bridge|first1=Carl|title=The Cambridge History of Australia, Volume 2, The Commonwealth of Australia|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2013|isbn=9781107011540|editor-last=Bashford|editor-first=Alison|location=Melbourne|pages=531|chapter=Australia, Britain and the British Commonwealth|editor-last2=MacIntyre|editor-first2=Stuart}}</ref>

As Britain struggled to enter the Common Market in the 1960s, Australia saw that its historic ties with the mother country were rapidly fraying. Canberra was alarmed but kept a low profile, not wanting to alienate London. Russel Ward states that the implications of [[European Communities Act 1972 (UK)|British entry into Europe in 1973]]: "seemed shattering to most Australians, particularly to older people and conservatives."<ref>Russell Ward, ''A Nation for a Continent: the history of Australia, 1901–1975'' (1977) p 343</ref> Carl Bridge, however, points out that Australia had been "hedging its British bets" for some time. The ANZUS treaty and Australia's decision to enter the Vietnam War did not involve Britain and by 1967 Japan was Australia's leading export partner and the US her largest source of imports. According to Bridge, Australia's decision not to follow Britain's devaluation of her currency in 1967 "marked the demise of British Australia."<ref name="Cambridge University Press"/>