Editing Zbigniew Brzezinski (section)

==National Security Advisor==
{{further|Presidency of Jimmy Carter#Foreign policy}}
{{main|History of the United States National Security Council 1977–81}}
[[File:Zbigniew Brzezinski, David Aaron and General David Jones - NARA - 182846.tif|thumb|247x247px|National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski with [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff|Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff]] General [[David C. Jones]] and [[Deputy National Security Advisor (United States)|Deputy National Security Advisor]] [[David L. Aaron]], following [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]] meeting at [[White House|The White House]], December 20, 1978.]]
[[File:President Jimmy Carter and Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown while touring Strategic Air Command's Headquarters.jpg|thumb|247x247px|National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski accompanying President [[Jimmy Carter]] during a visit to [[Strategic Air Command|Strategic Air Command's Headquarters]] in [[Offutt Air Force Base]], Nebraska.]]
President Carter chose Brzezinski for the position of National Security Adviser (NSA) because he wanted an assertive intellectual at his side to provide him with day-to-day advice and guidance on foreign policy decisions. Brzezinski would preside over a reorganized National Security Council (NSC) structure, fashioned to ensure that the NSA would be only one of many players in the foreign policy process.<ref>Justin Vaïsse, ''Zbigniew Brzezinski: America's Grand Strategist'' (2018) ch 6.</ref>

Initially, Carter reduced the NSC staff by one-half, and decreased the number of standing NSC committees from eight to two. All issues referred to the NSC were reviewed by one of the two new committees, either the Policy Review Committee (PRC) or the [[Special Coordinating Committee]] (SCC). The PRC focused on specific issues, and its chairmanship rotated. The SCC was always chaired by Brzezinski, a circumstance he had to negotiate with Carter to achieve. Carter believed that by making the NSA chairman of only one of the two committees, he would prevent the NSC from being the overwhelming influence on foreign policy decisions it had been under Kissinger's chairmanship during the Nixon administration.<ref name="Vaïsse, 2018">Vaïsse, ''Zbigniew Brzezinski'' (2018) ch 6.</ref>

The SCC was charged with considering issues that cut across several departments, including oversight of intelligence activities, arms control evaluation, and crisis management. Much of the SCC's time during the Carter years was spent on SALT issues. The Council held few formal meetings, convening only 10 times, compared with 125 meetings during the eight years of the Nixon and Ford administrations. Instead, Carter used frequent, informal meetings as a decision-making device—typically his Friday breakfasts—usually attended by the Vice President, the secretaries of State and Defense, Brzezinski, and the chief domestic adviser.<ref name="Vaïsse, 2018"/>

No agendas were prepared and no formal records were kept of these meetings, sometimes resulting in differing interpretations of the decisions actually agreed upon. Brzezinski was careful, in managing his own weekly luncheons with secretaries Vance and Brown in preparation for NSC discussions, to maintain a complete set of notes. Brzezinski also sent weekly reports to the President on major foreign policy undertakings and problems, with recommendations for courses of action. President Carter enjoyed these reports and frequently annotated them with his own views. Brzezinski and the NSC used these presidential notes (159 of them) as the basis for NSC actions.<ref name="Vaïsse, 2018"/>

From the beginning, Brzezinski made sure that the new NSC institutional relationships would assure him a major voice in the shaping of foreign policy. While he knew that Carter would not want him to be another Kissinger, Brzezinski also felt confident that the President did not want Secretary of State Vance to become another Dulles and would want his own input on key foreign policy decisions. Brzezinski's power gradually expanded into the operational area during the Carter Presidency. He increasingly assumed the role of a presidential emissary. In 1978, for example, Brzezinski traveled to Beijing to lay the groundwork for normalizing [[Sino-American relations|U.S.–PRC relations]].<ref name="Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos 2016 143–44">{{cite book|author=Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos|title=Kissinger and Brzezinski: The NSC and the Struggle for Control of US National Security Policy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cPC-DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA144|year=2016|publisher=Springer|pages=143–44|isbn=9781349217410}}</ref>

Like Kissinger before him, Brzezinski maintained his own personal relationship with Soviet Ambassador to the United States [[Anatoly Dobrynin]]. Brzezinski had NSC staffers monitor State Department cable traffic through the Situation Room and call back to the State Department if the President preferred to revise or take issue with outgoing State Department instructions. He also appointed his own press spokesman, and his frequent press briefings and appearances on television interview shows made him a prominent public figure, although perhaps not nearly as much as Kissinger had been under Nixon.<ref name="Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos 2016 143–44"/>

The Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 significantly damaged the already tenuous relationship between Vance and Brzezinski. Vance felt that Brzezinski's linkage of SALT to other Soviet activities and the MX, together with the growing domestic criticisms in the United States of the SALT II Accord, convinced Brezhnev to decide on military intervention in Afghanistan. Brzezinski, however, later recounted that he advanced proposals to maintain Afghanistan's independence but was frustrated by the Department of State's opposition. An NSC [[working group]] on Afghanistan wrote several reports on the deteriorating situation in 1979, but Carter ignored them until the Soviet intervention destroyed his illusions. Only then did he decide to abandon SALT II ratification and pursue the anti-Soviet policies that Brzezinski proposed.<ref>{{cite book|author=Brian J. Auten|title=Carter's Conversion: The Hardening of American Defense Policy|publisher=University of Missouri Press|url=https://archive.org/details/cartersconversio00aute|url-access=registration|year=2008|page=[https://archive.org/details/cartersconversio00aute/page/276 276]|isbn=9780826218162}}</ref>

