Editing World War I reparations (section)

==German reaction==
{{Main|Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles}}
[[File:Mass demonstration in front of the Reichstag against the Treaty of Versailles.jpg|thumb|right|Demonstration against the Treaty of Versailles, in front of the [[Reichstag building|Reichstag]].]]

In February 1919, [[Minister for Foreign Affairs (Germany)|Foreign Minister]] [[Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau|Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau]] informed the [[Weimar National Assembly]] that Germany would have to pay reparations for the devastation caused by the war, but would not pay for actual war costs.{{sfn|Young|2006|pp=133–135}} After the drafting of the Treaty of Versailles on 7 May that year, the German and Allied delegations met and the treaty was handed over to be translated and for a response to be issued. At this meeting Brockdorff-Rantzau stated, "We know the intensity of the hatred which meets us, and we have heard the victors' passionate demand that as the vanquished we shall be made to pay, and as the guilty we shall be punished". However, he proceeded to deny that Germany was solely responsible for the war.{{sfn|Young|2006|pp=135–136}}

Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles was not correctly translated. Instead of stating "...&nbsp;Germany accepts responsibility of Germany and her allies causing all the loss and damage&nbsp;...", the German Government's edition reads, "Germany admits it, that Germany and her allies, as authors of the war, are responsible for all losses and damages&nbsp;...".{{sfn|Binkley|Mahr|1926|pp=399–400}} This resulted in a prevailing belief of humiliation among Germans; the article was seen as an injustice and there was a view that Germany had signed "away her honor".{{sfn|Morrow|2005|p=290}}{{sfn|Binkley|Mahr|1926|p=400}} Despite the public outrage, German government officials were aware "that Germany's position on this matter was not nearly so favorable as the imperial government had led the German public to believe during the war".{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|pp=537–538}} Politicians seeking international sympathy would continue to use the article for its propaganda value, persuading many who had not read the treaties that the article implied full war guilt.{{sfn|Marks|1978|pp=231–232}} German revisionist historians who later tried to ignore the validity of the clause found a ready audience among revisionist writers in France, Britain, and the US.{{sfn|Bell|1997|p=21}} The objective of both the politicians and historians was to prove that Germany was not solely guilty for causing the war; this was with the idea that, if that guilt could be disproved, the legal requirement to pay reparations would disappear.{{sfn|Albrecht-Carrié|1940|p=15}}