Editing Yom Kippur War (section)

==Sinai front==
{{overly detailed|date=June 2024}}
[[File:Hatzerim 290110 Sukhoi 7.jpg|thumb|upright=.8|Wreckage from an Egyptian [[Sukhoi Su-7]] shot down over the Sinai on 6 October, [[Israeli Air Force Museum]]]]

The Egyptians had prepared for an assault across the canal and deployed five divisions totaling 100,000 soldiers, 1,350 tanks and 2,000 guns and heavy mortars for the onslaught. Facing them were 450 soldiers of the [[16th Infantry Brigade (Israel)|Jerusalem Brigade]], spread out in 16 forts along the length of the canal. There were 290 Israeli tanks in all of Sinai, divided into three armored brigades,{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|loc=Prologue}} only one of which was deployed near the canal when hostilities commenced.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=62}}

Large [[bridgehead]]s were established on the east bank on 6 October. Israeli armoured forces launched counterattacks from 6 to 8 October, but they were often piecemeal and inadequately supported and were beaten back principally by Egyptians using portable anti-tank missiles. Between 9 and 12 October, the American response was a call for a cease-fire in place.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=109}} The Egyptian units generally would not advance beyond a shallow strip for fear of losing the protection of their SAM batteries, which were situated on the west bank of the canal. In the Six-Day War, the Israeli Air Force had pummeled the defenseless Arab armies; this time, Egypt had heavily fortified their side of the ceasefire lines with SAM batteries provided by the Soviet Union.<ref>{{cite web|last=Abudi |first=Joseph |title=The missile did not bend the wing |work=Journal of the Israeli Air Force |language=he |date=1 October 2003 |url=http://www.iaf.org.il/1213-21478-he/IAF.aspx |access-date=15 February 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110513095613/http://www.iaf.org.il/1213-21478-he/IAF.aspx |archive-date=13 May 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last=Abudi |first=Joseph |title=[What between 'challenge' and 'model'] |publisher=The Fisher Institute |language=he |date=October 2005 |url=http://www.fisherinstitute.org.il/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/num27.pdf |access-date=15 February 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110511232617/http://www.fisherinstitute.org.il/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/num27.pdf |archive-date=11 May 2011}}</ref>

On 9 October, the IDF chose to concentrate its reserves and build up its supplies while the Egyptians remained on the strategic defensive. Nixon and Kissinger held back on a full-scale resupply of arms to Israel. Short of supplies, the Israeli government reluctantly accepted a cease-fire in place on 12 October, but Sadat refused to do so.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=112}} The Soviets started an airlift of arms to Syria and Egypt. The American global interest was to prove that Soviet arms could not dictate the outcome of the fighting, by supplying Israel. With an airlift in full swing, Washington was prepared to wait until Israeli success on the battlefield might persuade the Arabs and the Soviets to bring the fighting to an end.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=114}}
[[File:Bridge Crossing.jpg|thumb|Egyptian forces crossing the Suez Canal]]

The Israelis decided to counterattack once Egyptian armor attempted to expand the bridgehead beyond the protective SAM umbrella. The riposte, codenamed [[Operation Gazelle]], was launched on 15 October. IDF forces spearheaded by Ariel Sharon's division broke through the Tasa corridor and crossed the Suez Canal to the north of the [[Great Bitter Lake]]. After intense fighting, the IDF progressed towards Cairo and advanced southwards on the east bank of the Great Bitter Lake and in the southern extent of the canal right up to [[Port Suez]].{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=116}} Israeli progress towards Cairo was brought to a halt by a fresh ceasefire on 24 October.{{citation needed|date=June 2022}}

===Egyptian attack===
{{main|Operation Badr (1973)}}
[[File:1973 sinai war maps.jpg|thumb|upright=1.8|The 1973 War in the Sinai, 6–15 October]]
Anticipating a swift Israeli [[Armored warfare|armored counterattack]] by three armored divisions,{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|pp=224–225}} the Egyptians had armed their assault force with large numbers of man-portable [[Anti-tank warfare|anti-tank]] weapons—[[rocket-propelled grenade]]s and the less numerous but more advanced [[9K11 Malyutka|Sagger]] guided missiles, which proved devastating to the first Israeli armored counterattacks. Each of the five infantry divisions that were to cross the canal had been equipped with RPG-7 rockets and [[RPG-43]] grenades and reinforced with an anti-tank guided missile battalion, as they would not have any armor support for nearly 12 hours.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|pp=225–226}} In addition, the Egyptians had built separate ramps at the crossing points, reaching as high as {{convert|21|m|ft}} to counter the Israeli sand wall, provide covering fire for the assaulting infantry and to counter the first Israeli armored counterattacks.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=189}}

The Egyptian Army put great effort into finding a quick and effective way of [[Operation Badr (1973)#Combat engineering|breaching the Israeli defenses]]. The Israelis had built large 18-metre (59&nbsp;foot) high sand walls with a 60-degree slope and reinforced with concrete at the water line. Egyptian engineers initially experimented with explosive charges and bulldozers to clear the obstacles, before a junior officer proposed using high pressure water cannons. The idea was tested and found to be a sound one, and several high pressure water cannons were imported from Britain and East Germany. The water cannons effectively breached the sand walls using water from the canal.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|pp=55–56}}
[[File:Israeli A-4 Skyhawk Wreckage.jpg|thumb|Wreckage of an Israeli [[A-4 Skyhawk]] on display in Egypt's war museum.]]
[[File:Egyptian MIG 21s during Yom Kippur War.jpg|thumb|Egyptian [[Sukhoi Su-7]] fighter jets conducting air strikes over the [[Bar Lev Line]] on 6 October]]
At 2:00&nbsp;pm on 6 October, [[Operation Badr (1973)|Operation Badr]] began with a large airstrike. More than 200 Egyptian aircraft conducted simultaneous strikes against three airbases, [[MIM-23 Hawk|Hawk]] missile batteries, three command centers, artillery positions, and several radar installations.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=28}} Airfields at [[Bir Gifgafa Airfield|Refidim]] and Bir Tamada were temporarily put out of service, and damage was inflicted on a Hawk battery at Ophir. The aerial assault was coupled with a barrage from more than 2,000 artillery pieces for a period of 53 minutes against the Bar Lev Line and rear area command posts and concentration bases.<ref name="Ramadan">{{cite book |first=Hamdy Sobhy |last=Abouseada |url=http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA379531&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf |title=The Crossing of the Suez Canal, 6 October 1973 (The Ramadan War) |page=9 |series=USAWC strategy research project |year=1980 |publisher=U.S. Army War College |isbn=978-0-89141-043-0 |oclc=45004992 |access-date=4 October 2008 |archive-date=29 July 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090729084424/http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA379531&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf |url-status=dead}}</ref>

