Editing Will (philosophy) (section)

==Kant==
[[File:Immanuel Kant portrait c1790.jpg|thumb|Immanuel Kant considered the will to be guided by laws and maxims]]
Immanuel Kant's theory of the will consists of the will being guided subjectively by maxims and objectively via laws. The former, maxims, are precepts.<ref name=":02">{{Cite book|last=Kant|first=Immanuel|url=https://kantwesley.com/Kant/CritiqueOfPracicalReason.pdf|title=The Critique of Practical Reason|year=2019|pages=29|translator-last=Rudisill|translator-first=Philip McPherson|orig-year=1788}}</ref> On the other hand, laws are objective, apprehended ''a priori''—prior to experience.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kant|first=Immanuel|url=https://kantwesley.com/Kant/CritiqueOfPracicalReason.pdf|title=The Critique of Practical Reason|year=2019|pages=29|translator-last=Rudisill|translator-first=Philip McPherson|orig-year=1788}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.thefreedictionary.com/a+priori|title=A priori|website=The Free Dictionary|access-date=10 February 2020}}</ref> In other words, Kant's belief in the ''a priori'' proposes that the will is subject to a before-experience practical law—this is, according to Kant in the ''Critique of Practical Reason'', when the law is seen as "valid for the will of every rational being",<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kant|first=Immanuel|url=https://kantwesley.com/Kant/CritiqueOfPracicalReason.pdf|title=The Critique of Practical Reason|year=2019|pages=17|translator-last=Rudisill|translator-first=Philip McPherson|orig-year=1788}}</ref> which is also termed as "universal laws"<ref>{{Cite book|last=Watson|first=John|title=The Philosophy of Kant Explained|publisher=Maclehose & Sons|year=1908|location=Glasgow|pages=350}}</ref>

Nonetheless, there is a hierarchy of what covers a person individually versus a group of people. Specifically, laws determine the will to conform to the maxims before experience is had on behalf of the subject in question.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kant|first=Immanuel|url=https://kantwesley.com/Kant/CritiqueOfPracicalReason.pdf|title=Critique of Pure Reason|year=2019|pages=39|translator-last=Rudisill|translator-first=Philip McPherson|orig-year=1788}}</ref> Maxims, as mentioned, only deal with what one subjectively considers.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kant|first=Immanuel|url=https://kantwesley.com/Kant/CritiqueOfPracticalReason.pdf|title=Critique of Practical Reason|year=2019|pages=29|translator-last=Rudisill|translator-first=Philip McPherson|orig-year=1788}}</ref>

This hierarchy exists as a result of a universal law constituted of multi-faceted parts from various individuals (people's maxims) not being feasible.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kant|first=Immanuel|title=Critique of Practical Reason|year=2019|pages=33|translator-last=Rudisill|translator-first=Philip McPherson|orig-year=1788}}</ref>

Because of the guidance by the universal law that guides maxims, an individual's will is free. Kant's theory of the will does not advocate for [[determinism]] on the ground that the laws of nature on which determinism is based prompts for an individual to have only one course of action—whatever nature's prior causes trigger an individual to do.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kohl|first=Markus|year=2015|title=Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative|journal=Ethics|volume=125|issue=2|pages=331–356|doi=10.1086/678370|s2cid=143461907}}</ref> On the other hand, Kant's [[categorical imperative]] provides "objective ''oughts"'',<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kohl|first=Markus|year=2015|title=Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative|journal=Ethics|volume=125|issue=2|pages=332|doi=10.1086/678370|s2cid=143461907}}</ref> which exert influence over us ''a priori'' if we have the power to accept or defy them.<ref name=":110">{{Cite journal|last=Kohl|first=Markus|year=2019|title=Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative|url=http://content.ebscohost.com/ContentServer.asp?T=P&P=AN&K=PHL2236302&S=R&D=pif&EbscoContent=dGJyMNHr7ESep7Q4xNvgOLCmsEiep7FSrqy4SbaWxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGqtk%2B3rK5MuePfgeyx44Dt6fIA|journal=Ethics|volume=125|pages=337|via=Ebsco}}</ref> Nonetheless, if we do not have the opportunity to decide between the right and the wrong option in regard to the universal law, in the course of which our will is free, then natural causes have led us to one decision without any alternative options.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kohl|first=Markus|year=2019|title=Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative|url=http://content.ebscohost.com/ContentServer.asp?T=P&P=AN&K=PHL2236302&S=R&D=pif&EbscoContent=dGJyMMvl7ESep7U4xNvgOLCmsEieprJSs6i4TLGWxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGqtk%2B3rK5MuePfgeyx44Dt6fIA|journal=Ethics|volume=125|pages=337–338|via=Ebsco}}</ref>