The [[Iranian revolution]] was the last straw for the disintegrating relationship between Vance and Brzezinski. As the upheaval developed, the two advanced fundamentally different positions. Brzezinski wanted to control the revolution and increasingly suggested military action to prevent [[Ayatollah Khomeini]] from coming to power, while Vance wanted to come to terms with the new Islamic Republic of Iran. As a consequence, Carter failed to develop a coherent approach to the Iranian situation. Vance's resignation following the unsuccessful mission to rescue the American hostages in March 1980, undertaken over his objections, was the final result of the deep disagreement between Brzezinski and Vance.<ref>Gary Sick, ''All fall down: America's fateful encounter with Iran'' (IB Tauris, 1985).</ref>

===Major policies===
During the 1960s, Brzezinski articulated the strategy of peaceful engagement for undermining the Soviet bloc, and while serving on the State Department Policy Planning Council, persuaded President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] to adopt (in October 1966) peaceful engagement as U.S. strategy, placing [[détente]] ahead of [[German reunification]] and thus reversing prior U.S. priorities.{{Citation needed|date=May 2017}}

During the 1970s and 1980s, at the height of his political involvement, Brzezinski participated in the formation of the Trilateral Commission in order to more closely cement U.S.–Japanese–European relations. As the three most economically advanced sectors of the world, the people of the three regions could be brought together in cooperation that would give them a more cohesive stance against the communist world.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://dinoknudsen.dk/books-pamphlets|title=Books|website=dinoknudsen.dk}}</ref>

While serving in the White House, Brzezinski emphasized the centrality of human rights as a means of placing the Soviet Union on the ideological defensive. With Jimmy Carter in [[Camp David Accords (1978)|Camp David]], he assisted in the attainment of the [[Egypt–Israel peace treaty]].<ref>{{cite web|first=Zbigniew|last=Brzezinski|title=Strategy for Camp David|url=http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1821105/1978-08-31c.pdf|work=[[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]|date=August 31, 1978|access-date=February 11, 2017}}</ref>

====Afghanistan====
{{main|Operation Cyclone}}
[[File:Jimmy Carter and Prince Fahd at a meeting between U.S. and Saudi Arabian officials. - NARA - 174853.tif|thumb|250px|Carter, Brzezinski and Prince [[Fahd of Saudi Arabia]]]]
Communists under the leadership of [[Nur Muhammad Taraki]] [[Saur Revolution|seized power in Afghanistan]] on April 27, 1978.<ref name="Kaplan">{{cite book|author-link=Robert D. Kaplan|last=Kaplan|first=Robert D.|title=Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan|publisher=[[Random House|Knopf Doubleday]]|year=2008 |isbn=978-0-307-54698-2|pages=115–117}}</ref> The new regime—divided between Taraki's extremist [[Khalq]] faction and the more moderate [[Parcham]]—signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in December of that year.<ref name="Kaplan" /><ref name="Kepel">{{cite book|author-link=Gilles Kepel|last=Kepel|first=Gilles|title=Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam|publisher=[[I.B. Tauris]]|year=2006|isbn=978-1-84511-257-8|pages=138–139, 142–144}}</ref> Taraki's efforts to improve secular education and redistribute land were accompanied by mass executions (including of many conservative religious leaders) and political oppression unprecedented in Afghan history, igniting a revolt by [[Afghan mujahideen|mujahideen]] rebels.<ref name="Kaplan" />

Following a general uprising in April 1979, Taraki was deposed by Khalq rival [[Hafizullah Amin]] in September.<ref name="Kaplan" /><ref name="Kepel" /> Amin was considered a "brutal psychopath" by foreign observers; even the Soviets were alarmed by the brutality of the Afghan communists, and suspected Amin of being an agent of the U.S. [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA), although that was not the case.<ref name="Kaplan" /><ref name="Kepel" /><ref name="Blight">{{cite book|last1=Blight|first1=James G.|title=Becoming Enemies: U.S.–Iran Relations and the Iran–Iraq War, 1979–1988|publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]] Publishers|year=2012|isbn=978-1-4422-0830-8|pages=66, 69–70|display-authors=etal}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author-link=Steve Coll|last=Coll|first=Steve|title=[[Ghost Wars|Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001]]|publisher=[[Penguin Group]]|year=2004|isbn=9781594200076|pages=47–49|quote=Frustrated and hoping to discredit him, the KGB initially planted false stories that Amin was a CIA agent. In the autumn these rumors rebounded on the KGB in a strange case of "[[Blowback (intelligence)|blowback]]," the term used by spies to describe planted propaganda that filters back to confuse the country that first set the story loose.}}</ref> By December, Amin's government had lost control of much of the country, prompting the Soviet Union to [[Soviet–Afghan War|invade Afghanistan]], execute Amin, and install Parcham leader [[Babrak Karmal]] as president.<ref name="Kaplan" /><ref name="Kepel" />

President Carter was surprised by the invasion, as the consensus of the U.S. intelligence community during 1978 and 1979—reiterated as late as September 29, 1979—was that "Moscow would not intervene in force even if it appeared likely that the Khalq government was about to collapse." Indeed, Carter's diary entries from November 1979 until the Soviet invasion in late December contain only two short references to Afghanistan, and are instead preoccupied with the ongoing [[Iran hostage crisis|hostage crisis in Iran]].<ref name="Riedel">{{cite book|author-link=Bruce Riedel|last=Riedel|first=Bruce|title=What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989|publisher=[[Brookings Institution]] Press|year=2014|isbn=978-0-8157-2595-4|pages=ix-xi, 21–22, 93, 98–99, 105}}</ref> In the West, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was considered a threat to global security and the oil supplies of the [[Persian Gulf]].<ref name="Kepel" />

