Editing European Central Bank (section)

===== An independence that would be the source of a democratic deficit. =====
According to Christopher Adolph, the alleged neutrality of central bankers is only a legal façade and not an indisputable fact.<ref name="Adolph, Christopher, 1976–2013">{{Cite book|last=Adolph |first=Christopher |title=Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality|date=2013|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-139-61681-2|location=New York|oclc=844940155}}</ref>

'''The crisis: an opportunity to impose its will and extend its powers''':

– ''Its participation in the [[European troika|troika]]'': Thanks to its three factors which explain its independence, the ECB took advantage of this crisis to implement, through its participation in the troika, the famous structural reforms in the Member States aimed at making, more flexible the various markets, particularly the labour market, which are still considered too rigid under the [[ordoliberal concept]].<ref name="Delaume 2015 75">{{Cite journal|last=Delaume|first=Coralie|date=2015|title=Où va la Banque centrale européenne ?: De la technique à la politique, sans la démocratie|url=http://www.cairn.info/revue-le-debat-2015-5-page-75.htm|journal=Le Débat|language=fr|volume=187|issue=5|pages=75|doi=10.3917/deba.187.0075|issn=0246-2346}}</ref>

- ''[[Macro-prudential supervision]]'' : At the same time, taking advantage of the reform of the financial supervision system, the Frankfurt Bank has acquired new responsibilities, such as macro-prudential supervision, in other words, supervision of the provision of financial services.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fontan|first=Clément|date=2010|title=Chantiers de recherche transfert d'idée et résistances au changement : le cas de la banque centrale européenne après la crise.: Questionnement scientifique et objectifs de la thèse|url=http://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-europeenne-2010-1-page-225.htm|journal=Politique Européenne|language=fr|volume=30|issue=1|pages=225|doi=10.3917/poeu.030.0225|issn=1623-6297|doi-access=free}}</ref>

-''Take liberties with its mandate to save the Euro'' : Paradoxically, the crisis undermined the ECB's ordoliberal discourse "because some of its instruments, which it had to implement, deviated significantly from its principles. It then interpreted the paradigm with enough flexibly to adapt its original reputation to these new economic conditions. It was forced to do so as a last resort to save its one and only raison d'être: the euro. This Independent was thus obliged to be pragmatic by departing from the spirit of its statutes, which is unacceptable to the hardest supporters of ordoliberalism, which will lead to the resignation of the two German leaders present within the ECB: the governor of the Bundesbank, Jens WEIDMANN<ref>{{Cite web|last=Raymond|first=Grégory|title=Jens Weidmann, l'homme qui dit "non" à toute l'Europe|url=https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2012/08/30/jens-weidmann-bundesbank-draghi-merkel-euro_n_1843003.html|website=huffingtonpost.fr|date=31 August 2012}}</ref> and the member of the executive board of the ECB, Jürgen STARK.<ref>{{Cite web|agency=Reuters|date=11 September 2011|title=La démission de Jürgen Stark de la BCE vient au pire moment|url=https://www.lexpress.fr/archives/economie/2011/09/11/|website=lexpansion.lexpress.fr/}}</ref>

– ''Regulation of the financial system'' : The delegation of this new function to the ECB was carried out with great simplicity and with the consent of European leaders, because neither the Commission nor the Member States really wanted to obtain the monitoring of financial abuses throughout the area. In other words, in the event of a new financial crisis, the ECB would be the perfect scapegoat.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Lebaron|first=Frédéric|date=2014|title=Quand le gardien du Temple devient le sauveur des marchés financiers|url=http://www.cairn.info/revue-savoir-agir-2014-1-page-5.htm|journal=Savoir/Agir|language=fr|volume=27|issue=1|pages=5–9|doi=10.3917/sava.027.0005|issn=1958-7856}}</ref>

- ''Capturing exchange rate policy'' : The event that will most mark the definitive politicization of the ECB is, of course, the operation launched in January 2015: the [[quantitative easing]] (QE) operation. Indeed, the Euro is an overvalued currency on the world markets against the dollar and the euro zone is at risk of deflation. In addition, Member States find themselves heavily indebted, partly due to the rescue of their national banks. The ECB, as the guardian of the stability of the euro zone, is deciding to gradually buy back more than EUR 1 100 billion Member States' public debt. In this way, money is injected back into the economy, the euro depreciates significantly, prices rise, the risk of deflation is removed, and Member States reduce their debts. However, the ECB has just given itself the right to direct the exchange rate policy of the euro zone without this being granted by the Treaties or with the approval of European leaders, and without public opinion or the public arena being aware of this.<ref name="Delaume 2015 75"/>