Author Andrew McGregor claimed that the success of the first strike negated the need for a second planned strike.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=232}}{{sfnp|Hammad|2002|pp=90–92, 108}}<ref>{{cite book |last=McGregor |first=Andrew |title=A Military History of Modern Egypt: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War |publisher=Praeger Security International |location=Westport, Conn |year=2006 |isbn=978-0-275-98601-8 |url=https://archive.org/details/militaryhistoryo00andr}}, p. 278.</ref> Egypt acknowledged the loss of five aircraft during the attack. [[Kenneth Pollack]] wrote that 18 Egyptian aircraft were shot down, and that these losses prompted the cancellation of the second planned wave.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=108}} In [[Ofira Air Battle|one notable engagement]] during this period, a pair of Israeli [[McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II|F-4E Phantoms]] challenged 28 Egyptian MiGs over Sharm el-Sheikh and within half an hour, shot down seven or eight MiGs with no losses.{{sfnmp|Rabinovich|2004|1p=115|Pollack|2002|2p=125}} One of the Egyptian pilots killed was Captain [[Atef Sadat]], President Sadat's half-brother.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=81}}

Simultaneously, 14 Egyptian [[Tupolev Tu-16]] bombers attacked Israeli targets in the Sinai with [[KSR-2 (Russian rocket)|Kelt missiles]], while another two Egyptian Tupolevs fired two Kelt missiles at a radar station in central Israel.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=115}} One missile was shot down by a patrolling Israeli Mirage fighter, and the second fell into the sea. The attack was an attempt to warn Israel that Egypt could retaliate if it bombed targets deep within Egyptian territory.<ref>''The Yom Kippur War 1973: The Sinai''&nbsp;– Simon Dunstan and Kevin Lyles.</ref>

[[File:MirageIIIShotDownByMiG-21.jpg|thumb|upright=0.7|left|An Israeli [[Dassault Mirage III|Mirage III]] shot down by an Egyptian MiG-21]]

Under cover of the initial artillery barrage, the Egyptian assault force of 32,000 infantry began crossing the canal in twelve waves at five separate crossing areas, from 14:05 to 17:30, in what became known as [[Operation Badr (1973)#6 October – the crossing|The Crossing]].{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=228}} The Egyptians prevented Israeli forces from reinforcing the Bar Lev Line and proceeded to attack the Israeli fortifications. Meanwhile, engineers crossed over to breach the sand wall.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=229}}<ref>{{cite news|first=Galal |last=Nassar |url=http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/398/oct12.htm |title=Into the breach, dear friends |work=Al-Ahram Weekly |issue=398 |date=8–14 October 1998 |location=Cairo |at=para. 10 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030506231103/http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/398/oct12.htm |archive-date=6 May 2003}}</ref> The Israeli Air Force conducted [[air interdiction]] operations to try to prevent the bridges from being erected, but took losses from Egyptian SAM batteries. The air attacks were ineffective overall, as the sectional design of the bridges enabled quick repairs when hit.{{sfnp|Cohen|1994|p=354}}

Despite fierce resistance, the Israeli reserve brigade garrisoning the Bar-Lev forts was overwhelmed. According to Shazly, within six hours, fifteen strongpoints had been captured as Egyptian forces advanced several kilometres into the Sinai. Shazly's account was disputed by Kenneth Pollack, who noted that for the most part, the forts only fell to repeated assaults by superior forces or prolonged sieges over many days.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=11}} The northernmost fortification of the Bar Lev Line, code-named '[[Battles of Fort Budapest|Fort Budapest]]', withstood repeated assaults and remained in Israeli hands throughout the war. Once the bridges were laid, additional infantry with the remaining portable and recoilless anti-tank weapons began to cross the canal, while the first Egyptian tanks started to cross at 20:30.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=233}}

The Egyptians also attempted to land several heli-borne commando units in various areas in the Sinai to hamper the arrival of Israeli reserves. This attempt met with disaster as the Israelis shot down up to 20 helicopters, inflicting heavy casualties.{{sfnp|Haber|Schiff|2003|p=32}}{{sfnp|Schiff|1974|pp=291–294}} Israeli Major General (res.) [[Chaim Herzog]] placed Egyptian helicopter losses at 14.{{sfnp|Herzog|1975|p=156}} Other sources claim that "several" helicopters were downed with "total loss of life" and that the few commandos that did filter through were ineffectual and presented nothing more than a "nuisance".<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 169, 170.</ref> Kenneth Pollack asserted that despite their heavy losses, the Egyptian commandos fought exceptionally hard and created considerable panic, prompting the Israelis to take precautions that hindered their ability to concentrate on stopping the assault across the canal.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=110}}

Egyptian forces advanced approximately {{convert|4|to|5|km|mi|frac=2|abbr=on}} into the [[Sinai Desert]] with two armies (both corps-sized by western standards, included the [[2nd Infantry Division (Egypt)|2nd Infantry Division]] in the northern Second Army). By the following morning, some 850 tanks had crossed the canal.<ref name="Ramadan" /> In his account of the war, [[Saad El Shazly]] noted that by the morning of 7 October, the Egyptians had lost 280 soldiers and 20 tanks, though this account is disputed.<ref name="autogeneratedil">{{cite web |url=http://www.iaf.org.il/Templates/FlightLog/FlightLog.aspx?lang=EN&lobbyID=40&folderID=48&subfolderID=322&docfolderID=939&docID=13279&docType=EVENT |title=Israel Air Force |publisher=Iaf.org.il |access-date=28 March 2010}}</ref>{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=108}}

[[File:Ofira Air Battle.jpg|thumb|An Egyptian [[MiG-17]] shot down during the [[Ofira Air Battle|dogfight over Sharm el-Sheikh]]]]

Most Israeli soldiers defending the Bar Lev Line became casualties, and some 200 were taken prisoner.{{sfnmp|Shazly|2003|1p=244|Hammad|2002|2p=133|3a1=Nicolle|3a2=Cooper|3y=2004|3p=40}} In the subsequent days, some defenders of the Bar Lev Line managed to break through the Egyptian encirclement and return to their lines or were extracted during later Israeli counterattacks. For the next several days, the IAF played a minimal role in the fighting, largely because it was needed to deal with the simultaneous, and ultimately more threatening, Syrian attack in the Golan Heights.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=112}}

Egyptian forces then consolidated their initial positions. On 7 October, the bridgeheads were enlarged an additional {{convert|4|km|mi|frac=2|abbr=on}}, at the same time repulsing Israeli counterattacks. In the north, the Egyptian 18th Division attacked the town of [[El-Qantarah el-Sharqiyya]], engaging Israeli forces in and around the town. The fighting there was conducted at close quarters, and was sometimes hand-to-hand. The Egyptians were forced to clear the town building by building. By evening, most of the town was in Egyptian hands. El-Qantarah was completely cleared by the next morning.{{sfnp|Hammad|2002|pp=712–714}}