Moreover, the failure to accurately predict Soviet intentions caused American officials to reappraise the Soviet threat to both Iran and Pakistan, although it is now known that those fears were overblown. For example, U.S. intelligence closely followed Soviet exercises for an invasion of Iran throughout 1980, while an earlier warning from Brzezinski that "if the Soviets came to dominate Afghanistan, they could promote a separate [[Balochistan|Baluchistan]]&nbsp; ... [thus] dismembering Pakistan and Iran" took on new urgency.<ref name="Blight" /><ref name="Riedel" />

These concerns were a major factor in the unrequited efforts of both the [[Presidency of Jimmy Carter|Carter]] and [[Presidency of Ronald Reagan|Reagan administrations]] to improve relations with Iran, and resulted in massive aid to Pakistan's [[Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq]]. Zia's ties with the U.S. had been strained during Carter's presidency due to Pakistan's nuclear program and the execution of [[Zulfikar Ali Bhutto]] in April 1979, but Carter told Brzezinski and Secretary of State [[Cyrus Vance]] as early as January 1979 that it was vital to "repair our relationships with Pakistan" in light of the [[Iranian Revolution|unrest in Iran]].<ref name="Riedel" />

One initiative Carter authorized to achieve this goal was a collaboration between the CIA and Pakistan's [[Inter-Services Intelligence]] (ISI); through the ISI, the CIA began providing some $695,000<ref name="Tobin 2020"/> worth of non-lethal assistance to the mujahideen on July 3, 1979—several months prior to the Soviet invasion. The modest scope of this early collaboration was likely influenced by the understanding, later recounted by CIA official [[Robert Gates]], "that a substantial U.S. covert aid program" might have "raise[d] the stakes" thereby causing "the Soviets to intervene more directly and vigorously than otherwise intended".<ref name="Riedel" /><ref name="Gates">{{cite book|author-link=Robert Gates|last=Gates|first=Robert|title=From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War|publisher=[[Simon and Schuster]]|year=2007|isbn=978-1-4165-4336-7|pages=145–147}} When asked whether he expected that the revelations in his memoir (combined with an apocryphal quote attributed to Brzezinski) would inspire "a mind-bending number of conspiracy theories which adamantly—and wrongly—accuse the Carter Administration of luring the Soviets into Afghanistan", Gates replied: "No, because there was no basis in fact for an allegation the administration tried to draw the Soviets into Afghanistan militarily." See Gates, email communication with John Bernell White, Jr., October 15, 2011, as cited in {{cite web|last=White|first=John Bernell|url=http://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4790&context=gradschool_theses|title=The Strategic Mind Of Zbigniew Brzezinski: How A Native Pole Used Afghanistan To Protect His Homeland|date=May 2012|access-date=August 23, 2017|pages=45–46, 82}}</ref><ref name="Coll">{{cite book|author-link=Steve Coll|last=Coll|first=Steve|title=Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001|publisher=[[Penguin Group]]|year=2004|isbn=978-1-59420-007-6|pages=[https://archive.org/details/ghostwarssecreth00coll/page/87 87, 581]|quote=Contemporary memos—particularly those written in the first days after the Soviet invasion—make clear that while Brzezinski was determined to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan through covert action, he was also very worried the Soviets would prevail.&nbsp; ... Given this evidence and the enormous political and security costs that the invasion imposed on the Carter administration, any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan warrants deep skepticism.}}</ref> The first shipment of U.S.weapons intended for the mujahideen reached Pakistan on January 10, 1980, shortly following the Soviet invasion.<ref name="Blight" />

In the aftermath of the invasion, Carter was determined to respond vigorously to what he considered a dangerous provocation. In a televised speech, he announced sanctions on the Soviet Union, promised renewed aid to Pakistan, and committed the U.S. to the Persian Gulf's defense.<ref name="Riedel" /><ref name="Gates" /> The thrust of U.S. policy for the duration of the war was determined by Carter in early 1980: Carter initiated [[Operation Cyclone|a program to arm the mujahideen through Pakistan's ISI]] and secured a pledge from Saudi Arabia to match U.S. funding for this purpose. U.S. support for the mujahideen accelerated under Carter's successor, [[Ronald Reagan]], at a final cost to U.S. taxpayers of some $3&nbsp;billion. The Soviets were unable to quell the insurgency and [[Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan|withdrew from Afghanistan]] in 1989, precipitating the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]] itself.<ref name="Riedel" />

However, the decision to route U.S. aid through Pakistan led to massive fraud, as weapons sent to [[Karachi]] were frequently sold on the local market rather than delivered to the Afghan rebels; Karachi soon "became one of the most violent cities in the world". Pakistan also controlled which rebels received assistance: of the [[Afghan mujahideen|seven mujahideen groups]] supported by Zia's government, four espoused Islamic fundamentalist beliefs—and these fundamentalists received most of the funding.<ref name="Kepel" /> Years later, in a 1997 [[CNN]]/[[National Security Archive]] interview, Brzezinski detailed the strategy taken by the Carter administration against the Soviets in 1979:

<blockquote>We immediately launched a twofold process when we heard that the Soviets had entered Afghanistan. The first involved direct reactions and sanctions focused on the Soviet Union, and both the [[United States Department of State|State Department]] and the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]] prepared long lists of sanctions to be adopted, of steps to be taken to increase the international costs to the Soviet Union of their actions. And the second course of action led to my going to Pakistan a month or so after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for the purpose of coordinating with the Pakistanis a joint response, the purpose of which would be to make the Soviets bleed for as much and as long as is possible; and we engaged in that effort in a collaborative sense with the Saudis, the Egyptians, the British, the Chinese, and we started providing weapons to the Mujaheddin, from various sources again—for example, some Soviet arms from the Egyptians and the Chinese. We even got Soviet arms from the [[Czechoslovakia|Czechoslovak]] communist government, since it was obviously susceptible to material incentives; and at some point we started buying arms for the Mujaheddin from the Soviet army in Afghanistan, because that army was increasingly corrupt.<ref name="gwu.edu">{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-17/brzezinski1.html |title=Interview with Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski |date= June 13, 1997 |access-date=May 25, 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20000829032721/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-17/brzezinski1.html |archive-date=August 29, 2000 }}</ref></blockquote>

====="Afghan Trap" theory=====
Following the [[September 11 attacks]], a theory that Brzezinski intentionally provoked the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was widely repeated.<ref>See, for example, {{cite journal|url=https://monthlyreview.org/2022/04/01/mr-073-11-2022-04_0/|title=NOTES FROM THE EDITORS|journal=[[Monthly Review]]|volume=73|issue=11|date=April 2022|accessdate=2022-10-04|quote=Brzezinski&nbsp;... had laid the trap for the Soviets in Afghanistan. It was under Brzezinski's direction, following a secret directive signed by Carter in July 1979, that the CIA, working together with the arc of political Islam stretching from Muhammad Zia-ul Haq's Pakistan to the Saudi royals, recruited, armed, and trained the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. The CIA's buildup of the Mujahideen and various terrorist groups in Afghanistan precipitated the Soviet intervention, leading to an endless war that contributed to the destabilization of the Soviet Union itself. To queries as to whether he regretted establishing the arc of terrorism that was to lead to 9/11 and beyond, Brzezinski (who posed in photos with Mujahideen fighters) responded by simply saying that the destruction of the Soviet Union was worth it.}}</ref> Some adherents of this theory thus blamed Brzezinski (and the Carter administration) for events subsequent to the Soviet invasion, including the decades-long [[Afghanistan conflict (1978–present)]], the [[September 11 attacks]], and the 2016 [[Orlando nightclub shooting]]. A 2020 review of declassified U.S. documents by Conor Tobin in the journal ''[[Diplomatic History (journal)|Diplomatic History]]'' contends that this theory—referred to as the "Afghan Trap" theory by the author—is a misrepresentation of the historical record based almost entirely on a  "caricature" of Brzezinski as an anti-communist fanatic, a disputed statement attributed to Brzezinski by a ''[[L'Obs|Le Nouvel Observateur]]'' journalist in 1998 (which was "repeatedly den[ied]" by Brzezinski himself), "and the circumstantial fact that U.S. support antedated the invasion."<ref name="Tobin 2020"/> In addition to Tobin, several academic or journalistic sources have questioned the veracity of aspects of the "Afghan Trap" theory,<ref name="Coll 2004"/><ref name="NSarchive 2019"/><ref name="Vaïsse 2018"/><ref name="Leake 2022"/> as have at least two former high-ranking Carter administration officials.<ref name="Tobin 2020"/>

While it is true that the March [[1979 Herat uprising]] in Afghanistan and a desire to rebuild [[Pakistan–United States relations|strained U.S. relations]] with Pakistani leader [[Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq]] in light of the [[Iranian Revolution]] prompted Carter to sign presidential findings in July 1979 permitting the CIA to spend $695,000 on non-military assistance (e.g., "cash, medical equipment, and radio transmitters") to [[Afghan mujahideen]] insurgents (and on a propaganda campaign targeting the Soviet-backed leadership of the [[Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]] or DRA), internal deliberations show that "U.S. policies were almost wholly reactive&nbsp;... to the Soviets' escalating military presence" with policymakers rejecting "a ''substantial'' covert aid program" (including lethal provisions) "to avoid provoking Moscow." (The Soviet military and political presence in Afghanistan steadily increased throughout 1979, including "tens of millions of dollars in military aid provided by Moscow to the DRA.")<ref name="Tobin 2020"/>

According to Tobin, Brzezinski went to considerable lengths to dissuade the Soviets from invading Afghanistan, urging the Carter administration to publicize information regarding the growing Soviet military role in Afghanistan's nascent civil war and to explicitly warn the Soviets of severe sanctions in the event of an invasion; when his warnings were watered-down by the [[United States Department of State|State Department]] under the leadership of Secretary of State [[Cyrus Vance]], Brzezinski leaked information to a journalist, resulting in an August 1979 article in ''[[The New York Times]]'' headlined "U.S. Is Indirectly Pressing Russians to Halt Afghanistan Intervention." (Ironically, Soviet general [[Valentin Varennikov]] complained in 1995 that American officials had never made Afghanistan's strategic significance clear to their Soviet counterparts prior to December 1979, speculating—in line with the "Afghan Trap" theory—that this omission may have been deliberate as the U.S. "had an interest in us getting stuck in Afghanistan, and paying the greatest possible price for that.")<ref name="Tobin 2020"/> Furthermore, Brzezinski attempted to discretely negotiate a withdrawal of Soviet troops with [[List of ambassadors of Russia to the United States|Soviet ambassador]] [[Anatoly Dobrynin]] during 1980, privately conceding that the country would likely remain within the Soviet sphere of influence following a diplomatic settlement, as he had little confidence in the mujahideen's ability to inflict a military defeat on the Red Army.<ref name="Tobin 2020"/><ref name="Vaïsse 2018"/>