There are some objections posited against Kant's view. For instance, in Kohl's essay "Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative", there is the question about the imperfect will, if one's will compels them to obey the universal law, but not for "recognizing the law's force of reason."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kohl|first=Markus|year=2019|title=Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative|url=http://content.ebscohost.com/ContentServer.asp?T=P&P=AN&K=PHL2236302&S=R&D=pif&EbscoContent=dGJyMMvl7ESep7U4xNvgOLCmsEieprJSs6i4TLGWxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGqtk%2B3rK5MuePfgeyx44Dt6fIA|journal=Ethics|volume=125|page=338|via=Ebsco}}</ref> To this, Kant would describe the agent's will as "impotent rather than... imperfect since... the right reasons cannot [compel] her to act."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kohl|first=Markus|year=2019|title=Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative|url=http://content.ebscohost.com/ContentServer.asp?T=P&P=AN&K=PHL2236302&S=R&D=pif&EbscoContent=dGJyMMvl7ESep7U4xNvgOLCmsEieprJSs6i4TLGWxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGqtk%2B3rK5MuePfgeyx44Dt6fIA|journal=Ethics|volume=125|pages=338|via=Ebsco}}</ref>[[File:John Stuart Mill by London Stereoscopic Company, c1870.jpg|thumb|256x256px|John Stuart Mill proposed a version of the will congruent with his ethics of utilitarianism]]
Besides the objections in Kohl's essay, [[John Stuart Mill]] had another version of the will, as written in his [[Utilitarianism (book)|''Utilitarianism'']] book. John Stuart Mill, as his ethical theory runs, proposes the will operates in the same fashion, that is following the greatest happiness principle: actions are morally right as long as they advocate for happiness and morally wrong if they advocate for pain<ref name=":182">{{Cite book|last=Mill|first=John Stuart|title=Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society|publisher=University of Toronto|year=1969|isbn=0-8020-1521-2|editor-last=Robson|editor-first=J.M.|location=Toronto|pages=210, 238–239}}</ref> The will is demonstrated when someone executes their goals without pleasure from incentivizing their contemplation or the end of fulfilling them, and he or she continues to act according to his or her goals,<ref name=":182" /> even if the emotions one had felt in the beginning of fulfilling their goals has decreased over time, whether it be from changes in their personality or desires, or their goals become counterbalanced by the pains of trying to fulfill them.<ref name=":182" /> Also, John Stuart Mill mentioned that the process of using one's will can become unnoticeable.<ref name=":182" /> This is a consequence of habit making volition—the act "of choosing or determining"<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/volition|title=Definition of VOLITION|website=www.merriam-webster.com|language=en|access-date=2020-02-21}}</ref>—second nature.<ref name=":182" /> Sometimes, using the will, according to Mill, becomes so habitual that it opposes any deliberate contemplation of one's options.<ref name=":182" /> This, he believes, is commonplace among those who have sinister, harmful habits.<ref name=":182" />

Although the will can seem to become second nature because of habit, that is not always the case since the habit is changeable to the will, and the "will is [changeable] to habit."<ref name=":182" /> This could happen when one wills away from habit what he or she no longer desires for their self,<ref name=":182" /> or one could desire from willing to desire something.<ref name=":182" /> In the case of someone who does not have a virtuous will, Mill recommends to make that individual "''desire'' virtue".<ref name=":182" /> In this, Mill means desiring virtue because of the pleasure it brings over the pain that not having it would bring, in accordance with the greatest happiness principle: actions are morally right as long as they advocate for happiness and morally wrong if they advocate for pain.<ref name=":182" /> Then, one has to routinely "will what is right"<ref name=":182" /> in order to make their will instrumental in achieving more pleasure than pain.<ref name=":182" />