Meanwhile, the Egyptian commandos airdropped on 6 October began encountering Israeli reserves the following morning. Both sides suffered heavy losses, but the commandos were at times successful in delaying the movement of Israeli reserves to the front. These special operations often led to confusion and anxiety among Israeli commanders, who commended the Egyptian commandos.{{sfnp|Hammad|2002|pp=717–722}}<ref>{{harvp|Gawrych|1996|p=38}}. In his memoirs, Adan, commenting on one of the commando operations in the north, noted that "Natke's experience fighting the stubborn Egyptian commandos who tried to cut off the road around Romani showed again that this was not the Egyptian Army we had crushed in four days in 1967. We were now dealing with a well-trained enemy, fighting with skill and dedication."</ref> This view was contradicted by another source that stated that few commandos made it to their objectives, and were usually nothing more than a nuisance.<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 169–170.</ref> According to [[Abraham Rabinovich]], only the commandos near Baluza and those blocking the road to Fort Budapest had measurable success. Of the 1,700 Egyptian commandos inserted behind Israeli lines during the war, 740 were killed—many in downed helicopters—and 330 taken prisoner.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=354}}

===Failed Israeli counter-attack===
[[File:destroyed m60.jpg|thumb|An Israeli [[M60 Patton]] tank destroyed in the Sinai]]

On 7 October, David Elazar visited Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Israeli [[Southern Command (Israel)|Southern Command]]—who had only taken the position three months before at the retirement of Ariel Sharon—and met with Israeli commanders. The Israelis planned a cautious counterattack for the following day by [[Avraham Adan]]'s [[162nd Division (IDF)|162nd Armored Division]].{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|pp=41–42}} The same day, the IAF carried out [[Operation Tagar]], aiming to neutralize [[Egyptian Air Force]] bases and its missile defense shield.<ref name="Dunstan and Lyles, p. 64">Dunstan and Lyles, p. 64.</ref><ref name="israeled.org">[http://www.israeled.org/PrimarySource/Memcon_Dinitz_Kissinger_100773.pdf] {{dead link|date=February 2016}}</ref>

Seven Egyptian airbases were damaged, with the loss of two [[A-4 Skyhawk]]s and their pilots. Two more planned attacks were called off because of the increasing need for air power on the Syrian front. The IAF carried out additional air attacks against Egyptian forces on the east bank of the canal, reportedly inflicting heavy losses. Israeli jets had carried out hundreds of sorties against Egyptian targets by the following day, but the Egyptian SAM shield inflicted heavy losses. IAF aircraft losses amounted to three aircraft for every 200 sorties, an unsustainable rate. The Israelis responded by rapidly devising new tactics to thwart the Egyptian air defenses.<ref name="Dunstan and Lyles, p. 64" /><ref name="israeled.org" />

[[File:Egyptian and Israeli Tanks Destroyed Near the Suez Canal During Yom Kippur War, 1973.jpg|thumb|right|Wrecks of Israeli and Egyptian armour stand directly opposed one another in a testament to the ferocity of the combat near the Suez Canal.]]
On 8 October, after Elazar had left, Gonen changed the plans on the basis of unduly optimistic field reports. Adan's division was composed of three brigades totaling 183 tanks. One of the brigades was still en route to the area, and would participate in the attack by noon, along with a supporting mechanized infantry brigade with an additional 44 tanks.{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|pp=43–44}}{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=234}} The Israeli counterattack was in the direction of the Bar Lev strongpoints opposite the city of [[Ismailia]], against entrenched Egyptian infantry. In a series of ill-coordinated attacks which were met by stiff resistance from Egyptian tanks, artillery, and infantry armed with anti-tank rockets, the Israelis were repulsed with heavy losses.{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|pp=44–52}}

An initial Israeli attack by some 25 tanks broke through the first Egyptian troops and managed to come within {{convert|800|m|ft}} of the canal before coming under withering fire. The Israelis lost 18 tanks within minutes and most of the commanders were killed or wounded. This was followed by a second attack by elements of two Israeli brigades, which had communication and coordination problems. The Egyptians allowed the Israelis to advance and then encircled them in a prepared [[kill zone]] before opening fire, wiping out most of the Israeli force within 13 minutes. The Egyptians destroyed over 50 Israeli tanks and captured eight intact.{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|pp=44–52}}

That afternoon, Egyptian forces advanced once more to deepen their bridgeheads, and as a result the Israelis lost several strategic positions. Further Israeli attacks to regain the lost ground proved futile.{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|pp=44–52}} Towards nightfall, an Egyptian counterattack was repulsed with the loss of 50 Egyptian tanks by the Israeli 143rd Armored Division, which was led by Ariel Sharon, who had been reinstated as a division commander at the outset of the war. Gawrych, citing Egyptian sources, documented Egyptian tank losses up to 13 October at 240.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|pp=192, 208}}

===Temporary stabilization===

[[File:Israeli Tank Battles Egyptian Forces in the Sinai Desert - Flickr - Israel Defense Forces.jpg|thumb|left|An Israeli [[Centurion tank]] operating in the Sinai]]
According to Herzog, by 9 October the front lines had stabilized. The Egyptians were unable to advance further, and Egyptian armored attacks on 9 and 10 October were repulsed with heavy losses.{{sfnp|Herzog|1982|pp=255–256}} However, this claim was disputed by Shazly, who claimed that the Egyptians continued to advance and improve their positions well into 10 October. He pointed to one engagement, which involved elements of the 1st Infantry Brigade, attached to the 19th Division, which captured Ayoun Mousa, south of Suez.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=241}}

The Egyptian 1st Mechanized Brigade launched a failed attack southward along the [[Gulf of Suez]] in the direction of [[Ras Sudar]]. Leaving the safety of the SAM umbrella, the force was attacked by Israeli aircraft and suffered heavy losses.{{sfnmp|Shazly|2003|1p=241|Herzog|1982|2p=256}}

[[File:IDF Troops with Captured Egyptian Armour During Yom Kippur War, 1973.jpg|thumb|Abandoned or destroyed Egyptian armour being collected by IDF personnel, 12 October 1973]] 
Between 10 and 13 October, both sides refrained from any large-scale actions, and the situation was relatively stable. Both sides launched small-scale attacks, and the Egyptians used helicopters to land commandos behind Israeli lines. Some Egyptian helicopters were shot down, and those commando forces that managed to land were quickly destroyed by Israeli troops. In one key engagement on 13 October, a particularly large Egyptian incursion was stopped and close to a hundred Egyptian commandos were killed.{{sfnp|Sharon|2011}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}

===Battle of the Sinai===

On 14 October, an engagement now known as the [[Battle of the Sinai (1973)|Battle of the Sinai]] took place. In preparation for the attack, Egyptian helicopters set down 100 commandos near the Lateral Road to disrupt the Israeli rear. An Israeli reconnaissance unit quickly subdued them, killing 60 and taking numerous prisoners. Still bruised by the extensive losses their commandos had suffered on the opening day of the war, the Egyptians were unable or unwilling to implement further commando operations that had been planned in conjunction with the armored attack.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=353}}