Carter administration officials [[Robert Gates]] and Vice President [[Walter Mondale]] criticized the "Afghan Trap" theory between 2010 and 2012, the former stating that it had "no basis in fact" and the latter calling it "a huge, unwarranted leap".<ref name="Tobin 2020"/> Tobin concludes: "The small-scale covert program that developed ''in response'' to the increasing Soviet influence was part of a contingency plan ''if'' the Soviets did intervene militarily, as Washington would be in a better position to make it difficult for them to consolidate their position, but not designed to induce an intervention."<ref name="Tobin 2020">{{cite journal|last=Tobin|first=Conor|title=The Myth of the "Afghan Trap": Zbigniew Brzezinski and Afghanistan, 1978–1979|journal=[[Diplomatic History (journal)|Diplomatic History]]|publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]|volume=44|issue=2|date=April 2020|pages=237–264|doi=10.1093/dh/dhz065|doi-access=free}}</ref> Historian Robert Rakove wrote, the notion of a U.S. effort to entrap the Soviet Union in Afghanistan has been "methodically and effectively refuted by Conor Tobin".<ref>{{cite book |last=Rakove |first=Robert B. |date=2023 |title=Days of Opportunity: The United States and Afghanistan Before the Soviet Invasion |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jaaoEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1592 |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=978-0-231-55842-6 |page=5}}</ref> [[Steve Coll]] had previously stated in 2004 that "[c]ontemporary memos—particularly those written in the first days after the Soviet invasion—make clear that while Brzezinski was determined to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan through covert action, he was also very worried the Soviets would prevail.&nbsp;... Given this evidence and the enormous political and security costs that the invasion imposed on the Carter administration, any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan warrants deep skepticism."<ref name="Coll 2004">{{cite book|author-link=Steve Coll|last=Coll|first=Steve|title=[[Ghost Wars|Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001]]|publisher=[[Penguin Group]]|year=2004|isbn=9781594200076|page=593}} cf. {{cite web|author-link=Zbigniew Brzezinski|last=Brzezinski|first=Zbigniew|url=http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB396/docs/1979-12-26%20Brzezinski%20to%20Carter%20on%20Afghanistan.pdf|title=Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan|date=26 December 1979|access-date=30 April 2022}}</ref> Coll's "specific debunking of the Brzezinski ''Nouvel Observateur'' interview" was cited by the [[National Security Archive]] in 2019.<ref name="NSarchive 2019">{{cite web|last1=Blanton|first1=Tom|last2=Savranskaya|first2=Svetlana|url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/afghanistan-russia-programs/2019-01-29/soviet-invasion-afghanistan-1979-not-trumps-terrorists-nor-zbigs-warm-water-ports|title=The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979: Not Trump's Terrorists, Nor Zbig's Warm Water Ports|publisher=[[National Security Archive]]|date=2019-01-29|accessdate=2022-10-04}}</ref> In 2016, [[Justin Vaïsse]] referred to "[t]he thesis according to which a trap was set having been dismissed" as "[s]uch a position would not be compatible with the archives".<ref name="Vaïsse 2018">{{cite book|author-link=Justin Vaïsse|last=Vaïsse|first=Justin|translator=Catherine Porter|chapter=In the White House|title=Zbigniew Brzezinski: America's Grand Strategist|publisher=[[Harvard University Press]]|year=2018|isbn=9780674919488|pages=307–311}} (First published in 2016 as ''Zbigniew Brzezinski: Stratège de l’empire'' in French.)</ref> Elisabeth Leake, writing in 2022, agreed that "the original provision was certainly inadequate to force a Soviet armed intervention. Instead it adhered to broader US practices of providing limited covert support to anti-communist forces worldwide."<ref name="Leake 2022">{{cite book|last=Leake|first=Elisabeth|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DiFnEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA178|title=Afghan Crucible: The Soviet Invasion and the Making of Modern Afghanistan|publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]|year=2022|isbn=9780198846017|page=178}}</ref>

====Iran====
[[File:The Shah with Atherton, Sullivan, Vance, Carter and Brzezinski, 1977.jpg|thumb|300px|The Iranian Shah, [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]], meeting with [[Alfred Atherton]], [[William H. Sullivan]], [[Cyrus Vance]], President [[Jimmy Carter]], and Zbigniew Brzezinski, in 1977]]
In November 1979, [[Iranian Revolution|revolutionary]] students stormed the [[Embassy of the United States, Tehran]] and took American diplomats hostage. Brzezinski argued against Secretary of State [[Cyrus Vance]]'s proposed diplomatic solutions to the [[Iran hostage crisis]], insisting they "would deliver Iran to the Soviets."<ref name=NYTobit /> Vance, struggling with [[gout]], went to Florida on Thursday, April 10, 1980, for a long weekend.<ref name=NYTmag>{{cite news|last1=Douglas Brinkley|title=The Lives They Lived; Out of the Loop|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/29/magazine/the-lives-they-lived-out-of-the-loop.html|access-date=May 3, 2017|work=[[The New York Times Magazine]]|date=December 29, 2002|author1-link=Douglas Brinkley}}</ref>

