Editing Winter War (section)

===Shelling of Mainila and Soviet intentions===
{{Main|Shelling of Mainila}}

On 26 November 1939, an incident was reported near the Soviet village of [[Mainila]], near the border with Finland. A Soviet border guard post had been shelled by an unknown party resulting, according to Soviet reports, in the deaths of four and injuries of nine border guards. Research conducted by several Finnish and Russian historians later concluded that the shelling was a [[false flag]] operation since there were no artillery units there, and it was carried out from the Soviet side of the border by an NKVD unit with the purpose of providing the Soviets with a ''[[casus belli]]'' and a pretext to withdraw from the non-aggression pact.<ref name="Ries1988_77-78">[[#Ries1988|Ries (1988)]], pp. 77–78</ref><ref>[[#murphy2021|Murphy (2021)]], p. 9</ref>{{refn|The Soviet role is confirmed in [[Nikita Khrushchev]]'s memoirs, which states that Artillery Marshal [[Grigory Kulik]] had personally supervised the bombardment of the Soviet village.<ref name="Edwards_105">[[#Edwards2006|Edwards (2006)]], p. 105</ref><ref name="Turtola1999a_44-45">[[#Turtola1999a|Turtola (1999a)]], pp. 44–45</ref>|group="F"}} Soviet war games held in March 1938 and 1939 had been based on a scenario in which border incidents taking place at the village of Mainila would spark the war.<ref>{{cite book |last=Leskinen | first=Jari |trans-title=Hushed bridge of Finland |title=Vaiettu Suomen silta |year=1997 |pages=406–407 |trans-chapter=Blockade of the Gulf of Finland and the Soviet Union |chapter=Suomenlahden sulku ja Neuvostoliitto |language=fi |isbn=951-710-050-7 |publisher=Hakapaino Oy |location=Helsinki}}</ref>

[[File:Press at Mainila.jpg|thumb|29 November 1939, foreign [[journalists]] at Mainila, where a [[Shelling of Mainila|border incident between Finland and the Soviet Union]] escalated into the Winter War.|alt=A group of foreign journalists observes something during snowfall in Mainila, where a border incident between Finland and the Soviet Union escalated into the Winter War.]]

Molotov claimed that the incident was a Finnish artillery attack. He demanded that Finland apologise for the incident and to move its forces beyond a line {{convert|20|-|25|km|mi|abbr=on}} from the border.<ref>[[#Tanner1950|Tanner (1950)]], pp. 85–86</ref> Finland denied responsibility for the attack, rejected the demands and called for a joint Finnish–Soviet commission to examine the incident. In turn, the Soviet Union claimed that the Finnish response was hostile, renounced the non-aggression pact and severed diplomatic relations with Finland on 28 November. In the following years, [[Soviet historiography]] described the incident as Finnish provocation. Doubt on the official Soviet version was cast only in the late 1980s, during the policy of ''[[glasnost]]''. The issue has continued to divide Russian historiography even after the [[end of the Soviet Union]] in 1991.<ref name="Kilin2007a_99-100">[[#Kilin2007a|Kilin (2007a)]], pp. 99–100</ref><ref>[[#Aptekar|Aptekar (2009)]]</ref>

====Soviet intentions====
In 2013, Russian President [[Vladimir Putin]] stated at a meeting with military historians that the Soviets had launched the Winter War to "correct mistakes" made in determining the border with Finland after 1917.<ref>[[#Yle2013|Yle News (2013)]]</ref> Opinion on the scale of the initial Soviet invasion decision is divided. The puppet Finnish communist government and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact's secret protocol is used as proof that the Soviet Union had intended to conquer all of Finland.{{refn|See the following sources:<ref name=":0"/><ref name=":1"/><ref name=":2"/><ref name=":3"/><ref name=":4"/>|group="F"}}

On 1 December 1939, the Soviet Union formed a [[puppet government]], named the [[Finnish Democratic Republic]], to govern Finland after Soviet conquest.{{refn|See the following sources:<ref>[[#Tanner1950|Tanner (1950)]], p. 114</ref><ref>[[#Trotter2002|Trotter (2002)]], pp. 58, 61</ref><ref>[[#Kokoshin1998|Kokoshin (1998)]], p. 93</ref><ref name=Killham>[[#Killham1993|Killham (1993)]], p. 78</ref>|group="F"}} A declaration delivered via [[TASS]] stated:

{{Blockquote|The People's Government in its present composition regards itself as a provisional government. Immediately upon arrival in Helsinki, capital of the country, it will be reorganised and its composition enlarged by the inclusion of representatives of the various parties and groups participating in the people's front of toilers.<ref>[[#Coates1940|Coates (1940)]]</ref>}}

Soviet leaflets dropped over Helsinki on the first day of the war stated: "Finnish Comrades! We come to you not as conquerors, but as liberators of the Finnish people from the oppression of the capitalists and the landlords".<ref>[[#Elliston1940|Elliston (1940)]], p. 237</ref><ref>[[#Sander2013|Sander (2013)]], pp. 38, 39</ref>

In 1939, Soviet military leadership had formulated a realistic and comprehensive plan for the occupation of Finland.<ref>[[#Nenye2015|Nenye (2015)]], p. 50</ref> However, Joseph Stalin was not pleased with the conservative pace that the operation required and demanded new plans be drawn up. With the new plans, the key deadline for Finland's capitulation was to be Stalin's 60th birthday on 21 December.<ref>[[#Nenye2015|Nenye (2015)]], pp. 50, 51</ref> Convinced of the invasion's forthcoming success, [[Andrei Zhdanov]], chairman of the highest legislative body in the Soviet Union, commissioned a celebratory piece of music from [[Dmitri Shostakovich]], ''[[Suite on Finnish Themes]]'', intended to be performed as the marching bands of the Red Army paraded through Helsinki.<ref name="Edwards_98">[[#Edwards2006|Edwards (2006)]], p. 98</ref><ref>[[#Nenye2015|Nenye (2015)]], p. 51</ref>  The Soviets were confident that the Western powers would not come to Finland's aid. Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador to the UK, said: "Who would help? The Swedes? The British? The Americans? There's no way in hell. There will be a fuss in the press, moral support, moaning and whining. But troops, aircraft, cannons, and machine guns – no."<ref>Rentola K. (2016): Stalin ja Suomen kohtalo. Otava, Helsinki.</ref>

Hungarian historian István Ravasz wrote that the [[Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Soviet Central Committee]] had set out in 1939 that the former borders of the Tsarist Empire were to be restored, including Finland.<ref name=":2"/> American political scientist [[Dan Reiter]] stated that the Soviets "sought to impose a [[regime change]]" and thus "achieve absolute victory". He quoted Molotov, who had commented in November 1939 on the regime change plan to a Soviet ambassador that the new government "will not be Soviet, but one of a democratic republic. Nobody is going to set up Soviets over there, but we hope it will be a government we can come to terms with as to ensure the security of Leningrad".<ref name=":5"/> According to Russian historian [[Yuri Kilin]], the Soviet terms encompassed the strongest fortified approaches of the Finnish defences for a reason. He claimed that Stalin had little hope for such a deal but would play for time for the ongoing mobilisation. He stated the objective as being to secure Finland from being used as a staging ground by means of regime change.<ref>[[#Iltasanomat2019|Iltasanomat (2019)]]</ref>

Others argue against the idea of a complete Soviet conquest. American historian [[William R. Trotter]] asserted that Stalin's objective was to secure Leningrad's flank from a possible German invasion through Finland. He stated that "the strongest argument" against a Soviet intention of full conquest is that it did not happen in either 1939 or during the [[Continuation War]] in 1944 even though Stalin "could have done so with comparative ease".<ref name="Trotter_17"/> Bradley Lightbody wrote that the "entire Soviet aim had been to make the Soviet border more secure".<ref name="Lightbody_55"/> In 2002, Russian historian A. Chubaryan stated that no documents had been found in Russian archives that support a Soviet plan to annex Finland. Rather, the objective was to gain Finnish territory and to reinforce Soviet influence in the region.<ref name=":6"/>

Another American historian [[Stephen Kotkin]] also shares the position that the Soviet Union did not aim for annexation. He points out the different treatment Finland was given, compared to the Baltics: unlike the pacts of mutual assistance that the Baltics were pressured into, resulting in their total Sovietization, the Soviets demanded limited territorial concessions from Finland, and even offered land in return, which would not have made sense if full Sovietization was intended.<ref name="Kotkin_966_974">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 966, 974</ref> And according to Kotkin, Stalin seemed to be genuinely interested in reaching an agreement during the negotiations: he had personally attended six of the seven meetings with the Finns, and had multiple times reduced his demands.<ref name="Kotkin_974_975">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 974-975</ref> However, mutual mistrust and misunderstandings would mar the negotiations, producing an impasse.<ref name="Kotkin_961_974"/>