General Shazly strongly opposed any eastward advance that would leave his armor without adequate air cover. He was overruled by General Ismail and Sadat, whose aims were to seize the strategic Mitla and Gidi Passes and the Israeli nerve centre at Refidim, which they hoped would relieve pressure on the Syrians (who were by now on the defensive) by forcing Israel to shift divisions from the Golan to the Sinai.{{sfnmp|Herzog|1982|1p=258|Shazly|2003|2p=317}}
[[File:1973 sinai war maps2.jpg|thumb|upright=1.8|The 1973 War in the Sinai, 15–24 October]]
The 2nd and 3rd Armies were ordered to attack eastward in six simultaneous thrusts over a broad front, leaving behind five infantry divisions to hold the bridgeheads. The attacking forces, consisting of 800–1,000 tanks would not have SAM cover, so the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) was tasked with their defense against Israeli aerial attacks. Armored and mechanized units initiated the attack on 14 October with artillery support. They were up against 700–750 Israeli tanks.{{sfnp|Schiff|1974|p=310}}<ref name="abc-clio1" />

In the event, the Egyptian armored thrust suffered heavy losses. Instead of concentrating forces of maneuvering, except for the [[wadi]] thrust, Egyptian units launched head-on-attacks against the waiting Israeli defenses.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=335}} At least 250 Egyptian tanks and some 200 armored vehicles were destroyed.{{sfnp|Haber|Schiff|2003|p=144}}{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=117}}<ref>{{cite book|first=Martin |last=Van Creveld |url=http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/courses/ise817/papers/creveld_military_lessons.pdf |title=Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives |publisher=Sage |year=1975 |page=17 |isbn=978-0-8039-0562-7 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140513183257/http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/courses/ise817/papers/creveld_military_lessons.pdf |archive-date=13 May 2014}}</ref><ref name="autogenerated260">Herzog, ''The Arab–Israeli Wars'', Random House, p. 260.</ref> Egyptian casualties exceeded 1,000.<ref name="autogenerated260" /> Fewer than 40 Israeli tanks were hit, and all but six of them were repaired by Israeli maintenance crews and returned to service,{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=117}} while Israeli casualties numbered 665.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.historynet.com/yom-kippur-war-embattled-israeli-bridgehead-at-chinese-farm.htm|title=Yom Kippur War: Embattled Israeli Bridgehead at Chinese Farm|date=21 August 2006 |website=HistoryNet}}</ref>

Kenneth Pollack credited a successful Israeli commando raid early on 14 October against an Egyptian signals-intercept site at Jebel Ataqah with seriously disrupting Egyptian command and control and contributing to its breakdown during the engagement.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|pp=116, 126 & 129}} Israeli intelligence had also detected signs that the Egyptians were gearing up for a major armored thrust as early as 12 October.{{sfnp|Herzog|1982|pp=257–258}}

===Israeli breakthrough and crossing of the Suez Canal===
[[File:143th Division during Yom Kippur War. VI.jpg|thumb|Israeli tanks crossing the Suez Canal]]
At this point, General Sharon advocated an immediate crossing at Deversoir at the northern edge of Great Bitter Lake. Earlier, on 9 October, a reconnaissance force attached to Colonel [[Amnon Reshef]]'s Brigade had detected a gap between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies in this sector.<ref name="abc-clio1">{{cite web |first=David T. |last=Zabecki |url=http://www.historyandtheheadlines.abc-clio.com/ContentPages/ContentPage.aspx?entryId=1281396&currentSection=1271019&productid=16 |title=Arab–Israeli Wars: 60 Years of Conflict |at=Chinese Farm, Battle of The |publisher=Historyandtheheadlines.abc-clio.com |date=3 December 2008 |access-date=28 March 2010}}</ref> According to General Gamasy, the gap had been spotted by an American [[SR-71]] spy plane.{{sfnp|el-Gamasy|1993|p=276}}

The Israelis followed the Egyptian failed attack of 14 October with a multidivisional counterattack through the gap between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies. Sharon's 143rd Division, now reinforced with a paratroop brigade commanded by Colonel [[Danny Matt]], was tasked with establishing bridgeheads on the east and west banks of the canal. The 162nd and 252nd Armored Divisions, commanded by Generals Avraham Adan and Kalman Magen, respectively, would then cross through the breach to the west bank of the canal and swing southward, encircling the 3rd Army.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=118}}

On the night of 15 October, 750 of Colonel Matt's paratroopers crossed the canal in rubber dinghies.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=374–375}} They were soon joined by tanks, ferried on motorized rafts, and additional infantry. The force encountered no resistance initially and fanned out in raiding parties, attacking supply convoys, SAM sites, logistic centers and anything else of military value, with priority given to the SAMs. Attacks on SAM sites punched a hole in the Egyptian anti-aircraft screen and enabled the IAF to strike Egyptian ground targets more aggressively.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=389–391}}

On the night of 15 October, 20 Israeli tanks and seven [[Armored personnel carrier|APCs]] under the command of Colonel Haim Erez crossed the canal and penetrated {{convert|12|km}} into Egypt, taking the Egyptians by surprise. For the first 24 hours, Erez's force attacked SAM sites and military columns with impunity, including a [[1973 raid on Egyptian missile bases|major raid on Egyptian missile bases]] on 16 October, in which three Egyptian missile bases were destroyed, along with several tanks, for no Israeli losses. On the morning of 17 October, the force was attacked by the 23rd Egyptian Armored Brigade, but managed to repulse the attack. By this time, the Syrians no longer posed a credible threat and the Israelis were able to shift their air power to the south in support of the offensive.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=511}} The combination of a weakened Egyptian SAM umbrella and a greater concentration of Israeli fighter-bombers meant that the IAF was capable of greatly increasing sorties against Egyptian military targets, including convoys, armor and airfields. The Egyptian bridges across the canal were damaged in Israeli air and artillery attacks.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}

Israeli jets began attacking Egyptian SAM sites and radars, prompting General Ismail to withdraw much of the Egyptians' air defense equipment. This in turn gave the IAF still greater freedom to operate in Egyptian airspace. Israeli jets also attacked and destroyed underground communication cables at [[Banha]] in the [[Nile Delta]], forcing the Egyptians to transmit selective messages by radio, which could be intercepted. Aside from the cables at Banha, Israel refrained from attacking economic and strategic infrastructure following an Egyptian threat to retaliate against Israeli cities with [[Scud missile]]s. Israeli aircraft bombed Egyptian Scud batteries at [[Port Said]] several times.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|pp=124–125}}

The Egyptian Air Force attempted to interdict IAF sorties and attack Israeli ground forces, but suffered heavy losses in dogfights and from Israeli air defenses, while inflicting light aircraft losses. The heaviest air battles took place over the northern Nile Delta, where the Israelis repeatedly attempted to destroy Egyptian airbases.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|pp=124–125}} Although the Israelis tended to come out on top in aerial battles, one notable exception was the [[Air battle of Mansoura]], when an Israeli raid against the Egyptian airbases of [[Tanta]] and [[Mansoura]] was repulsed by Egyptian fighter aircraft.<ref>{{cite web |title=Battle of el-Mansourah |url=http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_266.shtml |author=Dr. David Nicolle & Sherif Sharmy |publisher=Air Combat Information Group (ACIG) |date=24 September 2003 |access-date=2009-05-01 |df=dmy-all |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090414094408/http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_266.shtml |archive-date=14 April 2009 |url-status=usurped}}</ref>