On Friday, Brzezinski held a newly scheduled meeting of the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]] and authorized [[Operation Eagle Claw]], a military expedition into [[Tehran]] to rescue the hostages.<ref name=NYTmag /> Deputy Secretary [[Warren Christopher]], who attended the meeting in Vance's place, did not inform Vance.<ref name=NYTmag /> Furious, Vance handed in his resignation on principle, calling Brzezinski "evil".<ref name=NYTmag />

President Carter aborted the operation after three of the eight helicopters he had sent into the [[Dasht-e Kavir]] desert crashed, and a fourth then collided with a transport plane, causing a fire that killed eight servicemen.<ref name="NYTmag" /> The hostages were ultimately released on the day of the [[first inauguration of Ronald Reagan]], after 444 days in captivity.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Marilyn Berger|title=Cyrus R. Vance, a Confidant Of Presidents, Is Dead at 84|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/13/world/cyrus-r-vance-a-confidant-of-presidents-is-dead-at-84.html|access-date=May 3, 2017|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=January 13, 2002|page=A1|author1-link=Marilyn Berger}}</ref>

Along with Kissinger and David Rockefeller, Brzezinski played a role in convincing Carter to admit the exiled Shah into the U.S.<ref name=":0" />

Brzezinski has compared complaints by US officials about Iran's alleged nuclear ambitions to similar statements made before the [[Iraq War|Iraq war]] began: "I think the administration, the President and the Vice President particularly, are trying to hype the atmosphere, and that is reminiscent of what preceded the war in Iraq."<ref>{{Cite web |title=Brzezinski: U.S. in danger of 'stampeding' to war with Iran |url=https://edition-cnn-com.translate.goog/2007/POLITICS/09/23/iran.us/?_x_tr_sch=http&_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=fa&_x_tr_hl=en-US&_x_tr_pto=wapp}}</ref>

====China====
[[File:Zbigniew Brzezinski hosts a dinner for Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping. - NARA - 183125.tiff|thumb|250px|Brzezinski hosts a dinner for [[Communist Party of China|Chinese Communist]] leader [[Deng Xiaoping]] in 1979]]
Shortly after taking office in 1977, President Carter again reaffirmed the United States' position of upholding the [[Shanghai Communiqué]]. In May 1978, Brzezinski overcame concerns from the State Department and traveled to Beijing, where he began talks that seven months later led to full diplomatic relations.<ref name=NYTobit /> The United States and People's Republic of China announced on December 15, 1978, that the two governments would establish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. This required that the United States sever relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan. Consolidating U.S. gains in befriending Communist China was a major priority stressed by Brzezinski during his time as National Security Advisor.

Brzezinski "denied [[Allegations of United States support for the Khmer Rouge|reports]] that he encouraged China to support the genocidal dictator [[Pol Pot]] in [[Cambodia]], because Pol Pot's [[Khmer Rouge]] were the enemies of communist Vietnam."<ref name="Guardianobit">{{cite web|last=Hodgson|first=Godfrey|url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/may/28/zbigniew-brzezinski-obituary|title=Zbigniew Brzezinski obituary|work=[[The Guardian]]|date=May 28, 2017|access-date=May 28, 2017}}</ref> However, following the [[Cambodian–Vietnamese War|Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia]] which toppled the Khmer Rouge, Brzezinski prevailed in having the administration refuse to recognize the [[People's Republic of Kampuchea|new Cambodian government]] due to its support by the Soviet Union.<ref name=glad>{{cite book |title=An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy |author-link=Betty Glad |author=Glad, Betty |publisher=[[Cornell University Press]] |pages=237–239|isbn=9780801448157 |year=2009 }}</ref>

The most important strategic aspect of the new U.S.–Chinese relationship was in its effect on the Cold War. China was no longer considered part of a larger Sino-Soviet bloc but instead a third pole of power due to the [[Sino-Soviet Split]], helping the United States against the Soviet Union.<ref name="hoov_China-US">{{Cite web |title=China-US Relations In The Eyes Of The Chinese Communist Party: An Insider's Perspective |author=Cai Xia |work=Hoover Institution |date= |access-date=July 28, 2021 |url= https://www.hoover.org/research/china-us-relations-eyes-chinese-communist-party-insiders-perspective-zhong-gong-yan-zhong}}</ref>

In the [[Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations]] dated January 1, 1979, the United States transferred diplomatic recognition from [[Taipei]] to Beijing. The United States reiterated the Shanghai Communiqué's acknowledgment of the PRC position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China; Beijing acknowledged that the United States would continue to carry on commercial, cultural, and other unofficial contacts with Taiwan. The [[Taiwan Relations Act]] made the necessary changes in [[U.S. law]] to permit unofficial relations with Taiwan to continue.

In addition the severing relations with the Republic of China, the Carter administration also agreed to unilaterally pull out of the [[Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty]], withdraw U.S. military personnel from Taiwan, and gradually reduce arms sales to the Republic of China. There was widespread opposition in [[United States Congress|Congress]], notably from Republicans, due to the Republic of China's status as an [[anti-Communist]] ally in the Cold War. In ''[[Goldwater v. Carter]]'', [[Barry Goldwater]] made a failed attempt to stop Carter from terminating the mutual defense treaty.

[[File:Carter, Brzezinski and Vance at Camp David, 1977.jpg|thumb|216px|U.S. President [[Jimmy Carter]] with Brzezinski and [[Cyrus Vance]] at [[Camp David]] in 1977]]

====Arab-Israeli conflict====
{{main|Camp David Accords}}
[[File:Begin Brzezinski Camp David Chess.jpg|thumb|235px|Israeli Prime Minister [[Menachem Begin]] engages Brzezinski in a game of chess at Camp David]]
On October 10, 2007, Brzezinski along with other influential signatories sent a letter to President [[George W. Bush]] and Secretary of State [[Condoleezza Rice]] titled "Failure Risks Devastating Consequences." The letter was partly an advice and a warning of the failure of an upcoming<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-07-15-us-mideast_N.htm |work=USA Today |title=Bush announces Mideast peace conference |first=David |last=Jackson |date=July 17, 2007}}</ref> U.S.-sponsored Middle East conference scheduled for November 2007 between representatives of [[Israelis]] and [[Palestinians]]. The letter also suggested to engage in "a genuine dialogue with [[Hamas]]" rather than to isolate it further.<ref>{{cite journal|url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/20750|title='Failure Risks Devastating Consequences' by Zbigniew Brzezinski |author=Paul Volcker|journal=The New York Review of Books|date=November 8, 2007 |volume=54 |issue=17 |access-date=May 25, 2016}}</ref><!--
[[To be written]]...
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[[To be written]]...
===Poland, the Pope, and Solidarity===
http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=redux&s=szulc102878
http://www.debka.com/article.php?aid=1009

The New York Sun, April 4, 2005, Stephen Miller

Later in 1979 the Pope John Paul II traveled to Poland, where he was received rapturously by crowds that totaled a third of his homeland's population. His presence became a rallying point for the nation as its Communist regime seemed to be weakening in the face of popular dissent. The Kremlin was apoplectic, and a KGB inquiry into Wojtyla's election supposedly concluded that it was a German-American plot led by President Carter's national security adviser, the Polish-born Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Cardinal John Krol of Philadelphia.

In the wake of the Pope's departure, Poland's Solidarity movement arose, with the moral (and some said financial) support of the papacy. When Lech Walesa signed the agreement with the Polish government that legalised Solidarity in 1980, it was with a souvenir pen from the Pope's 1979 visit. {{citation needed|date=December 2013}}

Edmonton Journal (Alberta), April 3, 2005, Don Butler
Carter's Polish-born security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski had met Karol Wojtyla in 1976 when he was still an archbishop. The two corresponded regularly thereafter.

In 1980 Brzezinski began a dialogue with Czech bishop Jozef Tomko advising him of American financial and organisational support for the budding Solidarity movement. They discussed how the United States and the Vatican could work together to promote human rights in Poland without inciting a crackdown by authorities. {{citation needed|date=December 2013}}

Later that year Brzezinski phoned the pontiff to warn that the Soviets were preparing to invade Poland. According to Bernstein and Politi, the Pope quickly agreed to instruct his bishops to pressure governments in Western Europe to threaten the Soviets with isolation if they intervened. The Soviets later retreated. {{citation needed|date=December 2013}}

Thus began a pattern of co-operation and intelligence-sharing between Washington and the Vatican that would continue throughout the pivotal decade of the 1980s, when the Americans, according to the authors of His Holiness, covertly spent more than $50&nbsp;million US supporting Solidarity. {{citation needed|date=December 2013}}

Agence France Presse – English, April 2, 2005,
For the popular Komsomolskaya Pravda daily, "Several US politicians actively pushed (Karol) Wojtyla (John Paul II) forward to the Holy See, not least the famous anti-communist and Russophobe, (former US national security adviser) Zbignew Brzezinski. He thought "his man" in the Vatican would be well worth hundreds of divisions in the West's confrontation with the Soviet Bloc. And he was not wrong."-->

====Ending Soviet détente====
{{expand section|date=June 2008}}
Presidential Directive 18 on U.S. National Security, signed early in Carter's term, signaled a fundamental reassessment of the value of [[détente]], and set the United States on a course to quietly end Kissinger's strategy.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd18.pdf |title=Unclassified Memorandum from National Security Council |publisher=Jimmycarterlibrary.org |date=August 27, 1977 |access-date=December 31, 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110721044458/http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd18.pdf |archive-date=July 21, 2011 |url-status=dead  }}</ref>

Zbigniew Brzezinski played a major role in organizing Jimmy Carter's policies on the Soviet Union as a grand strategy.<ref name=":0" /> Brzezinski was a liberal Democrat and a committed anti-communist, favoring social justice while seeing world events in substantially Cold War terms.<ref>{{Cite web|date=May 28, 2017|title=Zbigniew Brzezinski obituary|url=http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/may/28/zbigniew-brzezinski-obituary|access-date=October 21, 2021|website=The Guardian|language=en}}</ref> Additionally, according to ''[[Foreign Policy]]'', "Brzezinski’s outlook was anti-Soviet, but he also insisted, like [[George F. Kennan|George Kennan]] before him, on the necessity of cultivating a strong West."<ref name=":0" />

Brzezinski stated that human rights could be used to put the Soviet Union ideologically on the defensive:

:I felt strongly that in the U.S.-Soviet competition the appeal of America as a free society could become an important asset, and I saw in human rights an opportunity to put the Soviet Union ideologically on the defensive....by actively pursuing this' commitment we could mobilize far greater global support and focus global attention on the glaring internal weaknesses of the Soviet system.<ref name="humanRightsWeapon">Zbigniew Brzezinski.  National Security Adviser to Jimmy Carter, US President (1977-1981). Power and Principle. Chapter 5.</ref>