===Securing the bridgehead===
[[File:Position with RPD Light Machinegun Overlooking Suez Canal During Yom Kippur War.jpg|thumb|150px|left|An Israeli position with captured RPD machine gun overlooks the Suez Canal on 16 October 1973]]
Despite the success the Israelis were having on the west bank, Generals Bar-Lev and Elazar ordered Sharon to concentrate on securing the bridgehead on the east bank. He was ordered to clear the roads leading to the canal as well as a position known as the [[Battle of the Chinese Farm|Chinese Farm]], just north of Deversoir, the Israeli crossing point. Sharon objected and requested permission to expand and break out of the bridgehead on the west bank, arguing that such a maneuver would cause the collapse of Egyptian forces on the east bank. But the Israeli high command was insistent, believing that until the east bank was secure, forces on the west bank could be cut off. Sharon was overruled by his superiors and relented.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=393}}

On 16 October, he dispatched Amnon Reshef's Brigade to attack the Chinese Farm. Other IDF forces attacked entrenched Egyptian forces overlooking the roads to the canal. After three days of bitter and close-quarters fighting, the Israelis succeeded in dislodging the numerically superior Egyptian forces. The Israelis lost about 300 dead, 1,000 wounded, and 56 tanks. The Egyptians suffered heavier casualties, including 118 tanks destroyed and 15 captured.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=425}}{{sfnp|Sharon|2011}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}{{sfnmp|Rabinovich|2004|1p=427|Pollack|2002|2pp=118–119|Hammad|2002|3pp=335–408|Gawrych|1996|4pp=62–64}}

===Egyptian response to the Israeli crossing===
[[File:IDF Ismailia Clash.jpg|thumb|Israeli soldiers during the [[Battle of Ismailia]]. One of them has a captured Egyptian [[RPG-7]].]]

The Egyptians, meanwhile, failed to grasp the extent and magnitude of the Israeli crossing, nor did they appreciate its intent and purpose. This was partly due to attempts by Egyptian field commanders to obfuscate reports concerning the Israeli crossing{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=129}} and partly due to a false assumption that the canal crossing was merely a diversion for a major IDF offensive targeting the right flank of the Second Army.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=119}} Consequently, on 16 October General Shazly ordered the 21st Armored Division to attack southward and the T-62-equipped 25th Independent Armored Brigade to attack northward in a pincer action to eliminate the perceived threat to the Second Army.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|pp=119–120}}

The Egyptians failed to scout the area and were unaware that by now, Adan's 162nd Armored Division was in the vicinity. Moreover, the 21st and 25th failed to coordinate their attacks, allowing General Adan's Division to meet each force separately. Adan first concentrated his attack on the 21st Armored Division, destroying 50–60 Egyptian tanks and forcing the remainder to retreat. He then turned southward and ambushed the 25th Independent Armored Brigade, destroying 86 of its 96 tanks and all of its APCs, while losing three tanks.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|pp=119–120}}

[[File:M48 tank wrecks at Suez Canal 1981.jpg|thumb|Destroyed Israeli [[M48 Patton]] tanks on the banks of the Suez Canal]]

Egyptian artillery shelled the Israeli bridge over the canal on the morning of 17 October, scoring several hits. The Egyptian Air Force launched repeated raids, some with up to 20 aircraft, to take out the bridge and rafts, damaging the bridge. The Egyptians had to shut down their SAM sites during these raids, allowing Israeli fighters to intercept the Egyptians. The Egyptians lost 16 planes and seven helicopters, while the Israelis lost six planes.<ref>Boyne, p. 181</ref>

The bridge was damaged, and the Israeli Paratroop Headquarters, which was near the bridge, was also hit; its commander and his deputy were wounded. During the night, the bridge was repaired, but only a trickle of Israeli forces was able to cross. According to Chaim Herzog, the Egyptians continued attacking the bridgehead until the ceasefire, using artillery and mortars to fire tens of thousands of shells into the area of the crossing. Egyptian aircraft attempted to bomb the bridge every day, and helicopters launched suicide missions, making attempts to drop barrels of napalm on the bridge and bridgehead.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}

The bridges were damaged multiple times, and had to be repaired at night. The attacks caused heavy casualties, and many tanks were sunk when their rafts were hit. Egyptian commandos and frogmen with armored support launched a ground attack against the bridgehead, which was repulsed with the loss of 10 tanks. Two subsequent Egyptian counterattacks were also beaten back.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}

After the failure of the 17 October counterattacks, the Egyptian General Staff slowly began to realize the magnitude of the Israeli offensive. Early on 18 October, the Soviets showed Sadat satellite imagery of Israeli forces operating on the west bank. Alarmed, Sadat dispatched Shazly to the front to assess the situation first-hand. He no longer trusted his field commanders to provide accurate reports.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=120}} Shazly confirmed that the Israelis had at least one division on the west bank and were widening their bridgehead. He advocated withdrawing most of Egypt's armor from the east bank to confront the growing Israeli threat on the west bank. Sadat rejected this recommendation outright and even threatened Shazly with a court martial.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=401}} Ahmad Ismail Ali recommended that Sadat push for a ceasefire so as to prevent the Israelis from exploiting their successes.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=120}}

===Israeli forces across the Suez===
[[File:Yom Kippur War. Force Naftul. MXX.jpg|thumb|right|A knocked-out Egyptian tank]]
Israeli forces were by now pouring across the canal on two bridges, including one of Israeli design, and motorized rafts. Israeli engineers under Brigadier-General {{ill|Dan Even|he|דן אבן}} had worked under heavy Egyptian fire to set up the bridges, and over 100 were killed and hundreds more wounded.<ref>Dunstan, p. 107.</ref> The crossing was difficult because of Egyptian artillery fire, though by 4:00&nbsp;am, two of Adan's brigades were on the west bank of the canal. On the morning of 18 October, Sharon's forces on the west bank launched an [[Battle of Ismailia|offensive]] toward Ismailia, slowly pushing back the Egyptian paratroop brigade occupying the sand rampart northward to enlarge the bridgehead.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=223}} Some of his units attempted to move west, but were stopped at the crossroads in Nefalia. Adan's division rolled south toward Suez City while Magen's division pushed west toward Cairo and south toward Adabiya.{{sfnmp|Herzog|1975|1pp=236–237|Pollack|2002|2p=122}}

On 19 October, one of Sharon's brigades continued to push the Egyptian paratroopers north towards Ismailia until the Israelis were within {{convert|8|or|10|km|mi|abbr=on|0}} of the city. Sharon hoped to seize the city and thereby sever the logistical and supply lines for most of the Egyptian Second Army. Sharon's second brigade began to cross the canal. The brigade's forward elements moved to the Abu Sultan Camp, from where they moved north to take Orcha, an Egyptian logistics base defended by a commando battalion. Israeli infantrymen cleared the trenches and bunkers, often engaging in hand-to-hand combat, as tanks moved alongside them and fired into the trench sections to their front. The position was secured before nightfall. More than 300 Egyptians were killed and 50 taken prisoner, while the Israelis lost 16 dead.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=428–429}}

The fall of Orcha caused the collapse of the Egyptian defensive line, allowing more Israeli troops to get onto the sand rampart. There, they were able to fire in support of Israeli troops facing Missouri Ridge, an Egyptian-occupied position on the [[Bar-Lev Line]] that could pose a threat to the Israeli crossing. On the same day, Israeli paratroopers participating in Sharon's drive pushed the Egyptians back far enough for the Israeli bridges to be out of sight of Egyptian artillery observers, though the Egyptians continued shelling the area.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=428–429}}

As the Israelis pushed towards Ismailia, the Egyptians fought a delaying battle, retreating into defensive positions further north as they came under increasing pressure from the Israeli ground offensive, coupled with airstrikes. On 21 October, one of Sharon's brigades was occupying the city's outskirts, but facing fierce resistance from Egyptian paratroopers and commandos. The same day, Sharon's last remaining unit on the east bank attacked Missouri Ridge. Shmuel Gonen had demanded Sharon capture the position, and Sharon had reluctantly ordered the attack. The assault was preceded by an air attack that caused hundreds of Egyptian soldiers to flee and thousands of others to dig in.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979|p=120}}{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=445}}

One Israeli battalion then attacked from the south, destroying 20 tanks and overrunning infantry positions before being halted by [[9M14 Malyutka|Sagger missiles]] and minefields. Another battalion attacked from the southwest and inflicted heavy losses on the Egyptians, but its advance was halted after eight tanks were knocked out. The surviving Israeli soldiers managed to hold off an Egyptian infantry assault while losing two soldiers before surrendering. Two of the Israeli soldiers managed to hide and escape back to Israeli lines. The Israelis managed to occupy one-third of Missouri Ridge. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan countermanded orders from Sharon's superiors to continue the attack.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979|p=120}}{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=445}} However, the Israelis continued to expand their holdings on the east bank. According to the Israelis, the IDF bridgehead was {{convert|40|km|abbr=on}} wide and {{convert|32|km|abbr=on}} deep by the end of 21 October.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979|p=121}}

[[File:IDF KIA Ismailia.jpg|thumbnail|Egyptian soldiers gather the bodies of Israeli soldiers killed during the Battle of Ismailia.]]
On 22 October, Ismailia's Egyptian defenders were occupying their last line of defense. At around 10:00&nbsp;am, the Israelis renewed the attack, moving toward Jebel Mariam, Abu 'Atwa and Nefisha. The paratroopers at Jebel Mariam became engaged in intense fighting but, with their advantageous position, were able to repel the attack by late afternoon. Meanwhile, the Israelis concentrated artillery and mortar fire against the Sa'iqa positions at Abu 'Atwa and Nefisha. At noon, advance Israeli elements engaged with a Sa'iqa reconnaissance unit, and the Israelis lost two tanks and a half-track. At 1:00&nbsp;pm, an Israeli paratrooper company attacked Abu 'Atwa without first scouting ahead, and was ambushed and annihilated. The attack ended after paratroopers suffered over fifty casualties and lost four tanks.

At the same time, two tank companies and mechanized infantry attacked Nefisha, supported with close air support. The Egyptian Sa'iqa commando battalion in charge of Nefisha managed to repel the attack after prolonged, heavy fighting that closed to very short distances. The Israelis lost three tanks, two half-tracks, and a large number of men. For their part the Sa'iqa commandos at Nefisha lost 24 killed, including four officers, and 42 wounded, including three officers. [[Edgar O'Ballance]] mentions a counterattack by the Sa'iqa which took place during the afternoon and pushed some of Sharon's troops back along the Sweetwater Canal.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979|p=249}} The Israeli attack had been thoroughly routed.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=220}}<ref name=Dupuy529>Dupuy (2002), p.529</ref>

Israeli forces failed to get behind Ismailia and encircle the city. The Israeli advance on Ismailia was stopped {{convert|10|km|mi|0|abbr=on}} south of the city. The IDF failed to cut supplies for the Egyptian Second Army or to occupy [[Ismailia]]. The Egyptians registered a tactical and strategic victory in the defense of Ismailia, stopping an encirclement of their large forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal and ensuring their supply lines remained open.

On the northern front, the Israelis also attacked Port Said, facing Egyptian troops and a 900-strong [[Tunisia]]n unit, who fought a defensive battle.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979|p=122}} The Egyptian government claimed that the city was repeatedly bombed by Israeli jets, and that hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded.<ref>''[[The Leader-Post]]'', 25 October 1973, issue.</ref>

Adan and Magen moved south, decisively defeating the Egyptians in a series of engagements, though they often encountered determined Egyptian resistance, and both sides suffered heavy casualties.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=223}} Adan advanced towards the Sweetwater Canal area, planning to break out into the surrounding desert and hit the Geneifa Hills, where many SAM sites were located. Adan's three armored brigades fanned out, with one advancing through the Geneifa Hills, another along a parallel road south of them, and the third advancing towards Mina. Adan's brigades met resistance from dug-in Egyptian forces in the Sweetwater Canal area's [[green belt|greenbelt]]. Adan's other brigades were also held by a line of Egyptian military camps and installations. Adan was also harassed by the Egyptian Air Force.<ref name="Boyne, p. 183">Boyne, p. 183.</ref>

The Israelis slowly advanced, bypassing Egyptian positions whenever possible. After being denied air support due to the presence of two SAM batteries that had been brought forward, Adan sent two brigades to attack them. The brigades slipped past the dug-in Egyptian infantry, moving out from the greenbelt for more than {{convert|8|km|mi|0|abbr=on}}, and fought off multiple Egyptian counterattacks. From a distance of {{convert|4|km|mi|frac=2|abbr=on}}, they shelled and destroyed the SAMs, allowing the IAF to provide Adan with close air support.<ref name="Boyne, p. 183"/> Adan's troops advanced through the greenbelt and fought their way to the Geneifa Hills, clashing with scattered Egyptian, Kuwaiti and Palestinian troops. The Israelis clashed with an Egyptian armored unit at Mitzeneft and destroyed multiple SAM sites. Adan also captured [[RAF Fayid|Fayid Airport]], which was subsequently prepared by Israeli crews to serve as a supply base and to fly out wounded soldiers.<ref>Hoyne, p. 205.</ref>

{{convert|10|mi|km|order=flip|spell=In}} west of the Bitter Lake, Colonel Natke Nir's brigade overran an Egyptian artillery brigade that had been participating in the shelling of the Israeli bridgehead. Scores of Egyptian artillerymen were killed and many more taken prisoner. Two Israeli soldiers were also killed, including the son of General [[Moshe Gidron]]. Meanwhile, Magen's division moved west and then south, covering Adan's flank and eventually moving south of Suez City to the Gulf of Suez.<ref>Boyne, p. 214</ref>