Brzezinski's policy on Iran was thoroughly connected to the Soviet Union, because it was observed that each coup and revolution in 1979 had advanced Soviet power towards the Persian Gulf.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web|title=Jimmy Carter and the Second Yemenite War: A Smaller Shock of 1979? {{!}} Wilson Center|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/jimmy-carter-and-second-yemenite-war-smaller-shock-1979|access-date=November 21, 2021|website=www.wilsoncenter.org|date=June 28, 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=INTERVIEW WITH DR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI-(13/6/97) |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/interviews/episode-17/brzezinski1.html |access-date=2022-09-29 |website=nsarchive2.gwu.edu |quote=I think the crisis in Iran heightened our sense of vulnerability in so far as that part of the world is concerned. After all, Iran was one of the two pillars on which both stability and our political preeminence in the Persian Gulf rested. Once the Iranian pillar had collapsed, we were faced with the possibility that one way or another, before too long, we may have either a hostile Iran on the northern shore of the Persian Gulf facing us, or we might even have the Soviets there; and that possibility arose very sharply when the Soviets marched into Afghanistan. If they succeed in occupying it, Iran would be even more vulnerable to the Soviet Union, and in any case, the Persian Gulf would be accessible even to Soviet tactical air force from bases in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was viewed by us as of serious strategic consequence, irrespective of whatever may have been the Soviet motives for it. Our view was the objective consequences would be very serious, irrespective of what may or may not have been the subjective motives for the Soviet action.}}</ref> Brzezinski advised President Carter that the United States's "greatest vulnerability" lay on an arc "stretching from [[Chittagong]] through [[Islamabad]] to [[Aden]]."<ref>{{Cite web|title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy – Office of the Historian|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d100|access-date=November 21, 2021|website=history.state.gov}}</ref> This played a role in the [[Carter Doctrine]].<ref name=":1" />

====Nuclear strategy====
{{expand section|date=June 2012}}
[[Presidential Directive 59]], "Nuclear Employment Policy", dramatically changed U.S. targeting of nuclear weapons aimed at the Soviet Union. Implemented with the aid of Defense Secretary [[Harold Brown (Secretary of Defense)|Harold Brown]], this directive officially set the United States on a countervailing strategy.{{Clarify|date=August 2009}}<ref>[http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd59.pdf Nuclear Employment Policy] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130403031534/http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd59.pdf |date=April 3, 2013}}{{Failed verification|date=January 2012}}" (PDF)</ref>

====Arms control====
{{see also|Arms control}}Zbigniew Brzezinski utilized the United States' need to stability and progress in political relations with the Soviet Union to spur on the call for a new strategic arms treaty. On April 5, 1979, Brzezinski made a speech at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations where he stated that competition between the two powers and the nuclear arms race would not simply end because of the accord. According to him, the projected strategic arms treaty that would intend to impose limits on power such as missiles and bombers through the year 1989, would be what contributes to the progress and confidence in Soviet-American relations.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Times |first=Richard Burt Special to The New York |date=1979-04-05 |title=BRZEZINSKI DEFENDS ARMS TREATY IMPACT |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1979/04/05/archives/brzezinski-defends-arms-treaty-impact-says-new-agreement-with.html |access-date=2023-04-04 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>

He aimed to frame his arms control policy in a way that portrayed it as favorable to create, ensure, and maintain Soviet-American relations.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Garrison |first=Jean A. |date=December 2001 |title=Framing Foreign Policy Alternatives in the Inner Circle: President Carter, His Advisors, and the Struggle for the Arms Control Agenda |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0162-895X.00262 |journal=Political Psychology |language=en |volume=22 |issue=4 |pages=775–807 |doi=10.1111/0162-895X.00262 |issn=0162-895X}}</ref> Leading up to the presidential election in 1980, the Carter administration set sight on confronting Ronald Reagan on arms control agreements with Moscow. On this issue, Brzezinski believed that to continue moving safely ahead with talks to control atomic arms with Moscow, despite Soviet troops holding position in Afghanistan, the United States needed to remain firm in containing Soviet expansionism.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Getler |first=Michael |date=July 23, 1980 |title=Administration Willing to Confront Reagan on Arms Limits |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/07/23/administration-willing-to-confront-reagan-on-arms-limits/07de844e-dc73-4dad-ba0f-12e0b21c5f18/}}</ref>

Overall, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s arms control views leaned skeptical and mistrusting of Soviet motives in general and emphasized the central importance of the East-West competition. On the other hand, other officials such as the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance worked to pave a way for a wider US-Soviet relationship. Arms control in Brzezinski’s terms would take any opportunity to halt or reduce the momentum of the Soviet buildup.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Garrison |first=Jean A. |date=2001 |title=Framing Foreign Policy Alternatives in the Inner Circle: President Carter, His Advisors, and the Struggle for the Arms Control Agenda |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3792486 |journal=Political Psychology |volume=22 |issue=4 |pages=775–807 |doi=10.1111/0162-895X.00262 |jstor=3792486 |issn=0162-895X}}</ref>[[File:Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and the other members of Joint Chiefs of Staff.jpg|thumb|Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and the other members of Joint Chiefs of Staff during a National Security Council Meeting at The White House on October 5, 1978.]]
[[File:Carter Brezhnev sign SALT II.jpg|thumb|350px|President [[Jimmy Carter]] and Soviet General Secretary [[Leonid Brezhnev]] sign the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks ([[SALT II]]) treaty, June 18, 1979, in Vienna (Austria). Brzezinski is directly behind President Carter.]]