===The ceasefire and further battles===
[[File:Yom Kippur War map.svg|thumb|upright=1.2|When the ceasefire came into effect, Israel had lost territory on the east side of the Suez Canal to Egypt&nbsp;– {{color box|#E0584E}}, but gained territory west of the canal and beyond the Golan Heights&nbsp;– {{color box|#A08070}}.]]
[[File:Soldier Ismailiya.jpg|thumb|upright|alt= A soldier with an Uzi next to a road sign reading "ISMAILIA 36"| An Israeli soldier on the road to [[Ismailia]]]]

The [[United Nations Security Council]] passed (14–0) [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 338|Resolution 338]] calling for a ceasefire, largely negotiated between the U.S. and Soviet Union, on 22 October. It called upon the belligerents to immediately cease all military activity. The cease-fire was to come into effect 12 hours later at {{nowrap|6:52 pm}} Israeli time.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=452}} Because this was after dark, it was impossible for [[satellite]] [[surveillance]] to determine where the front lines were when the fighting was supposed to stop.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=458}} U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger intimated to Prime Minister Meir that he would not object to offensive action during the night before the ceasefire was to come into effect.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-54.pdf |title=22 October Memorandum of Conversation between Meir and Kissinger |access-date=28 March 2010}}</ref>

Several minutes before the ceasefire came into effect, three Scud missiles [[October 22 Scud missile attack|were fired]] at Israeli targets by either Egyptian forces or Soviet personnel in Egypt. This was the first combat use of Scud missiles. One Scud targeted the port of [[Arish]] and two targeted the Israeli bridgehead on the Suez Canal. One hit an Israeli supply convoy and killed seven soldiers.<ref>Adan, p. 284.</ref> When the time for the ceasefire arrived, Sharon's division had failed to capture Ismailia and cut off the Second Army's supply lines, but Israeli forces were just a few hundred metres short of their southern goal—the last road linking Cairo and Suez.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|pp=73–74}}

Adan's drive south had left Israeli and Egyptian units scattered throughout the battlefield, with no clear lines between them. As Egyptian and Israeli units tried to regroup, regular firefights broke out. During the night, Elazar reported that the Egyptians were attacking in an attempt to regain land at various locations, and that nine Israeli tanks had been destroyed. He asked permission from Dayan to respond to the attacks and Dayan agreed. Israel then resumed its drive south.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=463}}

It is unclear which side fired first<ref name="collapse">{{cite web |title=The October War and U.S. Policy |at=The Collapse of the Ceasefire |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/#VII |access-date=2023-03-10 |df=dmy-all |website=nsarchive2.gwu.edu |editor=William Burr |date=7 October 2003}}</ref> but Israeli field commanders used the skirmishes as justification to resume the attacks. When Sadat protested alleged Israeli truce violations, Israel said that Egyptian troops had fired first. [[William B. Quandt]] noted that regardless of who fired the first post-ceasefire shot, it was the Israeli Army that was advancing beyond the 22 October ceasefire lines.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=120}}

Adan resumed his attack on 23 October.{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|pp=73}} Israeli troops finished the drive south, captured the last ancillary road south of the port of Suez, and encircled the Egyptian Third Army east of the Suez Canal.{{sfnp|Hammad|2002|pp=483, 487–490}} The Israelis then transported enormous amounts of military equipment across the canal, which Egypt claimed was in violation of the ceasefire.<ref name="collapse" /> Egyptian aircraft launched repeated attacks in support of the Third Army, sometimes in groups of up to 30 planes, but took severe losses.{{sfnp|Nicolle|Cooper|2004}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}

=== Battle of Suez ===
{{Main|Battle of Suez}}

Israeli armor and paratroopers also entered Suez in an attempt to capture the city, but failed after being confronted by Egyptian soldiers and hastily raised local militia forces. They were surrounded and the armored column was ambushed and severely hit, while the paratroopers came under heavy fire and many of them became trapped inside a local building. The armored column and part of the infantry force were evacuated during the day, while the main contingent of the paratrooper force eventually managed to dash out of the city and make their way back to Israeli lines. The Israelis had lost 80 dead and 120 wounded, with minimal Egyptian casualties, for no tactical gain. Israel made two more probes into Suez, one on the 25th and one on the 28th, but both were repulsed.{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|pp=73}}{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=466–475}}<ref>[https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a324335.pdf] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200126235235/https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a324335.pdf|date=2020-01-26|df=dmy-all}}"The experience represents one of the most humiliating failures in israeli modern history .. Analysis reveals there were three main factors that led to this stunning defeat."</ref>

===Egypt's trapped Third Army===
Kissinger found out about the Third Army's encirclement shortly thereafter.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=465}} Kissinger considered that the situation presented the United States with a tremendous opportunity and that Egypt was dependent on the United States to prevent Israel from destroying its trapped army. The position could be parlayed later into allowing the United States to [[mediation|mediate]] in the dispute and wean Egypt from Soviet influence. As a result, the United States exerted tremendous pressure on the Israelis to refrain from destroying the trapped army, even threatening to support a UN resolution demanding that the Israelis withdraw to their 22 October positions if they did not allow non-military supplies to reach the army. In a phone call with Israeli ambassador [[Simcha Dinitz]], Kissinger told the ambassador that the destruction of the Egyptian Third Army "is an option that does not exist."{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=487}}

The Israeli government also had its own motivations for not destroying the Third Army. These included the possibility of using the encircled Third Army as a bargaining chip for ending the Egyptian blockade of the Bab-el-Mandel Straits in the Red Sea and negotiating a repatriation of Israeli prisoners-of-war captured by Egypt. The exhausted state of the IDF, the possibility that humiliating Egypt by destroying the Third Army would make Sadat more bellicose and unwilling to cease hostilities, and Israel's intense fears that the Soviet Union would militarily intervene in the event the Third Army was destroyed were additional reasons for Israel ultimately deciding against destroying it.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Winokur |first1=Talia |date=27 February 2009 |title='The Soviets were just an excuse': why Israel did not destroy the Egyptian Third Army |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14682740802573458 |journal=[[Cold War History (journal)|Cold War History]] |volume=9 |issue=1 |pages=59–78 |doi=10.1080/14682740802573458 |s2cid=154527628 |access-date=19 February 2023}}</ref>

Despite being surrounded, the Third Army managed to maintain its combat integrity east of the canal and keep up its defensive positions, to the surprise of many.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=74}} According to [[Trevor N. Dupuy]], the Israelis, Soviets and Americans overestimated the vulnerability of the Third Army at the time. It was not on the verge of collapse, and he wrote that while a renewed Israeli offensive would probably overcome it, this was not a certainty.<ref>Dupuy, pp. 543–545, 589.</ref>

David T. Buckwalter agrees that despite the isolation of the Third Army, it was unclear if the Israelis could have protected their forces on the west bank of the canal from a determined Egyptian assault and still maintain sufficient strength along the rest of the front.<ref name="The 1973 Arab-Israeli War">David T. Buckwalter, [https://web.archive.org/web/20040628000145/http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/1973.pdf The 1973 Arab–Israeli War.]</ref> This assessment was challenged by [[Patrick Seale]], who stated that the Third Army was "on the brink of collapse".<ref name="Seale">{{cite book |last1=Seale |first1=Patrick |last2=McConville |first2=Maureen |title=The Struggle for the Middle East |date=1988 |publisher=University of California Press |location=Berkeley |isbn=978-0-520-06976-3 |page=227 |edition=Revision 1995 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6D9EiJKRTHcC&pg=PA213}}</ref> Seale's position was supported by P.R. Kumaraswamy, who wrote that intense American pressure prevented the Israelis from annihilating the stranded Third Army.<ref name="Kumaraswamy">{{cite book|last1=Kumaraswamy|first1=P. R.|title=Revisiting the Yom Kippur War|date=2000|publisher=Psychology Press|isbn=978-0-313-31302-8|page=1|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=z58nmWqS94MC}}</ref>

Herzog noted that given the Third Army's desperate situation, in terms of being cut off from re-supply and reassertion of Israeli air superiority, the destruction of the Third Army was inevitable and could have been achieved within a very brief period.{{sfnp|Herzog|1982|p=283}} Shazly himself described the Third Army's plight as "desperate" and classified its encirclement as a "catastrophe that was too big to hide".{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=293}} He further noted that, "the fate of the Egyptian Third Army was in the hands of Israel. Once the Third Army was encircled by Israeli troops every bit of bread to be sent to our men was paid for by meeting Israeli demands."{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=323}}

Shortly before the ceasefire came into effect, an Israeli tank battalion advanced into Adabiya, and took it with support from the [[Israeli Navy]]. Some 1,500 Egyptian prisoners were taken, and about a hundred Egyptian soldiers assembled just south of Adabiya, where they held out against the Israelis. The Israelis also conducted their third and final incursion into Suez. They made some gains, but failed to break into the city center. As a result, the city was partitioned down the main street, with the Egyptians holding the city center and the Israelis controlling the outskirts, port installations and oil refinery, effectively surrounding the Egyptian defenders.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}<ref name=almog>{{cite magazine |last=Almog |first=Zeev |date=May 2011 |magazine=Military and Strategic Affairs |volume=3 |number=1 |pages=29–43 |issn=2307-793X |publisher=[[Institute for National Security Studies (Israel)]] |url=https://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/(FILE)1308129507.pdf |title=Israeli Naval Power: An Essential Factor in the Operational Battlefield |access-date=8 February 2012 }}</ref>

===Post-war battles===
On the morning of 26 October, the Egyptian Third Army violated the ceasefire by attempting to break through the surrounding Israeli forces. The attack was repulsed by Israeli air and ground forces.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-77.pdf |title=Department of State Operations Center, Situation Report in the Middle East as of 10/26/73 |access-date=22 October 2011}}</ref> The Egyptians also made minor gains in attacks against Sharon's forces in the Ismailia area.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}} The Israelis reacted by bombing and shelling priority targets in Egypt, including command posts and water reserves.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=486}} The front was quieter in the Second Army's sector in the northern canal area, where both sides generally respected the ceasefire.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{page needed|date=December 2024}}

Though most heavy fighting ended on 28 October, the fighting never stopped until 18 January 1974. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan stated that: 
{{blockquote|The cease-fire existed on paper, but the continued firing along the front was not the only characteristic of the situation between 24 October 1973 and 18 January 1974. This intermediate period also held the ever-present possibility of a renewal of full-scale war. There were three variations on how it might break out, two Egyptian and one Israeli. One Egyptian plan was to attack Israeli units west of the canal from the direction of Cairo. The other was to cut off the Israeli canal bridgehead by a link-up of the Second and Third Armies on the east bank. Both plans were based on massive artillery pounding of Israeli forces, who were not well fortified and who would suffer heavy casualties. It was therefore thought that Israel would withdraw from the west bank, since she was most sensitive on the subject of soldiers' lives. Egypt, at the time had a total of 1,700 first-line tanks on both sides of the canal front, 700 on the east bank and 1,000 on the west bank. Also on the west bank, in the second line, were an additional 600 tanks for the defense of Cairo. She had some 2,000 artillery pieces, about 500 operational aircraft, and at least 130 SAM missile batteries positioned around our forces so as to deny us air support.<ref>{{cite book |last=Dayan |first=Moshe |title=Story of My Life |publisher=Da Capo |year=1992 |page=568}}</ref>}}

The IDF acknowledged the loss of 14 soldiers during this postwar period. Egyptian losses were higher, especially in the sector controlled by Ariel Sharon, who ordered his troops to respond with massive firepower to any Egyptian provocation.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=493}} Some aerial battles took place, and the Israelis also shot down several helicopters attempting to resupply the Third Army.{{sfnp|Aloni|2001}}{{page needed|date=January 2025}}

===Final situation on the Egyptian front===
By the end of the war, the Israelis had advanced to positions some 101 kilometres from Egypt's capital, Cairo, and occupied 1,600 square kilometres west of the Suez Canal.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=477}} They had also cut the Cairo–Suez road and encircled the bulk of Egypt's Third Army. The Israelis had also taken many prisoners after Egyptian soldiers, including many officers, began surrendering in masses towards the end of the war.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=467}} The Egyptians held a narrow strip on the east bank of the canal, occupying some 1,200 square kilometres of the Sinai.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=467}} One source estimated that the Egyptians had 70,000 men, 720 tanks and 994 artillery pieces on the east bank of the canal.{{sfnp|Neff|1988|p=306}} However, 30,000 to 45,000 of them were now encircled by the Israelis.{{sfnp|Johnson|Tierney|2009|p=176}}{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=295}}

Despite Israel's tactical successes west of the canal, the Egyptian military was reformed and organized. Consequently, according to [[Mohamed Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy|Gamasy]], the Israeli military position became "weak" for different reasons:

{{blockquote|One, Israel now had a large force (about six or seven brigades) in a very limited area of land, surrounded from all sides either by natural or man-made barriers, or by the Egyptian forces. This put it in a weak position. Moreover, there were the difficulties in supplying this force, in evacuating it, in the lengthy communication lines, and in the daily attrition in men and equipment. Two, to protect these troops, the Israeli command had to allocate other forces (four or five brigades) to defend the entrances to the breach at the Deversoir. Three, to immobilize the Egyptian bridgeheads in Sinai the Israeli command had to allocate ten brigades to face the Second and Third army bridgeheads. In addition, it became necessary to keep the strategic reserves at their maximum state of alert. Thus, Israel was obliged to keep its armed force—and consequently the country—mobilized for a long period, at least until the war came to an end, because the ceasefire did not signal the end of the war. There is no doubt that this was in total conflict with its military theories.{{sfnp|el-Gamasy|1993|p=302}}}}

Egypt wished to end the war when it realized that the IDF canal crossing offensive could result in a catastrophe.{{sfnp|Morris|2011|p=436}} The Egyptians' besieged Third Army could not hold on without supply.{{sfnmp|Morris|2011|1p=437|Shazly|2003|2p=323}} The Israeli Army advanced to 100&nbsp;km from Cairo, which worried Egypt.{{sfnp|Morris|2011|p=437}} The Israeli army had open terrain and no opposition to advance further to Cairo; had they done so, Sadat's rule might have ended.<ref name="Stein1999p87" />